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ABSTRACT
Income tax expenditures are a significant source of government
indirect aid to the arts, providing over $300 million in publicly-
supported funds to arts institutions in 1973 -- more than one and a half
times the direct aid provided in the same year. Yet, despite the
financial importance of the indirect aid system, its characteristics and
effects are poorly understood.
The tax expenditure in the charitable income tax deduction is the
most important income tax expenditure, and its effects can be assessed
in a variety of ways: The overall incidence of the portion of indirect
aid attributable to income tax deductions is slightly redistributive, but
alternative funding mechanisms are similarly redistributive. Use of the
charitable deduction is linked to the personal preferences and whims of
donors, and since the system is inequitable in its provision of tax
incentives to donors, the system accentuates the tastes of wealthy donors.
Arts institutions, uniquely dependent on the support provided by wealthy
donors, are particularly susceptible to their tax-expenditure-weighted
influence. Even though this funding system is widely believed to be
decentralized, according to most reasonable definitions of decentralization
it is not. In addition, private donors' decisions lead to input and
output distortions in the operation of arts institutions -- distortions
in conflict with accepted public policy for the arts. Furthermore, the
system is not as secure as is widely believed.
The efficiency of the indirect aid system can be improved by the
implementation of an auction to distribute donated gifts of artwork
among museums and, more generally, by sunset legislation or partial
deductions for restricted gifts. Replacement of the charitable deduction
with a matching grant such as a percentage contribution bonus would
improve the equity of the indirect aid system. But only replacement of
the indirect aid system with a direct aid system would lead to a system
which could be easily adjusted and monitored in accordance with
accepted cultural policy.
Thesis Supervisor: Michael O'Hare, Associate Professor
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
Since the creation of the National Endowment for the Arts in 1965,
government funding for the arts in the United States has increased
dramatically. Netzer [98] estimates that in 1965 direct support from all
levels of government totalled $21 million; this rose to $85 million in
1970 and to $282 million in 1975. The budget for the National Endowment
for the Arts alone is $150 million for fiscal 1979 [2], and the total of
all the state arts councils' budgets is $77.6 million [10]. And these
latter figures do not include direct support from a multitude of other
agencies at all levels of government. It is clear that direct aid is an
important component of support for the arts, and each year considerable
effort is spent by the arts community and the government determining the
amounts of direct aid which will be appropriated for the coming year.
But direct aid is only one portion of the total financial support
provided annually to the arts by governments. Far more important, both
in terms of its financial magnitude and its unnoticed, and often harmful,
side-effects, is the indirect aid system. Governments can provide aid
to the arts by offering tax exemptions or by regulating the marketplace in
which artistic activities occur. Charitable income tax deductions, estate
and gift tax exemptions, property tax exemptions, unemployment insurance,
special zoning amendments, and copyright law are among the many ways in
which government can provide aid to the arts without directly writing a
check.1 In 1973 indirect government support of the arts totalled nearly
$500 million; in that same year direct aid was approximately $200 million.
The magnitude of the indirect aid system is particularly significant
from an international perspective. For years the following table has been
circulating through public discussions on arts funding:
Table I.1 Per Capita Government Support for the
Arts in Selected Countries, 1972
Country Per Capita Support
West Germany $2.42
Austria 2.00
Sweden 2.00
Canada 1.40
Israel 1.34
Great Britain 1.23
United States .15
Source: Veronis, "Editorial: Washington Must Do More for the
Arts," Saturday Review -- The Arts, 22 April 1972 [141].
This table is misleading for several reasons. It does not account for
differences in national standards of living. It does not include the
budgets of state arts councils or of any government agencies other than
those designated as the "official" national arts agency. But, most important,
it completely ignores any funding provided by indirect sources of support.
As it happens, the United States relies more heavily on indirect mechanisms
to provide government support to the arts than any other country: the
$500 million in indirect aid identified above adds $2.44 to the per capita
support for the United States. While it is true that other countries also
use indirect aid mechanisms to provide support to the arts, nowhere is its
use as widespread and as financially significant as in the United States. 2
Thus, recognition of the indirect aid system indicates that the United States
is not as parsimonious in its funding of the arts as has commonly been believed.
3As the resources devoted to the arts by governments have increased,
the need for evaluation of public arts programs has correspondingly grown,
particularly as legislatures have conducted their annual reviews of these
programs. The National Endowment for the Arts has created a Research
Division which has begun collecting information on the public policy
implications of arts funding. Most research done to date, however, has
focussed on the direct aid system or on general economic issues unrelated to
government funding. While it is relatively easy to observe the operation
of, and assess the effects of, the direct aid system, the indirect aid
system is not widely understood, is more difficult to manipulate in light
of public policy goals, and is relatively difficult to analyze. This
obscurity has been exacerbated by the fact that legislatures do not have
periodic reviews of the impact of the indirect aid system on arts institu-
tions.
This thesis is an attempt to make sense out of a major segment of the
indirect aid system -- indirect aid attributable to provisions of income
tax law -- by documenting its financial impact and its qualitative effects
on the operation of arts institutions. Previous research on government
funding for the arts has invariably concluded with the predictable plea
for more funding. But such results are not particularly informative. Is
it surprising to learn that the arts would like more support? Cultural
policy would be better informed by research focussed on designing better,
more effective funding mechanisms. While it is true that the government
provides much more of its support for the arts through indirect aid
mechanisms, it is easy to become blinded by that fact and overlook the
4serious effects of supporting the arts in that way. Thus, in this thesis
I sidestep entirely the question "How much aid should the arts get?"
and focus instead on the equally important question, "However much aid
they get, how should it be provided?"
Similarly, I do not debate the more general question "Should govern-
ment be in the business of supporting the arts at all?" Whether or not this
question has received a satisfactory philosophical answer, it has been
resolved de facto -- government support for the arts in the United States is
well established.
In this thesis I take a close look at the indirect aid linked to the
definition and collection of income taxes in the United States. The income
tax system provides several types of indirect aid to the arts:
- Individual and corporate charitable income tax deductions.
- Capital gains taxes foregone on gifts of appreciated property.
- Income tax exemptions for foundations and arts institutions.
These sources of indirect aid occur at both the Federal and state levels
and have different characteristics at each of those levels. I describe
each of these sources of indirect aid, measure their incidence, and assess
the net effect which they have on the operation of arts institutions.
I focus on the income tax segment of the indirect aid system for
several reasons:
- Income tax law is the largest source of financial indirect aid:
of the $500 million in indirect aid, $313 is directly attributable
to provisions in income tax law.
5- Of all the types of indirect aid, income tax expenditures are
the type for which the best data are available. The economic
analysis can proceed further than with other types of indirect
aid. (This is not to say that the data are perfect or complete.
Much of the analysis, by necessity, rests on inference and
generalization.)
- In recent years income tax law has come under regular review and
a number of reforms have been considered. Yet, the impact of these
reforms on the arts (and on charitable institutions as a whole)
has often been overlooked. Therefore, a consideration of these
issues can make an immediate contribution to discussions about
the equity and efficiency of income tax law.
At the center of indirect income tax support for the arts is the
charitable contribution deduction, and it is the focus for much of the
analysis which follows. Charitable contributions for the arts are the
results of hundreds of thousands of private decisions made by individuals,
corporations, or foundations. Each of these contributions is the result of
the economic incentives provided by the indirect aid system and the donor's
own tastes and preferences. Each contribution reflects the donor's answer
to three questions:
- How much money shall I give?
- To whom?
- With what stipulations?
To assess adequately the effects which private charitable contributions have
had on arts institutions and the role which indirect aid plays in that
6transaction, it is necessary to describe how donors as a group have tended
to answer these questions.
Chapter II summarizes, as well as available data permit, donors'
answers to the first two questions. Particular attention is paid to
estimating the government's share in the charitable contribution.
Chapter III looks at the first question in a slightly different way; it
measures the incidence of the indirect aid attributable to the income tax
system and compares it to the overall incidence of arts support. Chapter IV
gives an alternative view of donors' answers to the second question; it
considers the traditional argument that one of the benefits of the charitable
deduction is that it decentralizes decisionmaking and assesses the degree
to which the current system is actually decentralized. Chapter V focusses
on donors' answers to the third question, emphasizing the restrictions
donors place on their gifts and the net effects of these restrictions.
Chapter VI considers a more general argument in favor of indirect support of
charitable institutions -- that that aid is more secure than direct aid --
and views that argument in light of recent changes in tax law. And finally,
Chapter VII, using the results of the previous chapters, suggests ways the
operation of the indirect aid system can be improved to better meet public
policy goals in the arts.
CHAPTER II: DESCRIPTION -- HOW INCOME TAX LAW PROVIDES
INDIRECT FINANCIAL AID TO THE ARTS
Income tax law includes several important mechanisms by which
governments provide indirect aid in the form of foregone taxes to
charitable institutions, including arts institutions. They are chari-
table income tax deductions and capital gains taxes foregone, both of
which provide benefits directly to donors and indirectly to charitable
institutions, and income tax exemptions for foundations and the chari-
table institutions themselves. The effects of these mechanisms are
quite extensive; all of these mechanisms exist at both the Federal
and state levels, and the first two are available both to individuals
and to corporations.
While it is clear these tax provisions affect the operation of
charitable institutions, it is not obvious that the taxes which are
foregone by the government when it creates certain exceptions to tax
law ought to be considered "government aid." A theoretical framework
on which to base such an assertion is necessary. In this chapter I
describe "tax expenditure analysis," the conceptual framework upon
which much of my analysis is based, and discuss several criticisms of
this concept. Then, using the tax expenditure perspective, I describe
how various income tax law provisions provide indirect government aid
to the arts and estimate the amount of financial aid associated with
each of these provisions.
The results of this estimation are very revealing and establish
the importance of the indirect aid system as a source of support for
the arts. In 1973 income tax provisions generated $313 million in
indirect aid to the arts. Table II.1 summarizes the financial impor-
tance of the various sources of indirect aid that will be discussed in
this chapter.
Indirect Aid Provided to Culture Through
Income Tax Provisions, 1973
Tax Provision
Federal Income Tax:
Individual Charitable Contributions
Corporate Charitable Contributions
State Income Tax:
Individual Charitable Contributions
Corporate Charitable Contributions
Other:
Charitable Contributions Made
Through Private Foundations
TOTAL
Source: Table 11.8
Amount ($ millions)
$208
64
12
5
24
$313
Netzer [98] has estimated that direct government support of the arts
totaled $85 million in 1970 and $282 million in 1975. Extrapolating
from these figures, direct government aid provided approximately
$200 million to the arts in 1973. Thus, in that year the indirect aid
which was provided through income tax provisions was one and a half times
the direct aid.1
Table 11.1
Tax Expenditures
Governments can subsidize many activities by failing to collect all
or part of a tax just as they can by making out a check. But in order
to identify which tax provisions subsidize arts institutions and artists
and to estimate the financial impact of the benefits, these provisions
must be separated from the tax-base-defining and other revenue-raising
provisions in the various tax laws. Unfortunately, few subsidy pro-
visions sport a subsidy label. Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of
the Treasury for Tax Policy in the Johnson administration, made the
first systematic list of subsidy provisions in the income tax and
estimated their cost to the government [115]. He named the result a
"tax expenditure budget," and I adopt this nomenclature to refer to
tax subsidies.
Basically, tax expenditure analysis calculates government taxes
foregone as the result of a given tax provision and considers this
amount the first-order cost to the government, and to the public in
general, of encouraging the particular behavior resulting from the tax
benefit. In other words, the analysis helps explain the government's
financial share in the tax benefit transaction. When a special tax
provision is analyzed as a tax expenditure, it can be thought of as if
it had been a two-step transaction: (i) the taxpayer pays the tax he
would have paid in the absence of the special provision and (ii) receives
a grant back from the government for that dollar amount when he completes
the action for which the tax incentive has been provided.
The tax expenditure perspective is helpful in determining whether
the tax provision under consideration has desirable side effects, is
efficient, and is equitable. Revealing the subsidy nature of tax
provisions often proves to be enlightening or disturbing, and this is
no less true of the arts sector than of any other sector of our economy
supported in whole or in part through tax expenditures.
The tax provision on which most of this study focusses is the
charitable deduction in the Federal income tax. Consider a simple
illustration of its operation:
A family in the 25 percent marginal tax bracket wishes to
donate $300 to the local opera company. Because the opera
company qualifies as an eligible charitable recipient, the
family may be able to reduce its total tax burden or, equiv-
alently, have the government help in providing part of the
cost of the donation. The family sends a check for $300 to
the opera. At the end of the year the family calculates its
income tax liability. If it is advantageous to the family to
itemize its deductions, the family deducts the $300 charitable
contribution from its taxable income. As a result, either the
government refunds $75 previously withheld in taxes or the
family remits to the government $75 less than it otherwise
would pay as its income tax liability.
The $75 is a tax expenditure -- the government's financial share in the
transaction.
Presenting this transaction as if it were accomplished through the
direct aid system provides a sharper view of the charitable contribution
benefits offered by the tax law. We substitute for the tax provision a
government agency authorized to match taxpayers' contributions according
to the marginal tax rates paid by the donor: in this model, the family
wishing to augment its donation to the opera contacts the government
matching grant office with proof of a donation of $225 to the opera, and
the agency then sends the opera an additional $75. The same government
agency would send more money if the family were in a higher tax bracket:
at a 70 percent marginal tax rate a contribution of $225 would generate
a matching grant -- or, equivalently, a tax expenditure -- of $525,
increasing the total received by the opera to $750. (For this donor a
contribution of only $90 would be needed to produce a total gift of
$300 to the opera since the matching agency would then provide $210.)
And last and least, the agency would provide no matching money for a
contribution by a taxpayer who does not itemize.
The same idea can be treated from a societal perspective. Consider
a government that raises its current budget through a tax system that
includes no charitable deduction: In this system, if an individual
wishes to donate $300 to the opera he can do so with $300 of after-tax
income. If a tax provision allowing deductibility of the opera contri-
bution is then introduced and the individual donor in the 25 percent
marginal tax bracket still wishes to channel $300 to the opera (as in
the example above), he deducts the gift and pays $75 less in taxes.
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To allow this to happen the government has to raise $75 in additional
taxes to make up for the loss in tax revenues -- perhaps by raising
everyone's taxes -- or cut back $75 worth of services which it previously
provided. In either event the tax expenditure costs $75, whether it is
paid for by increasing taxes, by foregoing some government service, or
by forcing the budget to run a $75 deficit imposing this cost on the
population by way of inflation.2
Even though some people or institutions will have more money and
others less when certain tax provisions are in effect than they would
have were they repealed or changed, this recognition of cost does not
mean they are bad laws. But to decide whether to continue existing
tax expenditures or institute new ones, we will certainly want to treat
them as the optional features of tax law that they are, and do the
best we can estimating their costs.
I have found the tax expenditure approach a useful one in analyzing
the interplay of tax law and arts aid. Others, doubtless, do not agree.
Tax expenditure analysis has been subjected to a variety of criticisms.
In general, they are of three types -- ideological, definitional, and
computational -- and each deserves attention.
The most common ideological attack on tax expenditure analysis is
expressed as a fear that the proponents of this type of analysis assume
that the taxes not collected as a result of the special provision
"belong" to the government and only the government can appropriately
13
decide how to allocate or spend them. These critics assert that a dollar
of income belongs to the individual who earned it without any (real
or imputed) tax liability to the government and that tax expenditure
analysis treats it as coming to the individual on government sufferance.
Sometimes this criticism is coupled with concern that repeal of special
tax provisions will increase tax revenues and encourage government
spending.
The ideological criticism, focussed as it is on who "owns" income,
is misleading because it fails to confront the crucial issue of how
changes in tax law affect the flow of support to certain activities. We
can expect income as earned to be subjected to Federal income tax for
the foreseeable future. It is more realistic to view a dollar of income
as encumbered by a tax liability on its receipt than to think of it as
"owned" in full by the earner; indeed, the current system of withholding
taxes at the source of income should dispel any illusion that the earner
can dispose of all his income as he wishes without taking that liability
into account. Without any need to assess the rightness or wrongness of
this arrangement, tax expenditure analysis explores the implications of
altering the tax liability under certain conditions.
Perhaps these critics are disturbed in part by the fact that tax
expenditure analysis sets up a "straw man" in the form of the direct
aid equivalent of the tax provision as though it were the only logical
alternative to the tax provision. Yet tax expenditure analysis does not
presuppose the replacement of tax expenditures with direct programs.
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The substitution of matching grants or tax credits has been advocated in
certain situations; in other cases, more direct programs have been sug-
gested; and in still other cases it may be in society's best interest
to maintain and strengthen the tax expenditure system itself.
Both historical and legal precedent favor the characterization of
tax provisions as government subsidies. Advocates and opponents of
special tax benefits often state expressly that the purpose of the pro-
vision is to subsidize a particular activity or group. The legislative
history of many tax expenditures reveals that many tax provisions, when
first proposed, were so considered. For other provisions, even where
the historical record is ambiguous, the case for continuation of the
tax expenditure has been the need for the aid currently provided.
(The latter point is particularly true of the charitable deduction.)
Even some courts have recently treated tax breaks as the functional
equivalent of direct governmental grants.3
The second set of criticisms of tax expenditure analysis concerns
the difficulty of developing an adequate, universally-accepted definition
of a tax expenditure. In order to isolate tax expenditures it is neces-
sary to define a normative tax base against which tax expenditures can
be compared. Which provisions are tax expenditures and which are
integral components of the basic tax structure?
For some taxes this presents little problem, but for the income
tax the difficulty is more substantial. There is no rigorous definition
of income which commands uncritical acceptance. For many, the starting
15
point is the inclusive Haig-Simons economic definition of income: the
market value of rights exercised in consumption plus the change in value
of the store of property rights. But this definition is usually narrowed
to take account of administrative, legal and social limitations. And
there is respectable dissent from the comprehensive tax base ideal [4 ,18].
It is usually possible, nevertheless, to identify a widely accepted tax
base from which to measure deviations.
Some tax provisions are clearly intended to provide incentives for
particular actions (the investment credit); some play a dual role,
resolving problems in the definition of the tax and also encouraging
other social goals; and others are primarily internal adjustments
intended to restore tax logic. Different analysts might select different
reference points, but in my view this does not negate the usefulness of
tax expenditure analysis.
The income tax deduction for charitable gifts, for example, is in
my view a provision grafted onto the tax code having nothing to do with
the logic or theory of the income tax calculation, but there are individ-
uals who conceive of it as a way of helping to define appropriately
taxable income. Some argue that the contribution is a discharge of
moral obligation (and not a voluntary, discretionary expenditure), or
that it is a way of treating the donations of those who do not have the
time to donate their own services the same as the donations of those who
do donate their services (and do not have to pay taxes on the imputed
income received for.performing these services). Another way of stating
16
this view is just that "the income left over after gifts to charity is
a better measure of the earner's ability to pay tax than his income
without taking the gift into account." Others argue that the deduction
is only one of many corrections to an overly progressive tax rate
structure. By this construction, the basic tax rate structure is not
the base against which tax expenditures ought to be measured; society
has adjusted that structure via various exceptions to make it "correctly"
.4progressive.
The most recent empirical evidence suggests that the involuntary
expense argument is questionable. Feldstein [51] has shown that chari-
table giving, in response to decreases in the after-tax cost of the gift
-- the "price" to the donor, increases by an amount which is greater than
the increase in tax benefits to the donor. Since donors demonstrably
adjust the size of their gifts in this way, it is clear that at least
some part of their donations is voluntary. One plausibly could class
such gifts with all other voluntary expenditures, and in that sense they
should have no impact on tax liability.
As far as the choice of the proper tax base is concerned, I accept
Surrey's working definition as useful for an investigation into the
impact of tax law on charitable institutions. For income tax this means
the progressive structure, the specified rates, and the adjustments for
marital status and family size, as applied to gross realized income less
expenses of producing the income.
The third set of criticisms of tax expenditure analysis questions
the actual calculation of the expenditure. The calculation as currently
applied is a marginal analysis; it assumes that all other expenditures
would remain the same and full taxes would be paid if the provision
under consideration were discontinued. It ignores second-order effects
such as changes in taxpayers' behavior in response to the new rules.
Moreover, the analysis considers each provision separately. For example,
income sheltered from taxation under one tax provision might well be
sheltered under another provision when the first one is removed (rather
than becoming taxable income), yielding little, or no increase in tax
revenues; tax expenditure analysis does not account for such a switch.
These limitations of the analysis caution us to take the revenue
estimate of any particular tax expenditure as a gross figure for the
revenue foregone by the government or transferred from other sources.
Further research is necessary to pinpoint the actual impact of tax provi-
sions. Such research would improve our understanding of tax expenditures
but would not challenge the concept of tax provisions as subsidy.
Finally and conclusively, despite the challenges offered to tax
expenditure analysis as a way to understand and evaluate the indirect
aid system and even with its acknowledged limitations, the concept is
not only justified but inevitable when viewed from the perspective of
decisionmaking. A tax expenditure is the result of a provision of law,
enacted for various purposes and subject to continual review. Tax
expenditure analysis helps legislators and other interested individuals
(including the public) to know what the impact of changes in tax law
will be. If the provision's intended and accidental benefits outweigh
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its costs, it should be retained; if not, it should be revised or
repealed. Such decisions should be informed and explicit. If we do
not subject tax provisions to periodic review, we decide implicitly to
retain them.
Adopting the tax expenditure perspective, the remainder of this
chapter describes and estimates each of the major income tax expendi-
tures for the arts. Unfortunately, the quantification of the various
tax expenditures is limited by the available data. This thesis and the
broader research of which it is a part -- the Twentieth Century Fund
Project on Indirect Aid to the Arts [105]-- comprise the first compre-
hensive tax expenditure analysis of a particular charitable sector.
Previous work -- limited almost entirely to Treasury Department studies
-- has focussed on tax expenditures within a particular revenue instru-
ment. For example, Surrey [115]studied tax expenditures within the
individual Federal income tax. As a result, the data necessary for such
an analysis have not been collected in any structured way, so the present
study relies primarily on secondary data analysis amplified by conceptual
and theoretical arguments with one notable exception.
In 1973 the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs
was formed as a privately funded citizens' panel to study the role of
philanthropic giving and voluntary public-oriented activity in the
United States and to make recommendations to Congress and to the
American public to strengthen and improve philanthropic activity. As
part of the Commission's research, James N. Morgan directed the National
Study of Philanthropy, a comprehensive survey of household donations
made to charity in 1973 [86,87]. The survey collected data on the amount,
type (cash, property, or volunteer time), and recipient of each contribu-
tion. Fortunately, culture was included as a separate category of
recipient.5 The tax expenditure estimates contained in this chapter and
much of the analysis throughout this thesis are based on the data collected
in this study.
Federal Income Tax Expenditures
Three significant income tax expenditures for the arts are embedded
in Federal income tax law: individual charitable income tax deductions,
capital gains taxes foregone on gifts of property, and corporate chari-
table income tax deductions.
Since 1917 individual taxpayers6 have been allowed, under Federal
income tax law, to deduct contributions to nonprofit, charitable institu-
tions -- including arts institutions -- when computing their taxable
income, thereby reducing their total income tax liability. The effects
of this tax expenditure have already been outlined in the general dis-
cussion of tax expenditures. Through the deduction, the government
provides the donor with a tax savings, which reduces the net cost -- or
price -- to the donor of the gift. This, in turn, provides an incentive
for the individual donor to give more, perhaps in private dollars as well
as in tax expenditure dollars. To the extent that this incentive works,
the tax provision is helping to support charitable institutions indirectly
by funneling tax benefits through donors. 7
To facilitate the discussion of the incentive effects of tax expendi-
tures, I have adopted a standardized vocabulary for each of the components
of the charitable contribution which will be used throughout the thesis.
The total charitable contribution is the sum of two major components:
the tax expenditure and the private contribution. The private contribu-
tion is that portion of the total gift which is made up of the individual
(or corporate) donor's own money excluding all taxes foregone in the
transaction. The private contribution is further divided into two com-
ponents: the base gift and the induced gift. The base gift is defined
as the amount the donor would give in the absence of the tax expenditure
provision; the induced gift is the increase in the donation of the
donor's own money which results from the incentive presented by the tax
provision. Donors' reactions to the economic incentives presented by a
tax expenditure will determine whether the induced gift is a positive or
negative amount. This division of the charitable contribution is
summarized in Figure II.l.
Figure II.1 Components of the Total Charitable Contribution
Total Charitable Contribution
Base Gift Induced Gift
Private Contribution Tax Expenditure
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The obvious question to ask about the charitable income tax
deduction is: How much more does the individual taxpayer give as a
result of this tax provision? Does his private contribution increase?
(Or, equivalently, is the induced gift positive?) If the total chari-
table contribution does not increase by as much as the tax expenditure
involved, then the population as a whole is helping to finance part of
the contribution which would have been made anyway by the donor in the
absence of the tax-deductibility provision. Several studies have
provided a variety of answers to this question.8
Although there is no consensus as to the net effects of the chari-
table contribution deduction, the most recent studies by Feldstein [51,52]
suggest that charitable institutions do somewhat better under the deduc-
tion system than they would if there were no tax deduction and, instead,
taxes were collected and distributed to charitable institutions in amounts
equal to the current tax expenditure. In other words, individual donors
increase their own private contributions in the presence of the charitable
contribution deduction; the induced gift is positive.9
Another important characteristic of the charitable contribution de-
duction -- a characteristic which has been the focus of much debate --
is the fact that the tax savings which result from the tax expenditure
are directly proportional to the donor's marginal tax bracket; the
higher the individual's income and, therefore, his tax bracket, the
higher the tax break he is getting. The tax expenditure can range
from zero percent to 70 percent of the total contribution depending on
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the marginal tax bracket of the donor; a donor in the top (70%) marginal
tax bracket is reimbursed 70 cents out of every dollar of contribution,
while the taxpayer in the 25 percent marginal tax bracket is reimbursed
25 cents for every dollar of contribution.
Looking at the donation from another perspective, we see that to make
a $100 donation to a charitable institution the individual in the 70 percent
bracket has to spend only $30 of his own money, whereas the individual in
the 25 percent bracket has to spend $75, and an individual in the zero tax
bracket has to come up with the entire $100. This perspective emphasizes
the net cost or price of the donation as seen by the donor. Table 11.2
reproduces the 1973 Tax Rate Schedule for single taxpayers and demonstrates
how the marginal tax rate and the price of giving vary over the taxable
income of the donor.10
A corollary of the tax treatment of charitable contributions is that
this component of the indirect aid system allows wealthy individuals to
control the distribution of a large proportion of the tax expenditure.
This regressive effect is the result of grafting a tax deduction onto a
tax system which has progressive tax rates. This configuration of tax
benefits has been criticized as inequitable -- a criticism which is dis-
cussed in Chapter V -- but the arts are net beneficiaries from the
lopsidedness of the tax savings.
The type of charitable recipient changes significantly with the
income of the donor. Lower income donors tend to make their charitable
contributions to religious organizations whereas wealthy individuals are
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Table 11.2 Tax Rate Schedule for Single Taxpayers Comparing
Marginal Tax Rate and Price of Giving, 1973
(1)
Taxable Income
Over -
$0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
22,000
26,000
32,000
38,000
44,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000
But Not
Over -
$0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
20,000
22,000
26,000
32,000
38,000
44,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
80,000
90,000
100,000
(2)
Marginal Tax Rate
(percent)
0%
14
15
16
17
19
21
24
25
27
29
31
34
36
38
40
45
50
55
60
62
64
66
68
69
70
(3)
Price of Giving $1.00
$1.00
.86
.85
.84
.83
.81
.79
.76
.75
.73
.71
.69
.66
.64
.62
.60
.55
.50
.45
.40
.38
.36
.34
.32
.31
.30
Source: Columns 1 and 2, Internal
Income - 1973, Individual
Revenue Service, Statistics of
Income Tax Returns [137].
much more likely to donate to cultural or educational institutions.
Health and other social welfare institutions lie between these extremes
in relative attractiveness to the various income groups. As a result,
the present charitable contribution tax expenditure particularly bene-
fits charities favored by higher income donors, including cultural
institutions.
At the other end of the income spectrum, the tax deduction offers
no incentive at all to most taxpayers. 52 million of the 81 million
individual income tax returns filed in 1973 used the standard deduction
which precludes the deduction of charitable contributions [137]. Nearly
two-thirds of all income tax returns could not take advantage of the
charitable contribution deduction, and the individuals and families
represented by this two-thirds of the total tax returns, therefore, had
no voice in the allocation of the tax expenditure.
The basic mechanism of the charitable income tax deduction is
subject to a number of legal constraints.11 Most of these provisions
and regulations are tangential to the concerns of this study, but some
have particular importance for donations to cultural institutions. To
qualify as a tax deduction a contribution can be made only to institu-
tions eligible to receive income tax deductible contributions and tax
free gifts and bequests. According to section 501(c)(3) of the Internal
Revenue Code, these must be in one of the following categories:
religious, charitable, scientific, educational, testing for public
safety, or prevention of cruelty to children or animals.
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Even though cultural institutions do not fit comfortably into any
of these categories, Internal Revenue Service regulations allow the
classification of museums and symphony orchestras (and, by implication,
other nonprofit performing arts institutions) as charitable institutions.
Because the fit is awkward, arts institutions whose charitable status
appears to be secure are, nevertheless, concerned that their 501(c)(3)
designation could be used to force them to distort the real thrust of
their activities so that they would fit into one of the approved cate-
gories [60]. Presumably, the fear is that public policy would require
the institution to put more emphasis on educational programs and less on
the preservation, creation, and exhibition or presentation of art.
Another constraint on charitable deductions is the percentage
limitations placed on the total amount of such donations. The maximum
amount that an individual may deduct in any year is restricted accord-
ing to the type of gift and the type of charitable recipient. Gifts of
cash to publicly-supported charities, including arts institutions, are
limited to 50 percent of the donor's contribution base (typically
adjusted gross income with minor modifications). Gifts of property whose
sale would have produced long term capital gains are limited to 30 percent;
gifts of stocks or bonds or of artworks to museums come under this
limitation. And finally, gifts to privately-supported charities (as
opposed to publicly-supported charities -- defined as receiving at least
a third of their support from the general public or the government) are
limited to 20 percent of the contribution base. In practice these
limitations only affect substantial donors and, even then, if a donation
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exceeds these limits the excess can be carried over into following
years as a deduction.
A third set of constraints on charitable contributions deals specif-
ically with gifts of various types of property. These restrictions are
discussed later in this chapter when gifts of property are considered
separately.
Estimates of charitable contributions in 1973 are summarized in
Tables 11.3 and II.4a, b, and c.12 Table 11.3 presents a detailed com-
parison of individual giving to all charity to that portion which goes
to culture; it disaggregates giving into gifts of cash and gifts of
property and estimates the mean total gift per household in each of the
income brackets. Tables II.4a, b, and c separate individual charitable
giving by recipient sector: culture, religion, education, health, other
social welfare, and other charitable.13 These tables report charitable
giving by dollar amounts, table percentages, and column percentages;
each presentation offers valuable insights into the pattern of charitable
giving.
In 1973 all charitable institutions received $17 billion in chari-
table contributions. (Of that amount, $14 billion was deducted by
individual taxpayers [137]; the remainder was donated by individuals who
did not or could not take advantage of the deduction.) Cultural institu-
tions received $320 million, slightly less than 2 percent of the total.
Religion received the most substantial portion, 73 percent, and other
Table 11.3 Individual Charitable Giving, 1973
Aggregate Charitable Giving Giving to Cultural- Institutions
Modified
Income
Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000 +
TOTALS
Number of
Households
(thousands)
33,097
15,787
10,999
6,270
2,205
729
140
28
Total
Charitable
Gifts-Cash
$ 3,539
3,467
3,090
2,197
1,425
947
370
253
4 104
2 217
69,261 $15,609
Total
Charitable
Gifts -
Property
$ 115
221
91
570
80
262
233
160
68
28
$1,828
Total
Charitable
Gifts
$ 3,655
3,688
3,181
2,767
1,504
1,209
603
413
172
245
$17,437
Mean Total
Gift Per
Household
in Income
Class
(dollars)
Gifts to
Culture-
Cash
$ 110 $ 0
234 .8
289 3.0
441 7.3
682 34.7
1,658 34.6
4,304 3.2
14,597 25.6
44,167
153,427
$252
33.9
6.2
$138.3
Gifts to
Culture-
Property
$ 0
0
0
9.2
19.7
89.8
56.2
11.0
0
0
$185.9
Total
Gifts to
Culture
$ 0
Mean Total
Gift Per
Household
in Income
Class
(dollars)
$ 0
.06
3.0
16.5
54.4
124.4
59.4
36.6
22.9
6.2
$324.2
.27
2.63
24.66
170.64
423.52
1,293.95
5,872.62
3,874.19
$4.68
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [861.
Notes: * Average figure for all households.
All figures are presented in millions of dollars unless otherwise indicated.
Table II.4a Individual Charitable Giving by Sector, 1973
($ millions)
Modified
Income
Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14, 999
15-19,999
20-29, 999
30-49, 999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000 +
TOTALS
Culture
$ 0
0.8
3.0
16.5
54.4
124.4
59.4
36.6
22.9
6.2
$324.2
Religion
$ 3,269
3,261
2,727
2,052
881
313
131
36
11
60
$12,741
Education
$ 84
34
39
88
240
182
184
181
77
97
$1,206
Health
$ 141
109
127
158
70
89
113
58
11
25
$ 901
Other
Social
Welfare
$ 158
279
282
452
260
379
108
86
36
30
$2,070
Other
Charitable
$ 0
0
3
1
1
119
7
16
0
25
$ 172
Aggregate
$ 3,655
3,688
3,181
2,767
1,504
1,209
603
413
172
245
$17,437
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Note: Rows do not add exactly because of rounding errors.
Table II.4b Individual Charitable Giving by Sector, Table Percentages, 1973
Education Health
Other
Social
Welf are
Other
Charitable Aggregate
$ 1- 9,999 0 % 18.7% 0.5% 0.8% 0.9% 0% 21.0%
10-14,999 * 18.7 0.2 0.6 1.6 0 21,2
15-19,999 * 15.6 0.2 0.7 1.6 * 18.2
20-29,999 0.1 11.8 0.5 0.9 2.6 * 15.9
30-49,999 0.3 5.1 1.4 0.4 1.5 * 8.6
50-99,999 0.7 1.8 1.0 0.5 2.2 0.7 6,9
100,000 -
199,999 0.3 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.6 * 3.5
200,000 -
499,999 0.2 0.2 1.0 0.3 0.5 0.1 2.4
500,000 -
999,999 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.2 0 1.0
1,000,000 + * 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.1 1.4
TOTALS 1.9% 73.1% 6.9% 5.2% 11.9% 1.0% 100.0%
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Note: * Less than 0.1%.
Modified
Income
Class Culture Religion
Table II.4c Individual Charitable Giving by Sector, Column Percentages, 1973
Modified
Income
Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000 +
TOTALS
Culture
0%
0.2
1
5
17
99%
Religion
26%
26
21
16
7
2
1
0.3
0.1
0.5
100%
Education
7%
3
3
7
20
15
15
15
6
8
99%
Health
16%
12
14
18
8
10
13
6
1
3
101%
Other
Social
Welfare
8%
13
14
22
13
18
5
4
2
1
100%
Other
Charitable
0%
0
2
1
1
69
101%
Aggregate
21%
21
18
16
9
7
99%
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Note: All columns do not add to 100% because of rounding errors.
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social welfare institutions accounted for an additional 12 percent of the
total.
From Table II.4c it is clear that cultural institutions are more
dependent on high income donors than any other charitable sector except
education. (The 15 percent of "other charitable" giving made
by donors in the $1,000,000 + income bracket went mostly to private
foundations and trusts and from there was to be transferred to other
"charitable" uses.) Households with income less than $30,000 (96 percent
of all households) accounted for 76 percent of the total charitable
contribution to all charity but made only 6 percent of the total charitable
contributions to culture. (These same households accounted for 89 percent
of the total charitable contribution to religion.) Most of the contribu-
tion to culture came from households with incomes between $30,000 and
$199,999: $240 million or 73 percent. These households represented only
4 percent of all households in 1973. From these figures it seems efficient
for arts institutions to target their fundraising campaigns towards the
upper middle income groups with special attention to the occasional donor
of a very large gift who is found in one of the highest income categories.
The income tax expenditures associated with individual charitable
giving to all charity and to culture are summarized in Table 11.5, and
the total tax expenditures are calculated for each charitable sector in
Tables II.6a, b, and c. 1 $4.6 billion or one-fifth of the total chari-
table contributions was in the form of tax expenditures. For culture the
tax expenditure was $180 million, 56 percent -- more than half -- of the
Table 11.5 Tax Expenditures -- Individual Federal Charitable Contribution Deductions, 1973
Aggregate Charitable Giving Giving to Cultural Institutions
Modified
Income
Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000+
Number of
Households
(thousands)
33,097
15,787
10,999
6,270
2,205
729
140
28
4
2
Tax
Expenditure
$ 323
611
639
862
603
605
381
258
117
171
Effective
Price of
$1.00
Gift
(dollars)
$ .91
.83
.80
.69
.60
.50
.37
.38
.32
.30
Mean Tax
Expenditure
Per Income
Class Member
(dollars)
$ 10
39
58
138
274
830
2,719
9,127
29,977
106,961
Tax
Expenditure
$ 0
.2
.8
5.9
22.8
66.0
41.2
24.3
16.0
4.4
Effective
Price of
$1.00
Gift
(dollars)
$1.00
.78
.71
.64
.58
.47
.31
.34
.30
.30
Mean Tax
Expenditure
Per Income
Class Member
(dollars)
$ 0
.01
.07
.94
10.36
90.53
293.82
858.12
4,110,84
2,711,93
TOTALS 69,261 $4,570
*$ .74 *$ 70 $181.6 *$ .44 *$ 2.62
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Notes: * Average figure for all households.
Figures are presented in millions of dollars unless otherwise indicated.
These estimated tax expenditures do not include capital gains taxes foregone on gifts of property.
Table II.6a Tax Expenditures by Sector -- Individual Federal Charitable Contribution Deductions, 1973
($ millions)
Modified
Income
Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000+
TOTALS
Culture
$ 0
0.2
0.8
5.9
22.8
66.0
41.2
24.3
16.0
4.4
$181.6
Religion
$ 295.8
546.4
547.7
653.2
359.6
153.4
83.2
24.1
7.5
41.1
$2,712.0
Education
$ 9.4
3.7
10.3
27.7
90.1
93.0
114.1
109.5
50.8
68.6
$577.2
Health
$ 7.1
19.1
30.3
40.3
26.4
50.1
72.4
40.0
7.2
17.8
$310.7
Other
Social
Welfare
$ 10.1
41.0
51.3
135.1
104.4
181.9
65.8
49.2
25.0
20.3
$683.7
Other
Charitable
$ 0
0
0.7
0.2
0.3
62.9
4.4
11.3
0
18.5
$ 98.3
Aggregate
$ 323
611
639
862
603
605
381
258
117
171
$4,570
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Notes: Rows do not add exactly because of rounding errors,
Estimates do not include capital gains taxes foregone on gifts of property,
Table II.6b Tax Expenditures by Sector -- Individual Federal Charitable Contribution Deductions,
Table Percentages, 1973
Modified
Income
Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000+
TOTALS
Culture
0 %
0.1
0.5
1.4
0.9
0.5
0.4
0.1
4.0 %
Religion
6.5 %
12.0
12.0
14.3
7.9
3.4
1.8
0.5
0.2
0.9
59.3 %
Education
0.2 %
0.1
0.2
0.6
2.0
2.0
2.5
2.4
1.1
1.5
12.6 %
Health
0.2 %
0.4
0.7
0.9
0.6
1.1
1.6
0.9
0.2
0.4
6.8 %
Other
Social
Welfare
0.2 %
0.9
1.1
3.0
2.3
4.0
1.4
1.1
0.5
0.4
15.0 %
Other
Charitable
0 %
0
*
*
*
1.4
0.1
0.2
0
0.4
2.2 %
Aggregate
7.1 %
13.4
14.0
18.9
13.2
13.2
.8.3
5.6
2.6
3.7
100.0 %
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [861.
Notes: * Less than 0.1%.
Rows and columns do not add exactly because of rounding errors.
Estimates do not include capital gains taxes foregone on gifts of property.
Table II.6c Tax Expenditures by Sector -- Individual Federal Charitable Contribution Deductions,
Column Percentages, 1973
Modified
Income
Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14, 999
15-19, 999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000+
TOTALS
Culture
0 %
0.1
0.4
3
13
99 %
Religion
11 %
20
20
24
13
6
0.3
100 %
Education
2 %
1
2
5
16
16
20
19
9
12
102 %
Health
2 %
6
10
13
8
16
23
13
2
6
99 %
Other
Social
Welfare
1 %
101 %
Other
Charitable
0 %
0
1
0.2
0,3
64
4
11
0
19
99 %
Aggregate
7 %
13
14
19
13
100 %
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Notes: Columns do not add to 100% because of rounding errors.
Estimates do not include capital gains taxes foregone on gifts of property.
total charitable contribution. The corresponding percentages for each
of the other major sectors were: religion, 21 percent; education,
48 percent; health, 34 percent; other social welfare, 33 percent.
Thus, cultural institutions benefit more than any other charitable
sector from the present configuration of this tax expenditure. 15
As might be expected, the tax expenditure component of the chari-
table contribution is more heavily weighted toward higher income groups
than is total charitable giving; the individual tastes of high income
donors are magnified by the marginal tax rates which increase over income.
The 96 percent of all households with income less than $30,000, which
accounted for 76 percent of total contributions to charity, actually
allocated only 53 percent of the total tax expenditure. The households
with incomes greater than $100,000, which made 38 percent of all contri-
butions to culture, allocated 47 percent of the total tax expenditure
for culture.
Table 11.5 also shows the effective prices of gifts to all charity
and to culture by donor income groups. These prices, unlike the legis-
lated ones given previously in Table 11.2, are the results of two factors,
those legislated marginal tax rates and individual tastes, which together
determine the amount and recipient of the charitable gift. On the average
each dollar given to charity actually costs the donor $.74, while each
dollar given to culture costs $.44. This disparity indicates that culture
is getting proportionally more of the tax expenditure. While cultural
institutions receive 2 percent of the total charitable contributions,
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they receive 4 percent of the total tax expenditure. Comparing the
column totals in Table II.6b to those in Table II.4b indicates that
religion is the net loser in its share of the total tax expenditure
(as compared to its share of total charitable contributions) while all
of the other charitable sectors are net beneficiaries.
When a gift is property rather than cash, the tax expenditure
mechanism includes a second Federal income tax expenditure, capital gains
taxes foregone. In general, a gift of property is deductible at the fair
market value of the property at the time of the gift. But notice that
the donor may have paid quite a bit less for the property when he acquired
it than the market value at the time of the charitable gift. The donor
pays no tax on the appreciation (capital gain) in his investment, and yet
the donor is entitled to a full deduction for the market value of the
property. This combination of tax provisions renders a contribution of
appreciated property more attractive than selling the property and contrib-
uting the net proceeds to charity.
Thus, there are two tax expenditures in a charitable transfer of
property: the tax savings on the deduction as determined by the donor's
marginal tax bracket and the foregone capital gains taxes which are never
collected on the appreciation of the property. The first of these tax
expenditures has already been included in the estimates of Tables 11.5
and 11.6; to the extent that the gift of property is just like a gift of
cash it is treated the same way in the tax expenditure calculation.
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Note from Table 11.3 that cultural institutions are more dependent on
gifts of property than are charities as a whole. Only slightly more
than 10 percent of the value of total charitable gifts is in the form of
property, while 57 percent of the value of gifts to culture is in the
form of property. The major portion of the property gifts to culture came
from households with incomes between $50,000 and $199,999 who made
79 percent of the total property contributions.
The second of the property transfer tax expenditures, capital gains
taxes foregone, must be estimated separately. In 1973 capital gains were
taxed at exactly half the rate of other income, or, equivalently, only
half the capital gain was taxed at the individual's marginal tax rate.
But what proportion of the property donated was appreciation? Although
the National Study of Philanthropy reports the value of donated property,
it does not help in the estimation of what portion of that value repre-
sents taxable appreciation. For a rough estimate I have assumed that,
on the average, donors held property until it doubled in value before making
the donation. No doubt,in some cases the property will not have appreciated
at all, but in other cases the appreciation will have been substantial --
particularly in the case of art masterpieces which have been held for a long
time and whose current value is many times the original cost. The estimate
is calculated by multiplying the value of property donated by one-half --
to arrive at an estimate of the appreciation -- and then by one-half of the
effective marginal tax rate for each income class (Table 11.7). For all
charitable gifts there is a capital gains tax expenditure of $180 million;
for culture this tax expenditure is $26 million. Again, the tax expenditure
Table 11.7 Tax Expenditures -- Capital Gains Taxes Foregone on Individual Gifts of Property, 1973
Charitable Gifts of Property,
Aggregate
Charitable
to Culture
Gifts of Property
Modified
Income
Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000+
Effective
Marginal
Tax Rate
.09
.17
.20
.31
.40
.50
.63
.62
.68
.70
Tax
Expenditure
($ millions)
$ 2.6
9.4
4.6
44.2
8.0
32.8
36.7
24.8
11.6
4.9
Effective
Marginal
Tax Rate
.00
.22
.29
.36
.42
.53
.69
.66
.70
.70
Tax
Expenditure
($ millions)
$ 0
2.1
11.9
9.7
1.8
$179.6 million $ 26.3 million
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
TOTALS
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works to the advantage of culture: while culture receives 10 percent
of the total gifts of property, it receives the benefit of 15 percent of
the total capital gains tax expenditure.
Several restrictions on the general rule for the donation of property
were passed in the Tax Reform Act of 1969, and they affect the financial
incentives for donating property in certain situations. As a result of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969 ordinary income property, so-called because its sale
at a profit is part of the daily operation of a business such as gain
on inventory property or short term capital gains, is no longer deductible
at fair market value. The deduction is limited to the fair market value
minus the gain which would have been realized if the property had been sold
-- the donor's "basis" in the property. This change decreased the tax
incentives for gifts of such property.
This change has had an identifiable impact on cultural institutions.
Tax regulations stipulate that artworks in the hands of the original artist
are not entitled to capital gains treatment on sale; the difference between
the artist's investment in materials and the sale price is treated as ordi-
nary income. Thus, if the artist donates a work to a museum (or other chari-
table institution) the deduction is limited to the artist's investment in
materials (the fair market value of the work minus the gain which would have
been realized if the work had actually been sold). This effect of the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 has been widely criticized by artists.16 Much of the
financial incentive for charitable donations of their own works has been
removed, and the result has been a perceptible decrease in the donation of
artworks, literary manuscripts, and other similar works to museums and
libraries.
The Tax Reform Act also eliminated the advantages of "bargain sales"
of property to charity. Prior to 1969 donors could maximize the benefit
to them of the charitable donation of property by selling the property to
the charity for an amount equal to the original investment in the property
-- the basis -- and by donating and deducting the remainder of the full
market value. The Tax Reform Act removed the incentive for bargain sales
by requiring that the sale price be apportioned between taxable capital
gains and return on the initial investment as determined by the ratio of
actual appreciation to the full market value.
A third change in the treatment of charitable donations of property
wrought by the Tax Reform Act of 1969 was a reduction in the deduction
allowed for contributions of capital gain property to private foundations
and of tangible, personal property to institutions when the property is
not related to the exempt institution's own charitable purposes.
In the absence of more refined data, it is difficult to include the
effects of any of these three tax provisions in the estimates of the
tax expenditure. It is unlikely, however, that any impact could be
identified, especially because the capital gain tax expenditure is only
a rough estimate itself.
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The source of the third major Federal income tax expenditure is the
corporate charitable income tax deduction. Since 1935 corporations have
been allowed income tax deductions for charitable contributions. The
mechanism is identical to that for individuals except that corporate
charitable contributions are limited to a flat five percent of the cor-
poration's taxable income and the corporations have a different marginal
tax rate schedule. In 1973 the Federal corporation income tax was
22 percent on the first $25,000 of taxable income and 48 percent on the
remainder. It seems likely that the bulk of corporate charitable contri-
butions is made by firms in the higher tax bracket, but it is difficult
to estimate their relative share. For purposes of estimating the tax
expenditure an average marginal tax rate of 45.4 percent is used. This
rate is calculated by dividing total corporate income tax before invest-
ment credit, $52.4 billion, by income subject to tax, $115.5 billion [136].
The Business Committee for the Arts, an organization established by
businessmen to encourage corporate giving to culture, has estimated that
in 1973 business supported culture with donations of $140 million [30]. 7
For the same year, the Internal Revenue Service reported corporate chari-
table deductions of $1.2 billion [136]. Therefore, I estimate the 1973
corporate income tax expenditure for all charity as $533 million and the
tax expenditure for culture as $64 million.
It is quite likely that the figures understate total business
support for charity because philanthropic contributions often are
carried on the corporate books as part of the company's normal business
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expenses which, in any event, are deductible. This is particularly true
of sponsorship of cultural programs which is difficult to distinguish
from general advertising and public relations expenditures. For example,
is the Mobil Oil Corporation's sponsorship of "Masterpiece Theatre" on
the Public Broadcasting Service a charitable donation or an advertising
expenditure? For tax purposes, it could justifiably -- and legally --
be treated as either.
Corporations, like individuals, may donate property to charitable
institutions, but there are no available data with which to estimate the
additional tax expenditure attributable to the capital gains taxes foregone.
State Income Tax Expenditures
Because the income tax laws of numerous states rely on the Federal
definition of taxable income which allows charitable income tax deduc-
tions, these deductions often appear in state income tax computation as
well. In these cases there is a charitable income tax expenditure being
made by the state government and financed by the taxpayers in that state.
Forty-one states and the District of Columbia have broad-based individual
income taxes. In computing the income subject to state taxation most
begin with the Federal income tax base and make adjustments. Thirty-five
states allow a donor to deduct charitable contributions in calculating
taxable income either by an explicit deduction or by allowing the deduc-
tion which has already been taken in the Federal income tax to be
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incorporated into the calculation of the state income tax. Some states
also impose corporate income taxes and allow charitable deductions for
corporate donations.
It is difficult to estimate this tax expenditure because reliable
data do not exist, particularly data which indicate the amount of chari-
table donations to culture in a particular state. A rough estimate can
be developed using, once again, the National Study of Philanthropy data.
The analysis uses the assumption -- at least plausible in view of the
"piggy-back" nature of most state income taxes -- that the ratio between
tax expenditure and tax revenue is about the same for all states, on the
average, as it is for the Federal government. In 1973 the total Federal
revenue from personal and corporate income taxes was $150 billion. The
total revenue from income taxes in states which allowed a charitable
contribution deduction was $20 billion. Using the ratio of 2/15, it is
estimated that cultural institutions, which benefited from $210 million
in individual Federal income tax expenditures (individual charitable
income tax deductions plus capital gains taxes foregone), are the intended
beneficiaries of $27 million in state individual income tax expenditures.
(In this way, all charities are the intended beneficiaries of $630 million
in state individual income tax expenditures.) Similarly, the state cor-
porate income tax expenditure for culture can be estimated to be $8.5 million.
(The state corporate income tax expenditure for all charities was
$72 million.)
But because of the unique interrelationship between the Federal
and the various state income taxes, the state income tax expenditures
intended for cultural and other "charitable" institutions do not accrue
entirely to the benefit of these institutions. State income taxes are
deductible in computing the taxpayer's Federal income tax. Therefore,
a savings in state taxes from, for example, a charitable deduction results
in a smaller tax deduction on the Federal income tax which, in turn,
results in a higher Federal income tax liability. In this way part of
the tax expenditure benefit is removed. Consider a simple example:
A donor in the 25 percent Federal income tax bracket and an 8 percent
state income tax bracket donates $300 to a museum. The state makes a
$24 tax expenditure ($300 x .08) as part of his contribution. For Federal
income tax purposes this contribution reduces his state tax deduction by
$24. Therefore, the donor has to pay an additional $6 ($24 x .25) in
Federal income taxes. The net benefit to the donor from the state is only
$18. There is still a state tax expenditure of $24, but it is in two
parts: $18 benefit the museum and $6 benefit the Federal treasury.
Note that this effect is the greatest at the top income brackets:
the higher the income bracket the higher the percentage of the state tax
expenditure which flows directly to the Federal government. At lower income
brackets, where the state income tax deduction has proportionately less
effect, the proportional benefit to the donor is greater.
Two important conclusions follow from this analysis: First, only a
portion of the state tax expenditure intended for charitable institutions
reaches its target, and, second, the proportion of the state tax expendi-
ture that is actually an incentive for donors and that is passed on to
charitable institutions is greatest in the lower income brackets and
declines as the donor's income (and marginal tax rate) increases. Because
the state income tax rate is often flat, the state tax expenditure gives
relatively lower benefits per dollar of contribution to the higher income
donors.18 This is particularly significant for cultural institutions
which depend on higher income donors for the bulk of their contributions.
This is the only income tax expenditure for culture in which the incentive
effect is inversely related to the income of the donor.
How much, then, of the state tax expenditures estimated above actually
benefits charitable institutions? Table 11.5 shows the average effective
price of a $1.00 gift to culture as $.44. This figure is one minus the
average effective Federal tax rate. Therefore, for culture this rate is
56 percent. At this average rate $15 million of the $27 million individual
state income tax expenditure accrues to the Federal government and only
$12 million actually provides incentives to donors and benefits to arts
institutions. Similarly, the average Federal corporate income tax rate
was estimated above at 45.4 percent. At this rate, $4.6 million of the
$8.5 million corporate state tax expenditure benefits arts institutions.
(By similar calculations, $470 million of the state individual tax expen-
diture for all charities actually accrue to the benefit of charitable
institutions along with $39 million of the corporate tax expenditure.)
Other Income Tax Expenditures
There are two other income tax expenditures for the arts which
operate through state and Federal tax law: income tax exemptions for
institutions themselves and tax expenditures which are passed through
private foundations.
Like other nonprofit educational or charitable institutions, arts
institutions are typically exempt from Federal and state income taxes on
their income from investments and their admissions eceipts. This
exemption actually provides a tax expenditure only if the institution
would otherwise be subject to income tax. Gifts and foundation and
government grants are generally not considered income, and no corporation
pays income taxes if its expenses exceed its income for the taxable year.
Therefore, an arts institution which is, in fact, nonprofit would receive
no benefit from this tax expenditure. Only in certain cases where income
exceeds current expenses or, more likely, where wealth is being accumulated
through capital acquisitions or a growing endowment would the tax exemption
actually result in a tax expenditure for a cultural institution.
The primary significance of the tax exempt status of an institution is
not in the financial benefits it receives from that exemption. Rather it
is in the use of the criteria which determine income tax exemption to deter-
mine eligibility for other exemptions such as property tax and sales tax
exemptions.
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The final income tax expenditure for culture is found in charitable
donations initially made by individuals or corporations or estates to
private foundations rather than to operating charitable institutions.
These foundations, in turn, distribute their income to a variety of
recipients including arts institutions in the form of grants. The tax
expenditure which is created at the point of the charitable donation may
eventually be passed on to a charitable institution. Of course, the
income earned by the private foundation is also exempt from normal cor-
porate income tax.
During the years 1974 to 1976 foundation grants totalled $2 billion
of which $180 million went to museums, performing arts, music and art and
architecture [56]. The average annual amount of foundation grants to
culture was $59 million. It is impossible to determine the correct
marginal tax rate to apply to this figure because it involves a variety
of taxes and, very likely, a different configuration of donors than is
typical for direct contributions to culture. For purposes of rough esti-
mation a 40 percent tax rate offers a conservative estimate of the tax
expenditure. At this rate, the tax expenditure which is channeled through
foundation grants to cultural activities is $24 million.19 It is not
necessary to calculate this tax expenditure separately for giving to all
charitable institutions as it has already been implicitly included in the
estimates of tax expenditures for aggregate charitable giving estimated
above. 20
Summary
In 1973 all charity received $19 billion in contributions and
$5.8 billion -- nearly a third of that amount -- was in the form of
Federal or state income tax expenditures. (Table 11.8) Cultural insti-
tutions were the recipients of $530 million in contributions of which
$310 million -- 59 percent -- was in the form of income tax expenditures.
Culture received 2.8 percent of total contributions, but this included
5.4 percent of the total income tax expenditure for charity.
It is interesting to set these tax expenditure figures into the con-
text of the revenue raising mechanisms of which they are a part. In 1973
the Internal Revenue Service collected $108 billion in individual Federal
income taxes [137]. In comparison, the total tax expenditure to all charity
which was transferred through the Federal income tax amounted to
$4.8 billion; for culture the Federal individual income tax expenditure
was $0.2 billion. Similarly, in 1973 the IRS collected $52 billion in
corporate Federal income taxes [136] while channeling $0.5 billion in cor-
porate tax expenditures to all charity and $0.06 billion to cultural
institutions.
These comparisons highlight a basic characteristic of tax expenditure
provisions. Tax expenditures are relatively easy to pass through the legis-
lature because the financial impact of any single provision on the collec-
tion of revenues is inconsequential when compared to the total amount of
revenue collected under the tax instrument. On the other hand, the
Table 11.8 Summary of Estimated Income Tax Expenditures, 1973 ($ millions)
Federal Income Tax:
Individual Charitable Contribution Deductions
Capital Gains Tax Foregone
Corporate Charitable Contribution Deductions
Capital Gains Tax Foregone
State Income Tax:
Individual Charitable Contribution Deductions
and Capital Gains Tax Foregone
Corporate Charitable Contribution Deductions
and Capital Gains Tax Foregone
Other Tax Expenditures:
Tax Exempt Status
Donations Through Private Foundations
TOTALS
Aggregate
Tax Basea
$17,437
d
1,174
b
d
d
b
d
$18,611
Giving
Tax Expenditure
$4,570
179.6
533
b
468.6 (633.3)c
39.1 (71.7)c
b
d
$5,790.3 $527.2
Giving to
Tax Basea
$324.2
d
144
b
d
d
b
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The tax base is the total contributions of which the corresponding tax expenditure is a part,
except for Tax Exempt Status where the tax base is the income which, in the absence of the tax
exemption,would be taxable. (For charitable institutions this amount is arguably small.)
Data are insufficient to give a reasonable estimate. In any event, it would be small.
The figures in parentheses represent the total state tax expenditures. See text for explanation.
These amounts are already included in the respective columns of data.
Notes:
Culture
Tax Expenditure
$181.6
26.3
63.6
b
12.2 (27.7)c
4,6 ( 8 , 5 )c
b
23.6
$311.9-
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financial impact on the institution or individual who is the beneficiary
of the provision is likely to be substantial.
Culture is a net beneficiary of the various income tax expenditures.
The difference between culture and charitable institutions as a whole
lies in differences in the tastes of donors and variations in the tax
expenditure incentives over income groups; higher income donors favor
arts institutions with their contributions. With the exception of the
state income tax expenditures, income tax expenditures provide more incen-
tives to higher income donors, and the state incentives do not offset the
trend established by the others.
Moreover, income tax expenditures are a particularly significant
source of government aid for cultural institutions; in 1973 they received
50 percent more aid through income tax expenditures than they.did from all
sources of direct government aid [98].
This chapter has documented the financial implications of the indirect
aid system's use of income tax expenditures. It is clear that this system
contributes heavily to the support of charitable institutions. In the
following chapters, I take a look at tax expenditures from the perspective
of a variety of qualitative criteria, attempting to evaluate whether there
are hidden costs associated with supporting arts institutions in this way.
CHAPTER III: INCIDENCE -- HOW THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF INDIRECT AID ARE DISTRIBUTED
At the heart of any economic analysis of government support for the
arts -- direct and indirect -- lie two deceptively simple questions:
Who pays? and Who benefits? One way to answer these questions is to
describe the net movement of arts support funds among income (or other
demographic) classes within the population. This investigation is par-
ticularly important in the arts because of two common but inconsistent
assumptions. Are cultural institutions the beneficence of the wealthy
for the rest of society, or is it the wealthy who are the net bene-
ficiaries of an art system supported by public taxation? The latter
notion is contrary to acceptable public policy; we would seriously
question a government funding scheme for the arts if it had a "reverse
Robin Hood" effect, taking from the poor and giving to the rich.
Preferred are programs that are paid for by those who enjoy them -- a
"pay as you go" model that would prevail in the absence of government
programs if the market worked correctly -- or that redistribute
benefits by taxing those who are able to pay and by providing services
to those less able. Indeed, the stated goals of the National Endowment
for the Arts and the various state arts councils, which include making
the arts more accessible by removing geographical and income barriers
to the enjoyment of art, argue strongly in favor of a redistributive
program.
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This chapter details the incidence of the arts support system as
well as available data permit. First, the question of who benefits from
arts support is considered with a demographic analysis of the arts
audience. Then, taking the individual charitable income tax deduction
as an example, tax expenditure analysis is used to calculate the income
distribution of those individuals who help pay for the tax expenditure.
And, finally, this distribution of payments is set in the context of all
annual revenues to the arts to test whether the entire arts funding system
is more or less redistributive than the piece of the system attributable
to the tax expenditure. The aggregate incidence of several alternatives
to the current funding system is also estimated.
Based on the analysis in this chapter, I conclude that to a limited
extent the individual charitable income tax deduction is redistributive;
it is paid for by the wealthy and enjoyed by the moderately wealthy
who form the major component of the arts audience. Moreover, the
incidence of the charitable deduction tax expenditure is not significantly
different from the overall incidence of all income to the arts; it is
neither more nor less redistributive than the entire arts support system
of which it is a part. Furthermore, the analysis indicates that even
major changes in the configuration of arts institutions' incomes resulting
from a discontinuation of the charitable deduction would not substantially
alter the aggregate incidence of arts income.
Who Benefits?
Who attends the theatre, dance, museums, classical music concerts,
and the like? And what are their characteristics? These questions can
be answered by developing a general demographic picture of the American
arts audience.
As with other areas of arts policy,reliable data on this question
are scarce. While a number of arts institutions have conducted studies
of their own audiences, these studies are not easily compared, are often
poorly designed or at least self-serving, and certainly do not comprise
a representative sample of the overall arts audience of all arts insti-
tutions.1 The results of these surveys are suggestive (e.g. in pointing
to education as the individual characteristic best correlated with atten-
dance) but anecdotal. The last and only complete attempt to survey the
American arts audience was Baumol and Bowen's 1963-1965 Twentieth
Century Fund Audience Survey [11], but even this included only the
performing arts and, of course, is badly outdated.
Alternatively, the demographic profile of the arts audience can be
determined through cross-sectional surveys which sample and question an
entire population (local, regional, national) about attendance at arts
institutions. The cross-sectional survey allows identification of the
characteristics of the entire arts audience. Importantly, it also allows
the study of individuals who are not in the arts audience -- a proper
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concern to public policy in the arts and to any institution seeking to
broaden its base of support. Unfortunately, such studies cost far more
because they require a large sample to draw statistically meaningful con-
clusions. The need for these studies cannot readily be met by individual
institutions. For these reasons, the NEA, state arts councils and arts
service organizations whose purview is broad should undertake cross-
sectional surveys as appropriate tools of analysis.
My analysis of the arts audience relies heavily on the only major
cross-sectional surveys which have been done in the United States, the
Americans and the Arts studies conducted in 1973 and 1975 for Associated
Councils of the Arts by the National Research Center of the Arts [92,93].
These studies suffer from many of the problems generic to survey research
(particularly overestimation by respondents), but they are filled with
useful information that has only been partially explored. In view of
the similarities in results of the 1973 and 1975 studies, only the later
one has been used in the analysis.
One problem common to many previous audience studies in the arts
is the failure, both in administering the study and in interpreting the
results, to distinguish between "visits" and "visitors." An adequate
incidence analysis depends upon understanding and correctly applying the
distinction. Either may be an appropriate measure for public policy
analysis in the arts, but each is relevant to a distinct set of
questions.
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To illustrate the difference between the two, consider the museum
which reports attendance -- visits -- of 200,000 for the previous year.
This figure might represent 50,000 different individuals -- visitors --
each of whom made four visits to the museum during the year, or it might
represent 200,000 different visitors each of whom came to the museum only
once. A policy designed to maximize the quality of public contact with
the arts might be judged by improvement in the mean number of visits per
visitor, while evaluators of an outreach program designed to develop new
audiences would likely be more interested in how many visitors --
particularly new visitors -- were attending. When the audience at a
particular performance or during a particular time period at a museum
is sampled, this sample is a sample of visits, not of visitors. In such
a study individuals who are frequent attenders are much more likely to
be sampled than visitors who attend less frequently. 2
To measure the allocation of benefits from cultural institutions,
visits by demographic class is the better indicator. It is reasonable
to assume that each time an individual visits an arts institution he or
she is benefiting from part of the subsidy to that institution, and
that that benefit does not differ from visit to visit.3 In public
discussions of art support, direct subsidies (along with other non-
governmental unearned income) often are added to the actual ticket price
in order to estimate the "real" cost of each admission. The allocation
of subsidies according to visits is in keeping with this common practice.
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Table III.1 compares the income distribution of visits -- as calcu-
4 
_
lated from the National Research Center of the Arts data -- to the
income distribution of the population as a whole. The arts audience
(including all visits) is much wealthier than the population; the
household income of the individual who made the median visit is almost
exactly $5,000 more than the median household income in the population:
$17,765 as compared to $12,742. (For purposes of comparison, Table 111.2
summarizes results on the income distribution of visitors to the arts.)
These findings are confirmed by other recent studies. Dimaggio, Useem,
and Brown [49] observed a substantial though smaller differential be-
tween the median incomes reported in 270 selected audience surveys and
the population median income. A similar although somewhat larger
differential was observed by Baumol and Bowen in their Twentieth Century
Fund study [12]. They found that the performing arts audience surveyed
between 1963 and 1965 had a median family income of $12,804 while the
median family income of the population was half that amount, $6,166.5
Figure III.1 is a histogram of the income distributions of visits,
visitors, and individuals in the population. Looking at the data in
this way we can quickly see which income groups are "overrepresented"
or "underrepresented" in the audience (visits) and in the art public
(visitors).6 In both cases, $15,000 is the clear cutoff point;
individuals in households with income below this point are underrepresented
both in terms of visits and in terms of visitors, and individuals with
household incomes above this point are overrepresented in both cases.
Table III.1 Visits to Art Museums, Theatre, Classical Music and Opera, and Dance
by Adjusted Gross Income, 1974-1975
Adjusted Gross
Income Bracket
Income Distribution
of Population
Income Distribution
of Visits
(The Audience)
Mean Number
of Visits per
Individual in
This AGI Bracket
Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage
$ 0 - $2,999
3,000 - 4,999
5,000 - 6,999
7,000 - 9,999
10,000 - 14,999
15,000 - 19,999
20,000 - 24,999
25,000 - 29,999
30,000+
Average for All
Income Brackets
Median Incomes
8.1%
9.4
8.5
10.9
23.8
17.5
8.6
5.3
7.9
$12,742
8.1%
17.5
26.0
36.9
60.7
78.2
86.8
92.1
100.0
1.9%
3.2
6.9
8.0
18.3
20.6
13.3
9.3
18.5
1.9%
5.1
12.0
20.0
38.3
58.9
72.2
81.5
100.0
$17,765
Source: National Research Center of the Arts, Americans and the Arts, 1975 [93].
Notes: All columns impute predicted incomes at graduation to students.
All columns include only individuals age 16 or over.
1.05
1,55
3.60
3.33
3.44
5.24
6.75
7.75
10.44
4.46
Table 111.2 Visitors to Art Museums, Theatre, Classical Music and Opera, and Dance
by Adjusted Gross Income, 1974-1975
Adjusted Gross
Income Bracket
Income Distribution
of Visitors
Percent of Individuals
in This AGI Bracket
Who Were Visitors
Mean Number
of Visits per
Visitor in
This AGI Bracket
Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage
$ 0 - $2,999
3,000 - 4,999
5,000 - 6,999
7,000 - 9,999
10,000 -
15,000 -
14,999
19,999
2.9%
4.9
7.1
9.5
23.5
20.5
2.9%
7.8
14.9
24.4
47.9
68.4
20,6%
30.3
47.8
50.7
57.8
67.1
20,000 - 24,999 11.9 80.3 79.1
25,000 - 29,999 7.6 87.9 82.3
30,000+ 12.1 100.0 89.6
Averages for All 57.9%
Income Brackets
Median Income $15,454
Source: National Research Center of the Arts, Americans and the Arts, 1975 [93].
Notes: All columns impute predicted incomes at graduation to students.
All columns include only individuals age 16 or over.
5,10
5,12
5.14
6.57
6,95
7.81
8,53
9.42
11.65
7,70
Figure III.1 Income Distributions of Visits to Arts Institutions, Population of the United States,
and Visitors to Arts Institutions, 1974-1975.
Visits to Arts Institutions
Population of the United States
Visitors to Arts Institutions
3,000-
4,999
5,000-
6,999
7,000-
9,999
10,000-
14,999
15,000-
19,999
20,000-
24,999
25,000-
29, 999
30,000 +
Source: National Research Center of the Arts, Americans and the Arts, 1975 [931.
Note: All data include only individuals age 16 or over.
Household Income
30%
20%-
10%
H0
$0-
$2,999
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Furthermore, individuals with the lowest incomes are the most under-
represented while those with the highest are the most overrepresented.
The distribution of visitors falls off more rapidly in the higher
income categories than the distribution of visits, indicating nothing
more than that visitors in the higher income levels tend to make more
visits to the arts in a year than do visitors with lower incomes.7
The foregoing picture of the arts audience does not tell us exactly
who benefits from government aid to the arts. The Americans and the Arts
survey does not separate attendance at institutions.ineligible for
government aid -- such as dinner theatres, movies, or commercial art
galleries -- from attendance at those eligible for aid. In general,
government support at all levels, direct and indirect, has been condi-
tioned on nonprofit operation. The data in Tables III.1 and 111.2 and
Figure III.1 were calculated from the survey respondents' answers to
questions on attendance at classical music or opera performances; ballet,
modern dance, folk or ethnic dance performances; theatre performances;
and art museums or galleries. These categories offer a good approximation
of the range of cultural activities supported by government agencies in
the United States. But these categories also include commercial dinner
theatres, Broadway theatre, profit-making art galleries, and local,
amateur performances. The audience measured may not be the same as the
audience that benefits from government aid to the arts.8
Happily, further analysis of the data reveals a surprising result:
the income distributions of the audiences for different art forms are
virtually identical and change very little even when commercial or "pop"
art forms are included in the analysis. Table 111.3 and Figure 111.2
disaggregate the analysis and compare visits to the visual arts (art
museums and galleries) with visits to the performing arts (dance, theatre,
and music and opera). While neither category limits itself to arts
institutions eligible for government funding -- the visual arts category
probably comes closest with an insignificant number of visits to com-
mercial galleries -- they contain different proportions of eligible
institutions. Yet the income distributions of visits are remarkably
similar. (The visual arts are relatively more favored by individuals in
the $15-19,999 bracket, while the performing arts are relatively favored
by individuals in the highest income bracket, but for all other brackets
the income distributions are much alike.) 9
Even more surprising is the fact that the income distributions of
attendance at popular music performances and movies -- arts activities
typically ineligible for any government support -- are not substantially
different from those found for attendance at the more "high-brow" arts.
Contrary to the commonly-held notion that these audiences consist of
the less wealthy and the less well educated, attendance at these events
was not distributed significantly more toward the lower income brackets.
As Tables 111.4 and 111.5 and Figure 111.3 indicate, the income distri-
bution of visits changed only slightly in these cases. One summary
measure, the income represented by the median visit, did decline somewhat.
The median for all visits to visual and performing arts was $17,765;
separately, the visual arts audience had a median of $17,476, and the
Table 111.3 Visits to the Visual Arts and to the Performing Arts by Adjusted Gross Income, 1974-1975
Visual Arts Performing Arts
Adjusted Gross
Income Bracket
Income
Distribution of
Visits to
Visual Arts
Mean Number
of Visits
Per
Individual
Income
Distribution of
Visits to
Performing Arts
Mean Number
of Visits
Per
Individual
Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage
$ 0 - $2,999
3,000 - 4,999
5,000 - 6,999
7,000 - 9,999
10,000 - 14,999
15,000 - 19,999
20,000 - 24,999
25,000 - 29,999
30,000+
Averages for All
Income Brackets
Median Incomes
2.2%
2.9
7.1
8.0
18.4
22.4
13.5
9.4
16.3
2.2%
5.1
12.2
20.2
38.6
61.0
74.5
83.9
100.2
.45
.52
1.40
1.24
1.30
2.14
2.58
2.95
3.47
1.8%
3.6
7.0
8.1
18.1
19.6
13.0
9.2
19.6
1,8%
5.4
12.4
20,5
38,6
58.2
71.2
80.4
100.0
1.68
$17,476 $17 ,828
Source: National Research Center of the Arts, Americans and the Arts, 1975 [93].
Notes: All columns include only individuals age 16 or over.
All columns have been adjusted for imputed student incomes.
,60
1,06
2,26
2.09
2.11
3,13
4.17
4.76
6.91
2.77
Percentage
Figure 111.2 Income Distributions of Visits to the Visual Arts and Visits to the Performing Arts,
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Table 111.4 Visits and Visitors to Popular Music Performances by Adjusted Gross Income, 1974-1975
Adjusted Gross Income Distribution
Income Bracket of Visits
Mean Number
of Visits
Per Income Distribution
Individual of Visitors
Percent of Mean
Individuals Number of
in AGI Bracket Visits Per
Who Were Visitors Visitor
$ 0 - $2,999
3,000 - 4,999
5,000 - 6,999
7,000 - 9,999
10,000 - 14,999
15,000 - 19,999
20,000 - 24,999
25,000 - 29,999
30,000+
Averages for
All Income Brackets
Cumulative
rcentage Percentage
3.4% 3.4%
4.5 7.9
7.6 15.5
8.8 24.3
21.5 45.8
24.2 70.0
9.9 79.9
8.5 88.4
11.7 100.1
.58
.67
1.24
1.14
1.26
1.93
1.60
2.22
2.07
1.40
Cumulative
Percentage Percentage
3.3% 3.3%
4.8 8.1
7.9 16.0
9.0 25.0
23.0 48.0
22.4 70.4
10.8 81.2
7.6 88.8
11.4 100.2
Median Incomes $15,788 $15,397
Source: National Research Center of the Arts, Americans and the Arts, 1975 [93].
Notes: All columns include only individuals age 16 or over.
All columns have been adjusted for imputed student income.
14,4%
18.4
33.0
29.8
34.5
45.8
44.6
51,0
52.0
35.9%
4.03
3.64
3.76
3.83
3.65
4.21
3.59
4.35
3.98
3,90
Table 111.5 Visits and Visitors to Movies by Adjusted Gross Income, 1974-1975
Adjusted Gross
Income Bracket
Income Distribution
of Visits
Cumulative
Percentage Percentage
Mean Number
of Visits
Per
Individual
Percent of
Individuals
Income Distribution in AGI Bracket
of Visitors Who Were Visitors
Cumulative
Percentage Percentage
Mean
Number of
Visits Per
Visitor
$ 0 - $2,999 3.6% 3.6% 2.77 4.3% 4,3% 37
3,000 - 4,999 5.8 9.4 3.84 6.2 10.5 46
5,000 - 6,999 7.3 16.7 5.41 7.3 17.8 61
7,000 - 9,999 9.2 25.9 5.34 10.4 28.2 68
10,000 - 14,999 23.0 48.9 6.04 25.8 54,0 76
15,000 - 19,999 22.0 70.9 7.85 20.0 74.0 81
20,000 - 24,999 11.5 82.4 8.31 10.1 84,1 83
25,000 - 29,999 6.8 89.2 7,99 6.1 90.2 81
30,000+ 10.7 99.9 8.59 9.8 100.0 89
Averages for
All Income Brackets 6.26 71
Median Incomes $15,222 $14,243
Source: National Research Center of the Arts, Americans and the Arts, 1975 [93].
Notes: All columns include only individuals age 16 or over.
All columns have been adjusted for imputed student income.
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performing arts a median of $17,828; the median for the popular music
audience was $15,788 and for movies, $15,222. Figure 111.3 shows
that most of the aggregate differences are accounted for by differences
in the highest income brackets.
The audience for the arts is thus remarkably similar across all
art forms surveyed. (Baumol and Bowen found much the same result as
they looked at each of the various types of performing arts in
1963-1965 [11]; the audiences for each art form were very similar with
respect to several demographic characteristics.) This stability of
audience characteristics suggests that the income distribution of
visits given in Table III.1 is a reasonably accurate, if imprecise,
picture of who benefits from governmental support to arts institutions,
Other demographic characteristics besides income can usefully
measure incidence. One might be concerned about the distribution of
arts support by region of the country, race, gender, age, or formal
education of the audience. In particular, previous research on arts
attendance has found education level better predicts an individual's
attendance at the arts than income [48]. Even though it is difficult
to match education level with support for the arts -- data on who pays
for government support of the arts by education of the payer do not
exist -- it is instructive to look at the educational distribution
of arts consumption.
Tables 111.6 and 111.7 and Figure 111,4 describe the educational
distribution of visits, visitors, and the population. Individuals with
a high school education or less -- 63 percent of the population age 16
or over -- are underrepresented in the arts audience (visits) and in
the arts public (visitors); all higher education levels are over-
represented. In this case (as compared to the income distributions)
the distribution of visitors drops off much more rapidly than the
distribution of visits, indicating a more dramatic rise in visits per
visitor over educational levels than over income levels. Thus, the
audience for the arts is extremely well educated; 71 percent of the
audience has had some college education as compared to only 37 percent
of the general population.
In summary, the audience for the arts includes only 58 percent of
the population; this segment of the population enjoying the benefits
from government support for the arts has more income and much more
education than the population in general.10
It is important to note that this analysis does not offer any
guide to the beneficiaries (or benefits) of any particular government
support program. It does not, for example, distinguish between the
beneficiaries of NEA's Federal-State Partnership programs and the
beneficiaries of the Dance Program, each of which might plausibly and
justifiably aim to distribute its benefits in a different manner.
Similarly, it does not distinguish between the benefits which accrue to
Table 111.6 Visits to Art Museums, Theatre, Classical Music and Opera, and Dance by
Level of Education, 1974-1975
Education Level
Education Distribution
of Population
Education Distribution
of Visits
Mean Number
of Visits
Per
Individual
Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage
£~ 10/ A 1%
No Formal Education 0.37. U.3/ U 0.1%0 ,
1 - 7 years 6.6 6.9 1.0 1.1
8 years 5.5 12.4 1.1 2.2
9 - 11 years 14.9 27.3 4.7 6.9
High School Graduate 35.4 62.7 22.6 29.5
Some College 14.1 76.8 18.9 48.4
2 Year College Graduate 3.1 79.9 4.5 52.9
4 Year College Graduate 12.8 92.7 26.4 79.3
Post Graduate Education 7.3 100.0 20.7 100.0
Average For All
Education Levels
Source: National Research Center of the Arts, Americans and the Arts, 1975 [93].
1.26
.66
.90
1.39
2.85
5.96
6.33
9.10
12.55
4.43
Notes: All columns include only individuals age 16 or over.
All columns impute predicted educational levels at graduation to students.
Totals do not equal totals on table of Visits by Adjusted Gross Income (Table III.1)
because of differences in missing values for certain variables and cases.
Table 111.7 Visitors to Art Museums, Theatre, Classical Music and Opera, and Dance by
Level of Education, 1974-1975
Education Level
Education Distribution
of Visitors
Percent of
Individuals With
This Education Level
Who Were Visitors
Mean Number
of Visits
Per
Visitor
Percentage
Cumulative
Percentage
No formal Education 0.2% 0.2% 37.0%
1 - 7 years 1.6 1.8 14.1
8 years 2.9 4.7 30.8
9 - 11 years 8.8 13.5 33.9
High School Graduate 33.2 46.7 54.7
Some College 18.6 65.3 75.8
2 Year College Graduate 3.6 68.9 66.5
4 Year College Graduate 19.7 88.6 88.8
Post Graduate Education 11.3 99.9 89.6
Averages for All
Education Levels 57.8%
Source: National Research Center of the Arts, Americans and the Arts, 1975 [93].
3.41
4.68
2.92
4.10
5.21
7.86
9.52
10.25
14.01
7.66
Notes: All columns include only individuals age 16 or over.
All columns impute predicted educational levels at graduation to students.
Totals do not equal totals on table of Visitors by Adjusted Gross Income (Table 111.2)
because of differences in missing values for certain variables and cases.
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the audience of property-tax-exempt institutions and the benefits which
accrue to individuals attending institutions which have received chari-
table contributions.11 It offers a summary picture of how all the
benefits are distributed and suggests a methodology for determining the
beneficiaries of any particular governmental support program with a
specific set of distributional goals. Ironically, as direct arts
funding turns toward more general support rather than the heretofore
dominant program-linked support, with mechanisms such as NEA's
Challenge Grants and the new Museum Services Institute, the distribution
of the beneficiaries of more and more of the aid to the arts will
resemble the aggregate picture I have drawn.
Who Pays?
The other side of the incidence analysis -- determining who actually
pays for indirect aid to the arts -- is much more complicated than the
discussion of benefits. It is constrained both by incomplete data and
by lack of widely accepted theories concerning the incidence of each
of the various tax mechanisms. Nevertheless, even a partial estimate
of the incidence of payments for the arts is useful and revealing.
The analysis of who pays for the arts -- and, in particular, who
pays for indirect aid to the arts -- includes three steps: First, I
develop a theoretical answer to the question: How should the incidence
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of a tax expenditure be treated? Then, using the individual charitable
income tax deduction as an example, the actual incidence of the addi-
tional income attributable to that tax expenditure is calculated and
compared to the income distribution of the audience -- the beneficiaries
of that indirect aid. And, finally, the incidence of all income to the
arts is estimated and compared to the incidence of the tax expenditure.
This analysis is then used to calculate the incidence of several fund-
ing mechanisms which might be used to support charitable institutions
in lieu of the tax expenditure.
Who pays for the tax expenditure? The answer to this straight-
forward question is, unfortunately, not simple. Money is fungible.
Generally, a specific government expenditure dollar cannot be traced to
its origin. The contractor who built the Kennedy Center would not have
been able to determine whether Boston or San Diego taxpayers' dollars
were used to pay for it, either from his check or from the most detailed
analysis of the Federal budget. Some taxes., of course, are earmarked:
gasoline taxes go to highway construction and Social Security payments
are financed out of the FICA tax.12 For the most part, however,
appropriations come from a general fund fed by a variety of revenues.
The "who pays" question can only be meaningful in a dynamic sense: "If
a new government tax expenditure is created, other things being equal,
whose income after taxes will be changed, and by how much?"
In order to answer this more precise question, assumptions concern-
ing the political response and the economic response to the new tax
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expenditure must be made. Which factors are likely to remain the same
and which are likely to change? The actual responses are crucial in
determining who actually ends up paying for the new tax expenditure,
but without implementing the program, one can only make educated guesses
at the likely responses.
A political response to the tax expenditure is necessary because
of the decrease in direct government revenues needed to pay for the
other programs of that government. That decrease will come about as
taxpayers take advantage of the tax expenditure provisions. Something
has to give; some combination of tax increases and spending cuts will
be implemented.
The range of possible political responses can be approximately
categorized into three scenaries:
(1) If literally nothing else changes when a tax expenditure is
created -- if the previous level for all services is maintained -- the
government's deficit will increase (or its surplus will decrease) by the
amount of the tax expenditure. This will result in increased inflation
throughout the economy. Under this scenario, the marginal cost of the
tax expenditure is financed by consumers in general as they experience
increased costs due to inflation.
(2) If the government opts to hold the deficit (or surplus)
constant, the tax expenditure may be paid for by reduced spending on
some other program(s). In this case the cost of the tax expenditure
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is borne by those who previously benefited from the curtailed programs.
Often, creation of one government spending program is linked to decreased
spending of some other kind for the same constituency. Perhaps this
means that the cost of a new type of aid to the arts is the discon-
tinuation or slowing down of another program for the arts.
(3) Holding the government deficit constant might also be done
by a tax increase. The creation of a tax expenditure is coupled with a
general increase in taxes equal to the cost of the new expenditure, and,
setting aside for the moment the question of economic responses to
changes in tax laws, those who pay higher taxes as a result are those
who are paying for the tax expenditure. This leaves open the further
question: hich tax (estate, income, excise, etc.) would be increased
to support the new expenditure?
Although it is not an iron-clad rule, recent tax reforms seem to
have had an implicit goal of "revenue neutrality;" an attempt has been
made to offset changes within a particular tax with other changes in
the same tax in order to keep its net revenue relatively constant.
But even if it is clear which tax(es) will be modified, the burden can
vary widely depending on how the changes are made. Will the tax be
increased across the board? by tightening administration and catching
a few chiselers? by increasing the highest bracket rate only? or
by removing other special provisions in the tax?
Economic responses to changes in taxation further cloud the pic-
ture. In particular, it is necessary to ask: how would the market
redistribute the tax increase? If property taxes were suddenly increased,
it might seem at first glance that the costs would all be borne by land-
lords. But landlords would quickly realize that they could bargain
some part of the increase into tenants' rents. Economists have widely
varying views as to the net economic response to each type of tax.
What economists call the incidence or burden of a tax is usually challeng-
ing to determine since it depends on the market structure of the sector
to which the tax applies.13
Because the spending side of the budget involves a prediction of
the behavior of the Congress or other legislature, and because the data
and theory on economic responses are scanty and in dispute respectively,
it is possible to determine who pays for the government aid to the arts
only in a sketchy way. To be sure, that picture depends upon the assump-
tions which are made about both types of responses, but in the case of
the arts it will be demonstrated that the net result is not particularly
sensitive to changes in assumptions.
For the purposes of this analysis, I assume that the tax expendi-
ture will result in an adjustment within the same tax and that that
tax will be adjusted proportionately across the board, so as to distrib-
ute the increase in taxes across taxpayers in the same way as the
present payments of taxes. This enables the tax expenditures to be
considered tax by tax. As to economic responses, I have adopted the
"benchmark" burden shifting assumptions identified by Musgrave, Case,
and Leonard [90], reflecting the currently prevailing view for each tax,
How can this theoretical approach be used to determine the inci-
dence of a tax expenditure? Consider the individual charitable income
tax deduction (the one tax expenditure for which relatively complete
data is available). As has been discussed in Chapter II, the implemen-
tation of this particular tax expenditure results in three separate
flows of money to the arts -- a Federal income tax expenditure, a state
tax expenditure (only part of which actually benefits arts institutions),
and an induced gift as part of the donor's private contribution --
in addition to the base gift which the donor would have made in the
absence of the tax expenditure provision. In determining who pays for
the implementation of the tax expenditure provision, the incidence of
each of these three sources of money should be included because all
three are "attributable" to the existence of the tax expenditure.
It is important in understanding the nature of a tax expenditure to
note that any particular tax expenditure will not necessarily result in
all three of these additional sources of funds. Tax expenditures may
not be repeated at different governmental levels; the property tax
exemption is local (though typically required by state law). And, more
significantly, the taxpayers' aggregate response to a tax expenditure
may not include an induced gift. It is quite possible that the tax
expenditure would replace part of the base gift that the donor was other-
wise willing to make, thereby decreasing the total private contribution
rather than increasing it. In this case those who are paying for the
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tax expenditure are paying for what a private donor was willing to
give in any case.
Recent research has indicated that the individual charitable deduc-
tion in the Federal income tax does result in an induced gift in addi-
tion to channeling the foregone taxes to charitable institutions. In
his basic model specification Feldstein [51] estimates that the price
elasticity of giving is -1.24: for every one percent decrease in the
price of charitable giving (1 - taxpayer's marginal tax rate), the
donor will increase his giving by 1.24 percent. Thus, not only are the
foregone taxes being recouped and channeled to charitable institutions,
but the private donor is increasing his private contribution, in the
amount of the induced gift, as well. 14
Using Feldstein's estimate of the price elasticity of giving, the
induced gift to cultural institutions is estimated to be $24 million.
The Federal tax expenditure, estimated in Chapter II, is $180 million
and the state tax expenditure is approximately $10 million (leaving
aside the revenue attributable to capital gains taxes foregone). In
1973 the charitable income tax deduction was thus responsible for
channeling an additional $214 million to cultural institutions.
To assess the incidence of the tax expenditure in accordance with
the theoretical discussion above,I make the following assumptions:
- The Federal income tax expenditure is paid for by a propor-
tional increase in the Federal income tax in the amount of
the tax expenditure.
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- The state income tax expenditure is paid for in much the same
way; state income taxes are increased proportionally.
- The induced gift is paid for by the private donor who in-
creases his private contribution by that amount.
As regards economic response and the shifting of the income tax burden,
economists are generally agreed that income taxes lie where they fall;
the incidence of an income tax is the same as the distribution of the
tax payments themselves.
Based on these assumptions, Table 111.8 and Figure 111.5 compare
visits to the arts -- the arts audience -- to the incidence of the
expenditures attributable to the charitable income tax deduction. If
the money distributed through, and prompted by, the charitable contribution
deduction is raised by the Federal and state income taxes in proportion
to how those taxes are paid and by private induced gifts, and if the
money equally improves the quality of each visit to a visual or perform-
ing arts institution, Figure 111.5 can be read to indicate that another
dollar introduced into this system will on the whole be moved down the
income scale. The money will be raised rather more from the rich and
given rather more to the less rich; every income group below $30,000
benefits more than it pays under this system. But the benefits will
not accrue to the poor; the lion's share will be received by people with
incomes between $10,000 and $25,000, and nearly a fifth will still be spent
to benefit those with incomes over $30,000. Most of the redistributional
Table 111.8 Income Distribution of Who Benefits From and Who Pays For the Individual
Charitable Income Tax Deduction, 1974
Adjusted Gross
Income Bracket
$ 0 - $2,999
3,000 - 4,999
5,000 - 6,999
7,000 - 9,999
10,000 - 14,999
15,000 - 19,999
20,000 - 24,999
25,000 - 29,999
30,000+
Median Incomes
Sources: Column 1,
Column 2,
(1)
Benefits
Income Distribution
of Visits
Percentage
1.9%
3.2
6.9
8.0
18.3
20.6
13.3
9.3
18.5
$17,765
Cumulative
Percentage
1.9%
5.1
12.0
20.0
38.3
58.9
72.2
81.5
100.0
(2)
Payments
Federal Tax Expenditure +
State Tax Expenditure +
Induced Gift
Percentage
0.2%
1.4
2.9
6.7
15.4
16.0
11.9
7.4
38.1
Cumulative
Percentage
0.2%
1.6
4.5
11.2
26.6
42.6
54.5
61.9
100.0
$22,889
National Research Center of the Arts, Americans and the Arts, 1975 [93].
The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study
of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Notes: Column 1 includes only individuals age 16 or over.
Column 1 imputes predicted incomes at graduation to students.
See text for full explanation of calculation of column 2.
Figure 111.5 Income Distributions of Who Benefits From and Who Pays For the
Individual Charitable Income Tax Deduction, 1974.
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effect lies in the fact that more than a third of the funds comes from
the over $30,000 income groups.
This partial result is revealing; the individual charitable income
tax deduction performs reasonably well when measured according to the re-
distributive criterion. But this result by itself is insufficient evi-
dence to decide whether to keep, expand, or abolish this tax expenditure,
although it does seem to imply that the status quo is satisfactorily
meeting a redistribution objective. It is possible that the tax expendi-
ture is embedded in a system of income for the arts that has other elements
that are significantly better at redistributing the benefits within the
system. For example, a system which relied to a much greater-degree on paid
admissions (and to a lesser degree on tax expenditures) might prove to be
a more highly redistributive way of supporting the arts. For this reason
it is instructive to compare the incidence of the expenditures due to the
tax expenditure provision to the incidence of other sources of income for
the arts and to the aggregate of all these sources of income.
The logic of the aggregate incidence analysis is straightforward:
first, each of the sources of income for the arts is identified; then,
an income distribution of who pays for each item of income is calculated;
and, finally, each distribution is weighted according to the contribution
that each income item makes to total income for the arts.
84
In mathematical notation the model is as follows:
(1) For ease in presentation and calculation arts institutions are
divided into two groups, museums and performing arts. Each has
its own particular configuration of income sources:
X. = The set of income sources for museum9. i1,...
Y = The set of income sources for performing arts. j=l,...,J
(2) Each income item is associated with an income distribution of
payments for that item:
d(X ) = Income distribution of payments for item X.ik
d(Y )k = Income distribution of payments for item Y
In both cases the data are categorized into nine income brackets:
k=l,...,9.
(3) Two sets of weights are associated with each income item. The
first measures the contribution of the income item to its
institutional sector:
w(X ) = The weight income item i has in total income to
museums.
w(Y.) The weight income item j has in total income to
the performing arts.
The second weight measures the contribution of each institutional
sector to the total income for the arts:
W = The proportion of total arts income attributable to
m
museums.
W = The proportion of total arts income attributable to
performing arts.
Therefore, the calculation of the aggregate incidence distribution,
Dk, is given by:
D W w(Y + d(Y)k
i=l j=1
k=l,..., 9
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This equation is the basic mathematical structure of each of the models
of incidence discussed below. By adjusting the various parameters in the
model -- particularly the relative weights of each of the income items --
the effect of any change in arts funding on the aggregate incidence of
income for the arts can be determined.
What is the total annual income to the arts? And what are the
various sources of this income? By focussing on attendance at the arts
as the numeraire of benefits, the analysis can be restricted to arts
institutions open to the public on a regular basis for performances or
shows or the like. Arts service organizations such as the American
Symphony Orchestra League, grants to artists, public broadcasting, and
art schools need not be included in this analysis (though a similar
analysis could be done for each of them). Because this study focusses
on government aid to the arts, profit-making arts institutions ineligible
for that aid also need not be considered.
But even with these omissions it is still complicated to identify
precisely the income flows which are of interest. The analysis of
institutional income which follows relies heavily on two major surveys
of the finances of arts organizations: The Finances of the Performing
Arts by the Ford Foundation [54] and Museums U.S.A.: A Survey Report
conducted by the National Research Center of the Arts for the National
Endowment for the Arts [94]. The combined data provided by these two
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reports represent a substantial portion of the total income to the arts
institutions we are considering. The largest portion of the money which
still remains unaccounted for probably flows directly to arts performance
centers, such as Lincoln Center, which are not owned by the performing
arts institutions which perform there. (Some of the income to these
centers, of course, is counted because it flows through the individual
performing arts institutions' budgets.) Another source of income for
the performing arts which is underestimated is provision of artistic
programs directly by governments such as the "Summerthing" program
(operated by The Mayor's Office of Cultural Affairs) in Boston, but,
again, if these programs support performing arts organizations included
in the survey, they are being counted.
Nevertheless, the combination of these two major surveys will do
quite well at offering a picture of the distribution of payments to the
arts among income classes in the population. I assume that the other
sources of income, which have not been adequately identified and quanti-
fied, will not be distributed very differently from the aggregate income
that has been identified.
Tables III.9a and III.9b summarize the income data for performing
arts institutions and museums. But even with these data there remains
a question as to which income items should be included in the analysis.
There are basically two schools of thought, reflected in different
accounting practices, as to what items ought to be considered income in
a particular year. One view is that only that money which is spent to
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Table III.9a Income of Performing Arts Institutions, 1970-1971
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Income Item
Earned Income
Ticket Income
Amount
$ 62,723,000
Percentages
Model 1 Model 2 Distributiona
40.0% 37.9%
Services Income
from Government
Services Income
from Other Sources
Recordings/Films/
Radio/TV
Income from
Performances of
Other Groups
School/Class/
Training Income
Other Nonperformance
Earned Income
Unearned Income
Individual
Contributions
Business
Contributions
Combined/United Art
Fund Contributions
Local Foundation
Contributions
Other Local
Contributions
Federal Government
Grants
State Government
Grants
Local Government
Grants
6,011,000
11,663,000
2,579,000
(938,000)
1,108,000
6,321,000
17,700,000
6,173,000
4,675,000
6,073,000
4,869,000
3,390,000
2,755,000
2,151,000
(continued)
3.8
7.4
1.6
b
0.7
4.0
11.3
3.9
3.0
3.9
3.1
2.2
1.8
1.4
3.6
7.1
1.6
b
0.7
3.8
10.7
3.7
2.8
3.7
2,9
2.0
1.7
1.3
Table III.9a (continued)
(1)
Income Item
National Foundation
Grants
Corpus Earnings Used
for Operations
Other Income
Corpus Principal
Transfer to
Operations
Corpus Increase-
Gifts/Grants/Other
Subtotal Model 1
Subtotal Model 2
Amount
$ 8,193,000
7,840,000
2,661,000
11,204,000
$ 156,885,000
$ 165,428,000
Percentages
Model 1 Model 2 Distributiona
5.2
5.0
1.7
n. i.
5.0
4.7
n. i.
6.8
Source: Columns 1 and 2, Ford Foundation, The Finances of the Performing
Arts, 1974 [55].
Notes: a Refers to distributions contained in Table III.10
b Item is distributed according to the aggregate distribution
of all other income items. It is iterated into the analysis.
c 1970-1971 was the last year of the major Ford Foundation
program to supplement the endowments of symphony
orchestras. During this program corpus increase figures
were abnormally high. The estimate which is used here
allocates the Ford Program over 10 years and adds
corpus increases not attributable to that-program.
n.i. = Not included in this model.
(2) (3) (4) (5)
Table III.9b Income of Art and Art/History Museums, 1971-1972
(1)
Income Item
Operating Revenues
General and Special
Exhibit Admissions
Admissions to
Lectures, Films,
Performances
Tuition Payments
Other Program
Charges
Sales of Articles
and Materials from
Museum Shop and by
Other Means
Restaurants and
Parking Facilities
and Related
Activities
Fees for Services to
Other Museums
Miscellaneous
Private Support
Individuals
Corporations
Foundations
Special Fundraising
Events
United Fund
Organizations
Allocated by Colleges
and Universities
Other
(2)
Amount
$ 12,286,000
2,517,000
7,501,000
974,000
19,682,000
21,897,000
(373,000)
5,101,000
27,302,000
3,211,000
13,965,000
6,976,000
1,305,000
6,814,000
1,216,000
(3) (4)
Percentages
Model 1 Model 2
5.6%
1.2
3.4
0.4
9.0
10.1
b
2.3
12.5
1.5
6.4
3.2
0.6
3.1
0.6
(5)
Distributiona
4.1%
0.8
2.5
0.3
6.5
7.3
b
1.7
9.1
1.1
4.6
2.3
0.4
2.3
0.4
(continued)
Table III.9b (continued)
(1) (2)
Income Item Amount.
Percentages
Model 1 Model 2 Distributiona
Non-Operating Revenues
Investment Income
Gain/Loss on
Disposition of
Investment Properties
and Other Fixed Assets
Public Sector Support
Local Government
State Arts Council
or Commission
Other State Government
NEA
NEH
NSF
National Museum Act
U.S. Office of
Education
Other Federal Gov't
Transfers
Transfers from
Other Funds
$ 38,489,000
3,665,000
21,642,000
2,279,000
2,951,000
668,000
578,000
21,000,
51,000
804,000
9,341,000
6,448,000
17.7% 12.8%
1.7
9.9
1.0
1.4
0.3
0.3
*
*
0.4
4.3
3.0
1.2
7.2
0.8
1.0
0.2
0.2
*
*
0.3
3.1
n.i.
Additions to Fund Balances of All Funds
Contributions, Grants
Bequests, etc. 47,000,000
Gain/Loss on Disposition
of Investments 22,715,000
Investment Income 14,775,000
Other 5,502,000
Other Than Current Funds
n.i.
n.i.
n.i.
n.i.
15.6
7.5
4.9
1.8
(continued)
(3) (4) (5)
Table III.9b (continued)
(1)
Income Item Amount
Subtotal Model 1
Subtotal Model 2
Percentages
Model 1 Model 2 Distributiona
$ 217,684,000
$ 301,228,000
Source: Columns 1 and 2, National Research Center of the Arts,
Museums USA: A Survey Report, January 1975 [96].
Notes: a Refers to distributions contained in Table III.10
b Item is distributed according to the aggregate distribution
of all other income items. It is iterated into the analysis.
*
Less than 0.1%.
n.i. = Not included in this model.
(2) (3) (4) (5)
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mount the program in that year ought to be-considered as income for
the purposes of matching expenditures to benefits. This view includes
growth in endowment and other similar funds only to the extent that it
is transferred to operating expenses during the year. The alternative
view holds that all income, including increases in principal and capital
appreciation, should be considered income and should be included in the
equation. Thus, the income is included in the year in which it is
received rather than in the year in which it is spent.15 In the analysis
that.follows, Models 1 and 2, respectively, reflect these two views
on income accounting; the relative weights each income item has under
these models are shown in Tables III.9a and III.9b.
The next step is to associate each of these income items with an
income distribution of those who pay for the item. The argument relies
very heavily on the research on incidence done by Musgrave, Case, and
Leonard [89]. Their research estimated the distribution of tax burdens
and benefits in 1968. A number of the distributions used in the present
analysis are extrapolated from this study using the 1974 distribution
of Federal income tax payments as a base of comparison and calculation,
In general, the analysis adheres to the "benchmark" incidence assump-
tions outlined by Musgrave, Case, and Leonard.
The income distributions related specifically to the arts are
developed from a number of sources. I assume that paid admissions to
museums are, on the average, relatively constant; each individual pays
no more or no less than any other individual. Therefore, admissions
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to museums are simply distributed in the same way that the audience
for museums is distributed. Paid admissions to the performing arts, on
the other hand, differ by income class because there is typically a
range of admission prices for each performance. In the only work done
to date on the relationship between average ticket price paid and income,
Moore [85] has estimated that the elasticity of the average cost of a
ticket with respect to purchaser income for Broadway in 1962 was .191;
or, in other words, for every one percent increase in income the indivi-
dual would purchase a ticket which was approximately .2 percent more
expensive. This elasticity is used to estimate the relative average
ticket price paid by individuals in each of the income brackets, and
then these relative prices are adjusted according to the income distri-
bution of attendance to arrive at the income distribution of paid
admissions. The incidence of income items that include tax expendi-
tures is calculated in the same way as the incidence of the individual
charitable income tax deduction was calculated above.
Table III.10 summarizes the income distributions used in the aggre-
gate incidence calculation and also includes the income distribution of
the population for purposes of comparison.
Using these distributions, the calculation of the aggregate
incidence distribution follows the mathematical formulation outlined
above. Adjustments have been made for the facts that the performing arts
data represent approximately 90 percent of the total performing arts
expenditures and that the two surveys were conducted in consecutive years.
Table III.10 Income Distributions of Incidence of Variables Used in the Aggregate Incidence Analysis
$0- 3,000- 5,000- 7,000- 10,000- 15,000- 20,000- 25,000-
$2,999 4,999 6,999 9,999 14,999 19,999 24,999 29,999 30,000+ Source(s)
Variables Used in Models 1, la, and 2:
A. Arts Audience(Visits)
B. Paid Admissions -
Performing Arts
C. Federal Income Taxes
D. Total Federal Taxes
E. State Income Taxes
1.9% 3.2% 6.9% 8.0% 18.3% 20.6% 13.3% 9.3% 18.5% (a)
1.1
0.2
0.7
0.0
F. Total State and
Local Taxes 1.3
G. Property Taxes
H. Aggregate Individual
Charitable Giving
(Private Contribution
+ State and Federal
Tax Expenditures)
I. Individual Charitable
Giving to Culture
(Private Contribution
+ State and Federal
Tax Expenditures)
J. Individual Charitable
Giving to Education
(Private Contribution
+ State and Federal
Tax Expenditures)
2.7
1.6
4.8
0.4
8.3
1.7 10.4
2.2
0.1
1.6
3.8
0.9
3.1
5.8
3.4
7.1 17.0 19.6 13.7 10.0 23.0
7.7 17.4 17.9 12.8
5.5 10.3 19.6 18.1 11.9
1.7
7.9 31.2
6.8 22.3
5.5 15.9 18.0 15.4 12.1 30.9
7.1 12.3 21.2 18.2 11.4
7.5 12.2 20.1 16.8 10.4
5.5 10.5 22.0 19.3 10.5
2.0
4.8
4.5 10.5 11.3 9.7
9.6 20.5 18.8 11.3
6.0 14.1
5.4 15.4
6.2 20.1
6.0 55.0
6.8 23.5
(a),(b)
(c)
(d)
(d)
(d)
(d)
(d),(e)
(d),(e)
(d),(e)
(continued)
Variable
Table III.10 (continued)
$0- 3,000- 5,000- 7,000- 10,000- 15,000- 20,000- 25,000-
$2,999 4,999 6,999 9,999 14,999 19,999 24,999 29,999 30,000+ Source(s)
K. Corporate Charitable
Giving to Culture
(Private Contribution
+ State and Federal
Tax Expenditures)
L. Investment Income -
Museums (Including
Tax Expenditures)
M. Investment Income -
Performing Arts
(Including Tax
Expenditures)
N. Consumer Expenditures
for Education
0. Consumer Expenditures
for "Other Recreation"
1.0
0.2
0.2
1.5
3.5
7.2
1.4
1.9
2.1
4.5
5.7
2.3
2.6
2.2
8.3 14.5 14.0 10.4
4.8 10.8 11.5
5.1 11.1 11.7
9.8
9.8
5.5 15.4 21.3 18.9
6.0 11.4 23.1 20.6 13.7
7.1 31.7
6.1 53.3
6.2 51.2
9.4 23.8
4.9 12.3
Additional Variables Used in Models 3, 3a, 4. 4a, 5,
P. Individual Base Gift
to All Charity
Q. Individual Base Gift
to Culture
R. Individual Base Gift
to Education
S. Corporate Base Gift
to Culture
3.1
0.0
1.5
0.7
4.9
0.0
2.4
6.0
6.7 12.3 24.2 20.1
0.0
3.3
4.9
0.0
6.1
0.5
5.4
1.7
4.9
9.3
5.1
6.5
6.6 11.7 12.2 10.1
5.2 14.0
2.9 89.8
3.6 66.2
7.8 40.0 See text
(continued)
Variable
See text
(d),(e)
(d),(e)
(f)
(f)
and 5a:
(e)
(e)
(e)
Table III.10 (continued)
$0- 3,000- 5,000- 7,000- 10,000- 15,000- 20,000- 25,000-
$2,999 4,999 6,999 9,999 14,999 19,999 24,999 29,999 30,000+ Source(s)
T. Base Gifts in Invest-
ment Income-Museums
U. Base Gifts in Invest-
ment Income -
Performing Arts
Variables Included for
Adjusted Gross Income
Population
Individual Induced
Gift to Culture
0.1
0.1
0.5
1.1
0.4
0.9
Purposes of Comparison:
2.7 4.3 5.9
8.1 9.4 8.5
0.0 0.0 0.0
0.6
1.2
10.8
10.9
0.0
1.5
2.5
21.4
23.8
2.6
3.6
19.1
17.5
0.04 1.0
5.6
6.0
12.0
8.6
3.0
3.3 85.3
3.8 80.8
6.7
5.3
17,0
7.9
1.6 94,3
Sources: (a) National Research Center of the Arts, Americans and the Arts, 1975 [93],
(b) Moore, "The Demand for Broadway Theatre Tickets," The Review of Economics and
Statistics, February 1966 [85].
(c) Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-1974: Individual Income Tax Returns [138].
(d) Musgrave, Case, and Leonard, "The Distribution of Fiscal Burdens and Benefits,"
Public Finance Quarterly, July 1974 [91].
(e) The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy,
1974 [86].
(f) U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey
Series: Interview Survey, 1972-73 [134].
For further discussion of how each distribution was calculated see text.
Variable
V.
W.
X.
(e)
(e)
(c)
(a)
(e)
Note:
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The results of Models 1 and 2 are reported in Table III.11. It is
evident from these results that the type of accounting has very little
influence on the distribution of payments. The all-inclusive definition,
Model 2, is only slightly more reliant on payments from the highest
income class than is Model 1.
The most surprising result is that the aggregate incidence of all
sources of income is remarkably similar to the incidence of the income
flows attributable to the individual charitable income tax deduction.
Payments prompted by the tax expenditure come slightly more from the
highest income category and slightly less from the lowest income cate-
gories, but at the level of accuracy of the data and of the analysis
these differences are insignificant. Thus, the tax expenditure redis-
tributes benefits in roughly the same way as the entire arts support
system does.
These aggregate models do not account for all tax expenditures
for the arts; estate and gift tax expenditures and capital gains tax
expenditures are omitted because the data on institutional incomes do
not adequately reflect them and because their magnitudes are relatively
small. Property tax exemptions, on the other hand, represent a rather
substantial subsidy to the arts; $136 million in 1976.16 According to
the assumptions used above, property tax exemptions are tax expenditures
currently paid for by property taxpayers in proportion to the amount of
17
total property tax which they pay.
Table III.11 Incidence of Income of Arts Institutions, Various Models
Aggregate Incidence Models
Adjusted Gross
Income Bracket Audience
$ 0 - $2,999 1.9%
3,000 - 4,999 3.2
5,000 - 6,999 6.9
7,000 - 9,999 8.0
10,000 - 14,999 18.3
15,000 - 19,999 20.6
20,000 - 24,999 13.3
25,000 - 29,999 9.3
30,000+ 18.5
Income of
Arts Institutions
Attributable to
Individual
Charitable Income
Tax Deduction
0.2%
1.4
2.9
6.7
15.4
16.0
11.9
7.4
38.1
Present
Configuration of
Income
1
0.9%
2.9
4.6
7.1
15.4
16.4
11.7
7.6
33.4
la
1.0%
4.1
5.1
7.9
16.2
16.5
11.5
7.2
30.5
2
0.8%
2.7
4.2
6.7
14.5
15.4
11.4
7.3
37.1
Alternative
Income
Configurations
3
1.2%
3.2
4.8
6.7
14.4
15.6
11.3
7.4
35.4
3a
1.3%
4.6
5.4
7.8
15.6
15.8
11.1
7.0
31.3
Note: See text for full explanation of calculations.
4
1.0%
3.6
5.0
7.6
15.7
16.2
11.5
7.3
31.9
4a
1.1%
4.7
5.4
8.3
16.4
16.3
11.3
7.0
29.3
5
1.3%
3.1
5.3
7.0
15.3
16.8
11.9
8.0
31.5
5a
1.4%
4.3
5.7
7.8 **
16.1
16.8
11.7
7.6
28.9
Adding property tax exemptions as an income item to Model 1 results
in the incidence distribution reported in Model la. Once again, the
results are surprisingly similar. Inclusion of property tax exemptions
results in a slight downward shift in the aggregate incidence distribu-
tion but not enough to establish a pattern clearly different from any of
the incidence distributions already discussed.
But note that the incidence distribution of the property tax exemp-
tion itself (distribution F, Table III.10) is more concentrated in lower
income brackets than is the income distribution of the audience (distri-
bution A). In other words, looking at this source of support alone, a
dollar of income realized through property tax exemption tends to be re-
distributed to higher income groups. The situation with this tax expen-
diture is just the reverse of that which we observed for the individual
charitable income tax deduction. If the property tax exemption were
removed and that amount of income were made up via all other sources of
income in proportion to their present contribution to income, the overall
incidence would move toward higher income brackets from Model la to Model 1.
Using the techniques outlined above we can test what changes the
discontinuation of the charitable income tax deduction (for individuals
and for corporations) would bring about in the overall incidence of arts
support. Model 3 assumes that the charitable income tax deduction would
be replaced with a system which made up the lost income by increasing
all of the other sources of income in proportion to their relative
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contribution at present. Model 4 assumes that the foregone revenues
would be made up entirely from direct Federal support raised from income
brackets in the same proportion as the present distribution of Federal
tax revenues. And Model 5 assumes that the foregone revenues would be
made up entirely in increased admissions revenues, in proportion to the
current income distribution of the audience for museums and in propor-
tion to the current distribution of paid admissions for the performing
arts. The weights for each of these models are summarized in Tables III.12a
and III.12b. Models 3a, 4a, and 5a add property tax exemptions to each of
the models.
The removal of the charitable income tax deduction necessitates a
major reallocation of income sources for arts institutions; museums
lose 29 percent of their income -- approximately $63 million, while
performing arts institutions lose 20 percent -- approximately $36 million.
Both types of institutions are heavily dependent on the income which flows
to them as a result of the incentives incorporated in the charitable
income tax deduction.
Yet, despite the major changes in the configuration of income to
the arts that the alternative models impose, in every case the results of
the aggregate incidence analysis are astonishingly consistent. All of
the changes or modifications in the configuration of support for the
arts have very little effect on the distribution of payments for arts
services among income groups in the population. The system is quite
stable.
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Table III.12a Weights of Income Sources for Models 3, 4, and 5;
Performing Arts Institutions, 1970-1971
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Income Item
Earned Income
Ticket Income
Services Income
from Government
Services Income
from Other Sources
Recordings/Films/
Radio/TV
Income from Performances
of Other Groups
School/Class/Training
Income
Other Nonperformance
Earned Income
Unearned Income
Individual Contributions -
Base Gift
Business Contributions -
Base Gift
Combined/United Art Fund
Contributions - Base Gift
Local Foundation
Contributions - Base Gift
Other Local Contributions -
Base Gift
Federal Government Grants
State Government Grants
Local Government Grants
National Foundation Grants -
Base Gift
Base Gift in Corpus Earnings
Used for Operations
Percentages
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Distributiona
49.9% 40.0% 59.8%
4.8
9.3
2.1
b
0.9
5.0
4.6
2.5
2.5
2.9
1.3
2.7
2.2
1.7
3.9
2.9
3.8
7.4
1.6
b
0.7
4.0
3.7
2.0
2.0
2.3
1.0
22.0
1.8
1.4
3.1
2.3
3.8
7.4
1.6
b
0.7
4.0
3.7
2.0
2.0
2.3
1.0
2.2
1.8
1.4
3.1
2.3
(continued)
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Table III.12a (continued)
(1) (2)
Income Item
Other Income
Base Gift in Corpus
Principal Transfer to
Operations
Percentages
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Distributiona
1.0% 0.8 0.8
Source: Column 1, Ford Foundation, The Finances of the Performing Arts,
1974 [55].
Notes: a Refers to distributions contained in Table III,10.
b Item is distributed according to the aggregate distribution
of all other income items. It is iterated into the analysis.
(3) (4) (5)
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Table III.12b Weights of Income Sources for Models 3, 4,
Art and Art/History Museums, 1971-1972
(2) (3)
Percentages
(4)
and 5:
(5)
Income Item
Operating Revenues
General and Special
Exhibit Admissions
Admissions to Lectures,
Films, and Performances
Tuition Payments
Other Program Charges
Sales of Articles and
Materials from Museum
Shop and by Other Means
Restaurants and Parking
Facilities and Related
Activities
Fees for Services to
Other Museums
Miscellaneous
Private Support
Individuals - Base Gift
Corporations - Base Gift
Foundations - Base Gift
Special Fundraising Events -
Base Gift
United Fund Organizations -
Base Gift
Allocated by Colleges and
Universities - Base Gift
Other
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Distributiona
7.9% 5.6%
1.6
4.9
0.6
12.7
1.2
3.4
0.4
9.0
14.2 10.1
b
3.3
5.8
1.1
5.4
1.5
0.6
1.9
0.3
b
2.3
4.1
0.8
3.8
1.0
0.4
1.3
0.2
34.8%
1.2
3.4
0.4
9.0
10.1
b
2.3
4.1
0.8
3.8
1.0
0.4
1.3
0.2
(continued)
(1)
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Table III.12b (continued)
(1) (2)
Income Item
Non-Operating Revenues
Base Gift in Investment
Income
Base Gift in Gain/Loss on
Disposition of Investment
Properties and Other
Fixed Assets
Public Sector Support
Local Government
State Arts Council or
Commission
Other State Government
NEA
NEH
NSF
National Museum Act
U.S. Office of Education
Other Federal Government
Transfers
Base Gift in Transfers
from Other Funds
Percentages
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Distributiona
10.7%
1.0
14.0
1.5
1.9
0.4
0.4
*
*
0.5
6.0
1.8
7.6%
0.7
9.9
1.0
1.4
0.3
0.3
*
*
0.4
33.5
1.3
7.6%
0.7
9.9
1.0
1.4
0.3
0.3
*
*
0.4
4.3
1.3
Source: Column 1, National Research Center of the Arts,
Museums USA: A Survey Report, January 1975 [96].
Notes: a Refers to distributions contained in Table III.10.
b Item is distributed according to the aggregate distribution
of all other income items. It is iterated into the analysis.
* Less than 0.1%.
(3) (4) (5)
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When the charitable income tax deduction is removed, the Federal
income tax expenditure, the state income tax expenditure, and the
induced gift are lost.18 When they are replaced by other sources of
income the weighted average of their distributions -- Federal income
taxes paid (distribution C, Table III.10), state income taxes paid
(distribution E), and induced gifts made by donors (distribution X) --
is replaced with other incidence distributions. Because payments for
the induced gift to culture are concentrated in the highest income
bracket, one might expect that replacing this distribution with any of
the other distributions would shift the aggregate incidence onto lower
income brackets. But the induced gift is a relatively small portion --
approximately 11 percent -- of the additional income attributable to the
charitable income tax deduction. Thus, the overall incidence is mostly
dependent on how the incidence of the alternative source(s) of income
compare to the incidence of the Federal and state income tax expenditures.
In Model 3, they are replaced by the weighted average of the incidence
distributions for all the other sources of income; in Model 4 they are
replaced by the distribution of total Federal taxes paid (distribution D);
and in Model 5 they are replaced by the distribution of paid admissions
for the performing arts (distribution B) and by the distribution of the
arts audience for museums (distribution A). In each case the replace-
ment distributions are not different enough from the distributions of
:the tax expenditure provisions they replaced to have a noticeable effect
on the overall incidence.
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The results of the aggregate incidence analysis are summarized in
Figure 111.6. On balance, one dollar of payment into this system
from existing sources is shifted downward to benefit the individuals
who are somewhat less wealthy than those who paid it. On a redistributional
criterion the present system, in general, and the charitable income tax
deduction, in particular, cannot be faulted. 9 But these results have an
important implication. If, as I argue in later chapters, the charitable
income tax deduction does poorly when judged by other, widely-accepted
public policy criteria, it can be replaced by a variety of funding schemes
which will not wreak havoc on the distribution of payments for the aid,
Individuals will pay about as much as they paid before for the overall
support of arts institutions. At the same time it is important to recog-
nize that the system, although slightly progressive, does not induce a
wide redistribution of aid. It is redistributive in only a limited sense;
from the very wealthy to the moderately wealthy.
It might have struck the reader that nowhere in this chapter have
I referred to the income distribution of the individual charitable con-
tribution tax expenditure which was carefully constructed in Chapter II,
(See Table 11.4.) It should be clear that that distribution does not
describe who pays for the tax expenditure; it indicates who decides how
the tax expenditure will be spent. This is a crucial distinction, and
in the next two chapters I discuss the implications of allocating the
decisionmaking in the way we do.
Figure 111.6 Incidence of Income of Arts Institutions, 1974.
3,000-
4,999
Table 111.11
5,000-
6,999 9,999 14,999 19,999 24,999 29,999
Household Income
30%-
20%'
10%.
$0-
$2,999
Source:
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CHAPTER IV: DECENTRALIZATION -- HOW DECISIONMAKING
IS ALLOCATED IN THE INDIRECT AID SYSTEM
It is more than evident from the incidence analysis in the pre-
ceding chapter that the process by which decisions are made to allocate
resources to the arts is complicated, involving many different decision-
makers and numerous different sources of funds. Individual consumers
allocate a substantial portion of the income of arts institutions by
deciding to attend -- and to pay admission fees. Individual and corporate
donors decide to allocate funds to the arts -- including tax expenditures
as well as their own funds -- as part of their charitable contributions.
Government agencies -- primarily arts councils but including other
agencies as well -- make decisions about how to allocate various portions
of their budgets to the arts. Legislatures make decisions about how much
money to allocate to these various agencies. And foundations decide how
much of their funds to give to the arts. Even individual institutions
can decide how much they get in (local) government support by building
or buying property and qualifying for property tax exemptions!
Despite the multiplicity of funding sources, one characteristic plays
an important role throughout this system: decentralization of decision-
making. At several crucial points in this system arts funding is deter-
mined as the aggregate of many decisions made by many different individuals
expressing their own tastes and preferences. In general, decentralization
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of decisionmaking is evident in three different components of the arts
funding system: decisions made by consumers in the arts market, decisions
made by donors in the indirect aid system, and decisions made within
government arts agencies.
In the marketplace individual consumers are free to purchase whatever
types of art they prefer: theatre tickets, artworks, movies, records and
tapes, or the like. Their decisions are weighted by their market power;
decisionmaking is decentralized according to ability and desire to pay.
In the indirect aid system donors are allowed the opportunity to determine
not only the amount and recipient of their private contribution but also
the amount (calculated from the donor's private contribution and marginal
tax rate) and recipient of the attendant tax expenditure. Decisionmaking
about the private contribution is decentralized in much the same way as
in the marketplace; the allocation of decisionmaking about the tax
expenditure, also allocated among many individual donors, is explored in
detail in this chapter. Even direct government arts funding decisions
can be viewed as the result of a type of decentralization. The programs
of government arts agencies are subject to annual review by legislatures
and public executives who, in turn, are held accountable by the voters.
According to this view of decentralization, a government program is the
result of a demand for that program expressed by the public at large.
Even though any particular decision made within an arts agency is made
by a relatively few individuals, that decision is part of a broader
program with goals and objectives hammered out through a political process.
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Decentralization is the most often claimed virtue of the indirect
aid system, particularly of the charitable contribution deduction which
allows many individuals to determine, within certain bounds, the amounts
and recipients of many charitable donations. This view portrays the
indirect aid system as a counterbalance to the seemingly centralized,
heavy hand of a government bureaucracy (though little attention is paid
to the portion of the system which is most decentralized, the "pay as you
go" system of individual paid admissions discussed above).
The "decentralization view" of the charitable income tax deduction
is widely-held. The final report of the Commission on Private Philanthropy
and Public Needs states:
It is entirely appropriate, this commission believes, that
as a nation we encourage private giving to nonprofit
"charitable" organizations and that we do so by governmental
means. It is appropriate because these organizations
play an indispensable role in American life and because
private giving is essential not only to their autonomous
existence but also for maintaining the level of services and
benefits they provide to ultimate beneficiaries. Governmental
encouragements to giving are appropriate, further, because
giving provides an important mode of citizen expression. By
saying with his or her own dollars what needs should be met,
what objectives pursued, what values served, every contributor
exercises, in a profound sense, a form of self-government,
a form that parallels, complements and enriches the democratic
electoral process itself [40].
Despite the naivete of this statement in considering charitable contri-
butions private money,2 it reveals a widespread sentiment about the
"pluralistic" nature of the charitable income tax deduction.
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A similar statement is made by Bittker:
I would argue that the deduction can be viewed as a
mechanism for permitting the taxpayer to direct, within
modest limits, the social functions to be supported by
his tax payments. We have heard much in recent years
of alienation, of discontent with bureaucracy, and of the
citizen's inability to exert influence over governmental
activity. It has often been asserted -- with good reason, in
my opinion -- that voluntary nonprofit agencies under private
control provide an antidote to the citizen's feeling that
he is ineffectual and powerless, at the mercy of big business
and big government. It has, therefore, been customary to
defend tax exemption for these organizations and deductions
for their benefactors as enhancing their ability to function
as independent, decentralized centers of power. Of at
least equal importance, in my view, is the fact that the
deduction gives the taxpayer a chance to divert funds that
would otherwise be spent as Washington determines, and to
allocate them to other socially approved functions. One
need not be an anarchist to applaud the modest opportunity
that this gives the citizen to control the use of funds
that will in any event be taken from him [19].
And the editorial page of The Boston Globe [23], advocating a tax credit
system to replace the charitable income tax deduction, finds "something
very appealing -- one is tempted to say very American -- about this
system of the individual personally directing the flow of some 'government'
dollars."
Each of these comments illustrates a mystique surrounding the
charitable income tax deduction. At the center of this mystique is a
particular concept of decentralization.
Advocates for the various segments of the indirect aid system --
particularly the charitable income tax deduction -- argue that decentrali-
zation takes on two important forms, both of which are in evidence in the
quotes cited above. Decisions are decentralized with respect to:
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(1) Who decides
(2) What types of decisions are made.
This chapter, addressing the question, "who is deciding how the money is
to be spent?" assesses the degree to which this decisionmaking is really
decentralized under the charitable income tax deduction. In the following
chapter, I take a more general view of the types of decisions made within
the indirect aid system.
From a public policy standpoint, it is particularly important to
observe whether or not the allocation of the tax expenditure portion of
the total charitable contribution has been decentralized. The private
contribution -- base gift plus induced gift -- is considered to be
entirely in the hands of the individual donor and is therefore only in-
directly related to the critical question here: To what extent has the
individual charitable income tax deduction decentralized the decision-
making about allocating the tax expenditure?
Tax expenditure analysis facilitates distinction of those who pay
for the tax expenditure from those who decide how the money is to be
spent. Those deciding how the money is to be spent are those individuals
actually taking advantage of a particular tax expenditure -- by writing
a check which includes a tax expenditure -- even though all taxpayers
are helping to pay for the tax expenditure. Thus, Table 11.5 which
reports the income distributions of tax expenditures for culture and for
all charitable giving can also be viewed as a distribution of who decides
how the tax expenditure will be spent.3 And according to the arguments
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presented in Chapter III, the income distribution of who pays for the
tax expenditure is nothing more than thre income distribution of who pays
Federal income taxes.4
These data are repeated here in a slightly different form as
Table IV.1. From this table alone it is clear that there is a -mismatch
between who pays for the tax expenditure and who decides how it is to
be spent, It is not immediately obvious from this table alone whether
or not this mismatch indicates that the decisionmaking has been decentral-
ized, and, if so, relative to what criteria; the remainder of this
chapter offers a number of ways to consider this question and develops
some tentative conclusions about the degree to which decentralization
has taken place.
Models of Decentralization
There is no single, widely adopted theory about the type of decision-
making society expects -- or, indeed, wants -- when we allow individuals
to allocate the tax expenditure component of charitable contributions.
For this reason, the analysis defers the question of "what ought we be
doing?" until we see a picture of what we are doing. In order to test
whether or not decisionmaking power has been effectively decentralized in
the absence of any commonly accepted normative theory, I suggest four
models (and several variations of them) on the basis of which a society
might decide to allocate decisionmaking to individuals. These models
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Table IV.1 Comparison of Who Pays For and Who Decides the Allocation of
the Federal Tax Expenditure for all Charity: Individual
Charitable Income Tax Deductions, 1973
(1)
Who Pays
(2)
Who Decides
Income Distribution of
Total Income Taxes Paid
Income Distribution of
Aggregate Tax Expenditure
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000 +
Percentage
14.3%
19.6
18.2
18.5
11.3
9.6
4.6
2.3
0.7
0.8
Cumulative
Percentage
14.3%
33.9
52.1
70.6
81.9
91.5
96.1
98.4
99.1
99.9
Percentage
7.1%
13.4
14.0
18.9
13.2
13.2
8.3
5.6
2.6
3.7
Cumulative
Percentage
7.1%
20.5
34.5
53.4
66.6
79.8
88.1
93.7
96.3
100.0
Sources: Column 1, Internal Revenue Service, Statistics
Individual Income Tax Returns [137].
of Income - 1973:
Column 2, The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs,
National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
This table does not include the tax expenditure due to capital
gains taxes foregone on gifts of property.
Modified
Income
Class
Note:
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provide benchmarks to which the present system can be compared, and we
can ascertain to which of these models the existing system best conforms.5
MODEL I: The "Benefit Theory of Taxation" Model.
Decisionmaking in this model is allocated to households
according to how much they have helped pay for the govern-
ment support program; e.g., those households that have paid
25 percent of the government's revenue are entitled to
disburse -- and decide how to disburse -- 25 percent of the
total tax expenditure (and, as a corollary, 25 percent of
the tax expenditure to each charitable sector). In other
words, one dollar in taxes paid entitles the household to
allocate one share of the tax expenditure. The income dis-
tribution of income taxes paid is the base variable to
which the income distribution of donors weighted by the tax
expenditures they direct is compared.
Actually, this model inverts the benefit theory of taxation as con-
ventionally put, which is that a tax should be imposed proportional to
the value of public services used. That theory was formulated as a
basis on which to determine the appropriate level of taxation for any
particular household. It recognizes that different government programs
benefit different individuals and uses the benefits the household enjoys
and consumes to determine how much that household should be taxed exclu-
sive of any redistribution policy. In this model I reverse the sides of
the equation: a household is allowed to consume (i.e. determine the
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allocation of the tax expenditure) in accordance with how much that
household has paid to help support that tax expenditure. Of course,
these views are identical in seeking to make benefits equal costs
household by household.
MODEL II: The "Economic Share" Model.
Decisionmaking in this model is allocated according to the
share of a total economic picture represented by each house-
hold. This model actually takes two forms: Model IIa, the
"Income-Linked" Model,and Model IIb, the "Wealth-Linked" Model.
Under these models one dollar in income (or one dollar in
wealth) entitles the household to allocate one share of the
tax expenditure. Model IIa uses the income distribution of
total income received as the base of comparison, and Model IIb
uses the income distribution of total wealth.6
One justification for using an economic share model as a prescriptive
model for public decisionmaking is the recognized link between educational
level and economic level. We may wish to decentralize the decisionmaking
only among individuals or households that have developed some level of
expertise or knowledge about the possible areas to which the funding may
be allocated, thus level of income or level of wealth might provide a
proxy for that level of expertise. This reasoning is, of course, at odds
with some of the accepted reasons for decentralizing the decisionmaking in
the first place, but it is not far removed from the common conception of
the enlightened, benevolent philanthropist.
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Another reason to include these variations of Model II in the
analysis is that it is widely believed to be true in fact, whether or not
we would like it to be so. Individuals of higher income or wealth domi-
nate the allocation of charitable contributions. This view is clearly
represented in the supplementary comments to the final report of the
Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs:
The fact that the wealthy make the largest gifts, and have
the freedom to decide the objects of their gifts, is
referred to as inequitable and undemocratic. Yet it is the
essence of equity and democracy for people who have the
largest means to make the largest philanthropic contributions.
It is also the essence of democracy and pluralism, and the
strength of voluntary philanthropy, that givers should be able
to designate the objects of their gifts [41].
Note once again that the Commission does not separate the charitable
donation into the private contribution and the tax expenditure. Whether
this argument about the whole would be equally applied by the Commission
to the pieces is not clear. Nevertheless, the models are worth testing
to see whether decisionmaking actually conforms to either.
MODEL III: The "Democratic" Model.
In this model decisionmaking is equally allocated to house-
holds: one household is entitled to allocate one share of
the tax expenditure. To test it, the income distribution
of the tax expenditure is compared to the income distribution
of households.
This model suggests that the demand and need for public services
are not intrinsically related to the individual's ability to pay.
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Therefore, tax revenues should not (or, practically speaking, cannot) be
identified as to their origin in one particular household. Each member
of society has the same say in the allocation of that money.
This model is probably the most widely held view of what decentrali-
zation should mean. Indeed, the Commission on Private Philanthropy and
Public Needs in the statement cited at the beginning of this chapter [40]
suggests exactly that: "By saying with his or her own dollars what needs
should be met, what objectives pursued, what values served, every contrib-
utor exercises, in a profound sense, a form of self-government, a form
that parallels, complements, and enriches the democratic electoral process
itself [emphasis added]."
MODEL IV: The "Effort" Model.
In this model the household controls the disbursement of
the tax expenditure to the extent that it is willing to
contribute its own money as well to charity. The tax
expenditure is allocated according to the "effort" the donor
shows as measured by his private contribution. Like Model II,
this model has two forms: Model IVa, the "Flat Matching
Grant" Model, and Model IVb, the "Relative Sacrifice" Model.
Under Model IVa each dollar of private contribution (base gift
plus induced gift) entitles the household to allocate one
share of the tax expenditure. Model IVb allocates the
decisionmaking according to the percentage of his income the
donor spends as private contributions: the higher the
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percentage, the more of the total tax expenditure he is
allowed to distribute. The variable of comparison for
Model IVa is the income distribution of private contribu-
tions; for Model IVb the percentage of income spent on
private contributions by each donor is compared to the
amount of tax expenditure he allocates.
Models I, IIa, IIb, and III provide theories which average the
decisionmaking power over all households in each income group. Consider
an example: The households in the $50,000 - $99,999 income bracket
allocate 13.2 percent of the total tax expenditure to charity (or,
equivalently, make 13.2 percent of the decisions) while paying 9.6 percent
of the total income taxes paid. Model I, the "Benefit Theory of Taxation"
Model, would look at this result and find a mismatch. But these
are only average figures for the income bracket. Some households in
this bracket have "voted" to allocate no tax expenditure to charity by
making no charitable donations; others are unable to channel any tax
expenditure to charity because it is financially advantageous to them
to take the standard deduction on the income tax; and, on, the other
hand, members of this income group participate to varying degrees in
the payment of the total taxes paid by that group. Thus, the analysis
of these models, averaging decisionmaking throughout each income bracket,
can mask the fact that the decisionmaking may actually rest in the hands
of relatively few households in each bracket.
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Models IVa and IVb sidestep these averaging problems by including
in the decisionmaking only those households that "choose" to be included.
Under this view, the purpose of the charitable deduction is to allow
those who spend their own (and government) funds on charitable causes
to do so and to allocate them to the institutions of their choice. Thus,
it recognizes that differences in personal taste will result in different
allocations to the various charitable sectors. At the same time, it uses
the private contribution as the measure of concern on which the alloca-
tion of the tax expenditure is to be based. The term "flat matching
grant" has been used to describe Model IVa because of the obvious rela-
tionship between the individual contribution and the tax expenditure; if
the system worked exactly according to this model each individual gift
would be matched at exactly the same rate by tax expenditures.
Testing the Models
Which of these models best explains the type of decentralization
of decisionmaking that is evident in the existing system? In this
section I test each of the models to see how the present configuration
corresponds to the model. Although the present study focusses on aid to
cultural institutions, it is important to set this aid in the context
of aid to other charitable sectors and to all charity since the effects
of the indirect aid system differ markedly across the sectors; each model
is applied to each charitable sector and to the aggregate.
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Some of the data necessary to test these models have been presented
earlier; the percentage income distributions of tax expenditures to
each charitable sector are summarized in Table II.6c. The variables of
comparison for Models I, IIa, IIb, and III are summarized in Table IV.2.
For Model IVa the variable of comparison, private contributions to each
charitable sector, necessitates different data for each sector. The
income distribution of private contributions by sector is given in
Tables IV.3a, IV.3b, and IV.3c. (Note that these tables are in the same
format as Tables II.4a, b, and c and II.6a, b, and c, and all three are
included here for purposes of comparison; they represent the other major
component of the total charitable contribution.) As will be shown below,
the data for testing Model IVb cannot be displayed in a convenient manner
because they cannot be easily summarized by income bracket. Instead,
they are calculated for each donor household.
To facilitate the interpretation of these tables consider several
examples:
- Comparing Tables IV.2 and II.6c, we see that households in the lowest
income bracket ($1 - $9,999), 47.8 percent of all households, allocate
7 percent of the aggregate tax expenditure. They account for 11 percent
of the tax expenditure to religion but for none of the tax expenditure
to culture. Similarly, households in the $50,000 - $99,999 income bracket,
1.1 percent of all households~, have 4.7 percent of the total income,
pay 9.6 percent of the total income taxes and allocate 13 percent of
the aggregate tax expenditure. These same households allocate
36:.3 percent of the cultural tax expenditure but only 6 percent of the
Table IV.2 Income Distributions of Data for Testing Models I, IIa, IIb, and III
Variables of Comparison
Ha IIb
Modified
Income Class Income Taxes Paid,1973
Adjusted
Gross Income, 1973 Wealth,1973 (Estimated) All Households,1974
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000 +
Percentage
14.3%
19.6
18.2
18.5
11.3
9.6
4.6
2.3
0.7
0.8
Cumulative
Percentage
14.3%
33.9
52.1
70.6
81.9
91.5
96.1
98.4
99.1
99.9
Percentage
26.0%
23.5
18.8
16.2
7.8
4.7
1.7
0.7
0.2
0.2
Cumulative
Percentage
26.0%
49.5
68.3
84.5
92.3
97.0
98.7
99.4
99.6
99.8
Cumulative
Cumulative
Percentage Percentage Percentage
29% 29% 47.8%
19
10
9
9
11
13
22.8
15.9
9.1
3.2
1.1
0.2
*
100
Cumulative
Cumulative
Percentage
47.8%
70.6
86.5
95.6
98.8
99.9
100.1
100.1
100.1
100.1
Sources: Columns I and Ha,
Column Ilb,
All Other Columns,
Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income-1973: Individual Income Tax
Returns [1371.
Estimated from Projector and Weiss, Survey of Financial Characteristics of
Consumers, Federal Reserve Technical Papers, August 1966 [107].
The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of
Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Notes: * Less than 0.1%
All columns do not add to 100% because of rounding errors.
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Table IV.3a Individual Private Contributions by Sector,
($ millions)
Modified
Income Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000 +
TOTALS
Culture
$ 0
0.6
2.2
10.6
31.6
58.4
18.2
12.3
6.9
1.8
$142.6
Religion
$ 2,973.2
2,714.6
2,179.3
1,398.8
521.4
159.6
47.8
11.9
3.5
18.9
$10,029.0
Education
$ 74.6
30.3
28.7
60.3
149.9
89.0
69.9
71.5
26.2
28.4
$628.8
Health
$133.9
89.9
96.7
117.7
43.6
38.9
40.6
18.0
3.8
7.2
$590.3
Other Other
Social Welfare Charitable Aggregate
$ 147.9 $ 0 $ 3,332
238.0 0 3,077
230.7 2.3 2,542
316.9 0.8 1,905
156.0 0.7 901
197.1 56.1 604
42.2
36.8
2.6
4.7
11.0 0
9.7 6.5
$1,386.3 $ 73.7
222
155
55
74
$ 12,867
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy,1974 [861.
Note: Rows do not add exactly because of rounding errors.
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Table IV.3b Individual Private Contributions by Sector, Table Percentages, 1973
Modified
Income Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19,999
20-29,999
30-49,999
50-99,999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000 +
TOTALS
Culture Religion Education
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.1
0.1
0.1
*
1.1%
23.1%
21.1
16.9
10.9
4.1
1.2
0.4
0.1
*
0.1
77.9%
0.6%
0.2
0.2
0.5
1.2
0.7
0.5
0.6
0.2
0.2
4.9%
Other
Health Social Welfare
1.0%
0.7
0.8
0.9
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.1
*
0.1
4.6%
1.1%
1.8
1.8
2.5
1.2
1.5
0.3
0.3
0.1
0.1
10.8%
Other
Charitable
0 %
0
*
*
*
0.4
*
*
*
0.1
0.6%
Aggregate
25.9%
23.9
19.8
14.8
7.0
4.7
1.7
1.2
0.4
0.6
100.0%
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Notes: * Less than 0.1%
Rows do not add exactly because of rounding errors.
Table IV.3c Individual Private Contributions by Sector, Column Percentages, 1973
Modified
Income Class
$ 1- 9,999
10-14,999
15-19, 999
20-29, 999
30-49,999
50-99, 999
100,000 -
199,999
200,000 -
499,999
500,000 -
999,999
1,000,000 +
TOTALS
Culture Religion Education
0%
0.4
2
7
22
41
13
9
5
1
100%
30%
27
22
14
5
2
0.5
0.1
*
0.2
101%
12%
5
5
10
24
14
11
11
4
5
101%
Other
Health Social Welfare
23%
15
16
20
7
7
7
3
1
1
100%
11%
17
17
23
11
14
3
3
1
1
101%
Other
Charitable
0%
0
3
1
76
4
6
0
9
100%
Aggregate
26%
24
20
15
7
5
1
0.4
0.6
101%
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Notes: * Less than 0.1%
All columns do not add to 100% because of rounding errors.
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religious tax expenditure.
- Comparing Tables IV.3c and II.6c, we see that households in the
$20,000 - $29,999 income bracket allocate 19 percent of the aggregate
tax expenditure while providing only 15 percent of the total private
contributions. Similarly, households in the $30,000 - $49,999 income
bracket allocate 13 percent of the tax expenditure for culture while
making 22 percent of the private contributions to culture.
These tables are unwieldy and by themselves offer limited help in
interpreting how well the pattern of charitable giving corresponds to
each of the models. Figures IV.1 - IV.4a depict this correspondence
for each of the models except IVb with Lorenz curves drawn by ranking
households in the order of their household income from lowest to highest
and plotting the cumulative percentages of the two variables of interest
as categorized by household income, one on the vertical axis and one on
the horizontal axis. 8
A Lorenz curve offers a convenient way to display the degree of
equality between the distributions of the two variables. If the pattern
of giving corresponds exactly to the model being tested the Lorenz curve
will lie along the 450 line -- also known as the "curve of absolute
equality" -- which divides the diagram in half. For example, if aggregate
giving corresponded perfectly to Model I, the "Benefit Theory of Taxation"
Model, then the lowest income households that allocate 25 percent of the
aggregate tax expenditure would also account for 25 percent of the total
taxes paid, 60 percent of the tax expenditure would correspond to
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Figure IV.l Lorenz Curves for Model I
"Benefit Theory of Taxation"
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Source: See Tables IV.2 and II.6c
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Figure IV.2a Lorenz Curves for Model IIa
"Economic Share:Income-Linked"
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Figure IV.2b Lorenz Curves for Model IIb
"Economic Share: Wealth-Linked"
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Figure IV.3 Lorenz Curves for Model III
"Democratic"
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Figure IV.4a Lorenz Curves for Model IVa
"Effort: Flat Matching Grant"
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60 percent of the total taxes paid, and so forth. Deviations of the
Lorenz curves from this 45* line indicate deviations from the theory
or model being tested. Note that to the extent that decisionmaking
power is more in the hands of the wealthy than the variable of comparison,
the Lorenz curve will move away from the 45* line toward the lower right
hand corner of the diagram. Thus, the further the Lorenz curve is from
the line of equality, the less decentralized the decisionmaking power is.
If the charitable income tax deduction has resulted in perfect decentrali-
zation of decisionmaking power, as defined by any one of the proposed
models, the Lorenz curve and the line of equality will be congruent.
Figure IV.1 presents the Lorenz diagram for Model I, the "Benefit
Theory of Taxation" Model: cumulative percentages of total tax expendi-
tures for each sector are compared to the cumulative percentages of the
total taxes paid. From this diagram it is immediately obvious that the
degree of decentralization varies widely from sector to sector. (Even
though a policy for the disbursement of tax expenditures to charitable
organizations as a whole might be decentralized, it is quite possible
that the decisionmaking for any particular sector may be
centralized in the hands of a relatively few households.) In the case
of Model I, the Lorenz curve for tax expenditures to religion corresponds
extremely closely to the line of absolute equality. This means that the
cumulative percentage income distribution of income taxes paid is
virtually identical to the cumulative percentage income distribution of
tax expenditures for religion. This is the only case, for any of the
four models and five sectors, in which the 45* line is so closely followed.
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It is important to interpret this result carefully; given the present
configuration of the individual charitable income tax deduction and the
interaction of personal tastes with that system, the allocation of the
tax expenditures to religion happens to be decentralized de facto
according to the benefit theory of taxation model. Households are
deciding how to allocate tax expenditures to religion roughly in pro-
portion to how much taxes they pay.
Although the fit is not as marked as for religion, the aggregate
Lorenz curve for Model I also corresponds more closely to the line of
equality (as defined by Model I) than in any of the other models.
(Model IIb, discussed below, shows a similar pattern for aggregate
tax expenditures.) In other words, if decentralization is a goal of the
charitable income tax deduction system, the type of decentralization we
are experiencing under that system for aggregate giving is most nearly
explained by Model I. This is not to say that the "Benefit Theory
of Taxation" Model describes the way in which the decisionmaking should
be allocated; it merely says that of the suggested models this one offers
the most reasonable description of how aggregate decisionmaking is decen-
tralized de facto in the present system.
Tax expenditures for culture, on the other hand, are highly central-
ized in the hands of those households paying large proportions of the
total income taxes. This is also true for tax expenditures channeled
to educational uses. From most decentralized to least decentralized, the
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charitable sectors line up as follows: Religion, Aggregate Giving, Other
Social Welfare, Health, and Culture and Education. Note that this order
is preserved in Models IIa, IIb, and III as well. 9
The Lorenz diagrams for Models IIa and IIb are Figures IV.2a and
IV.2b. Looking first at Model IIa, the Income-Linked Model, and com-
paring this to the previous model, it is clear that Model IIa provides
a worse description of the allocation of the decisionmaking power than
Model I. Alternatively, donations to all sectors are more centralized
with respect to the income-linked theory of Model IIa than they are with
respect to the benefit theory of Model I.
On the other hand, Model IIb -- the Wealth-Linked Model presented in
Figure IV.2b -- offers what appears to be a reasonable alternative theory
about the type of decentralization which may be occuring in the charitable
income tax deduction system. While the fit for aggregate giving is only
slightly worse than the fit in Model I, Model IIb does a better
job of explaining the decentralization in each of the charitable sectors
except religion (where decisionmaking is overly concentrated in middle
income groups in proportion to the actual percentage of the total wealth
controlled by them). (For religion,Model I is a better predictor.)
For most people the "Democratic" Model -- Model III -- probably most
adequately represents what decentralization ought to mean. It is interest-
ing, therefore, to note by comparing Figure IV.3 to the other figures that
aggregate giving performs worse under this model than under any of the
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other models. Under this model, tax expenditures are particularly
centralized among the households with the highest incomes. Furthermore,
every individual charitable sector does worse under this model than when
it is analyzed according to any of the other models. Whatever its other
virtues, the current system of providing indirect aid through this
mechanism does not allocate that aid through a decentralized "democratic"
decisionmaking process.
The "Flat Matching Grant" Model is analyzed in Figure IV.4a. In
this model the values of the variable of comparison, the income distribu-
tion of individual contributions to the sector, differ for each sector,
and, as a result, the ranking of sectors according to how well they fit
the curve of absolute equality changes. Under this model, the allocation
of the tax expenditure for culture is more decentralized than for any
other sector and aggregate giving is more centralized than giving to any
of the separate sectors except health. As far as culture is concerned,
Model IVa offers a much better explanation of the type of decentralization
of decisionmaking that is happening within that sector than any of the
other models.
In the previous models the facts that -religious tax expenditures were
relatively decentralized and large in absolute amount and that tax expendi-
tures for the other sectors were relatively centralized and much more
modest led to a Lorenz curve for aggregate giving which reflected more
decentralization than in any one of the individual sectors except
religion. In Model IVa this pattern is not repeated; aggregate giving
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has a Lorenz curve which shows less decentralization than any of the
sectors except health. How is this possible? Each charitable sector
appeals to specific income classes, and this appeal differs from sector
to sector. For example, culture and education appeal to relatively
wealthy donors while religion appeals to comparatively poor donors.
Within each sector, therefore, the range of effective marginal income
tax rates is smaller than for all sectors combined. This is another
way of saying that the group of donors for any sector is more homogeneous
than the group of all donors. Because the amount of the tax expenditure
is determined by the donor's effective marginal tax rate, it is to be
expected that the match of amount of tax expenditure to amount of individ-
ual contribution will be more even within an individual charitable
sector than for all charitable giving. Thus, it is not unreasonable that
the Lorenz curve for aggregate giving under Model IVa shows that aggregate
giving is less decentralized than the giving to each charitable sector
This characteristic of the flat matching grant model also explains
its dramatic ability to define a type of decentralization in charitable
donations to culture. Households with less than $20,000 in household
income account for 5Z.1 percent of the total taxes paid, 68.3 percent of
the total income, 58 percent of total wealth, and 86.5 percent of the
total households, yet they account for very little -- only 2.4 percent --
of the total private contribution to culture. Model IVa, therefore, gives
them very little weight in the decisionmaking while the other models suggest
that these households should have substantial input.
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Unfortunately, Model IVb, the "Relative Share" Model, cannot be
displayed with Lorenz curves; the variable of comparison, percentage of
income spent as private contribution, cannot be logically expressed as
a total of which each household has a part. Therefore, to test this
model I have had to rely on another measure, bivariate correlation. If
charitable giving actually behaved according to this model we would observe
an exact correspondence between the amount of tax expenditure the household
allocated and the percentage of its income spent as private contributions;
the correlation coefficient between these two variables would be 1.0.
Correlating the tax expenditure to each sector with the percentage of
income spent in private contributions to that sector for each household
gives the following results:
Correlation
Sector Coefficient
Culture .6750
Religion .0766
Education .0042
Health .0864
Other Social Welfare .0073
Aggregate .0089
The correlation coefficient for culture is considerably higher than
the coefficients for the other sectors, leading to the tentative con-
clusion that this model offers some insight into how decisionmaking about
the tax expenditure for culture may be decentralized. It is more likely,
however, that the high coefficient is the result of the fact that there
are relatively few cases in the dataset which include giving to culture,
and while they offer enough information on which to base aggregate
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estimates of charitable giving to culture they are not sufficient to allow
a good estimate of the correlation coefficient. Far more interesting is
the correlation coefficient for all charity. This coefficient, .0089, is
extremely low; this model offers a very poor definition of decentralization
of decisionmaking about the tax expenditure for all charity.
Interestingly, of the models proposed as objectives for the system,
only Models IVa and IVb could be readily attained by a change in government
policy. Model IVa could be served by replacing the current charitable
deduction with a flat matching grant such as a tax credit or a percentage
contribution bonus.10 The curve of equality would then, by definition,
be the line described by giving to any and all sectors. Similarly,
Model IVb could be achieved by implementing a sliding matching grant
proportional to the donor's effort.
Summary
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that decentralization --
however defined -- is elusive. The current system of allowing individuals
to allocate tax expenditures according to their own individual wishes seems
to perform worst of all when analyzed according to a "Democratic" model of
decisionmaking in which each household is given one vote in the allocation
process, but serves "Benefit Theory of Taxation" goals relatively well.
(Figure IV.5 combines all of the Lorenz curves for aggregate giving on the
same diagram for purposes of comparison.) Furthermore, even if a theory of
Figure IV.5
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decentralization results in high scores for any one charitable sector --
as is the case for religion when viewed in terms of Model I -- it does
not necessarily follow that the other sectors will enjoy decentralized
decisionmaking by the same definition.
From the perspective of four of the models of decentralization, tax
expenditures for culture display the least decentralized Lorenz curves,
yet in Model IVa culture comes out best (with aggregate giving far behind).
The Lorenz curves for culture are summarized in Figure IV.6. Whatever
else is happening within this component of the indirect aid system, and
even though I have demonstrated that some explanations of decentralization
of decisionmaking are more adequate than others, it is clear that really
decentralized decisionmaking -- in terms of who is making the decisions --
is not happening by any definition, and this is particularly true for tax
expenditures for culture. The charitable contribution deduction does not
decentralize the decisionmaking power over tax expenditures for culture
in any significant way, except as compared to the "single bureaucrat"
simplistically understood. The analysis supports a skeptical view of the
charitable income tax deduction, such as that of Congressman John W. Byrnes:
Should we permit a segment of our society to set up a
government of its own to render philanthropic services?
The others have no such choice, but must go along with
the main stream, and not only carry its own burden, but
a little bit more. Our tax laws have given one group
a chance to escape that basic burden, to let them make their
own determination as to what is in the public good, and to
decide how to spend that money [131].
Figure IV.6
ercentage of Total
ultural Tax Expenditures
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10% --
141
Summary of Lorenz Curves for Cultural Tax
Expenditures, All Models
10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Percentage of
Variable of Comparison
for Each Model
Source: Figures IV.1 - IV.4a
142
The analysis in this chapter has focussed on one aspect of the
decisionmaking process: the transfer of the tax expenditure from the
government to the charitable recipient. If decisionmaking within cultural
institutions is decentralized and representative of the public, the central-
ization of the tax expenditure allocation in the hands of wealthy donors
might be less disturbing. However, there is a growing literature indi-
cating that decisionmaking within cultural institutions is also vested
in the hands of the wealthy upper class.1 1
Typically, a charitable institution's board of trustees is the body
where most of the important policy decisions are made, and it is reveal-
ing to look at the demographic characteristics of arts institution boards.
According to Museums USA [95], 69 percent of art museum trustees are
male, 86 percent are white, and 44 percent are more than 50 years old;
23 percent are business executives, 6 percent lawyers, and 7 percent
bankers. An unpublished 1969 sample of board members conducted by the
Twentieth Century Fund [57] revealed an even more rarefied pattern:
60 percent graduated from Ivy League or "Little Ivy League" schools,
nearly a third were in banking and finance and twenty percent were in law,
60 percent were at least 60 years old, 38 percent listed Episcopalian as
their religion, and they held an average of three trusteeships in other
cultural or educational institutions.
This pattern is no less true for performing arts institutions. In
1971 Hart [62] surveyed the board members of major and metropolitan
orchestras and reported that 86 percent of the board members were drawn
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from the business community: 40 percent industry executives, 16 percent
from banking, 12 percent from law, 5 percent from insurance, and
12 percent from other businesses. Arian's study of the Philadelphia
Orchestra [ 7] indicates that that orchestra's board has always been
predominantly drawn from the membership of the Social Register of
Philadelphia.12 Furthermore, all of these studies understate the
influence of this socio-economic elite because many trustees are wives
of wealthy businessmen and are not included in these categories.
In short, the boards of trustees for cultural institutions are not
representative of the general public. Yet they control the allocation of
tax expenditures once they have been funneled to their institutions by
their donors. This is not to say that these boards make decisions that
are not in the public interest; rather, there is neither a guarantee
nor an incentive in the indirect aid system for them to-do so. I argue
elsewhere in this thesis, particularly in Chapter VII, that public policy
could plausibly and justifiably delegate a disproportionate share of
public decisionmaking power to the trustees and managers of arts
institutions, but that argument cannot be based on decentralization.
Of course, tradition has played a large role in the composition of boards
of trustees in cultural institutions, but increasingly the realities of
arts financing in the United States are crucial. In either case, the
result is much the same: cultural institutions are uniquely dependent
on contributions from wealthy donors, and large donors are likely candi-
dates for board membership. Thomas Hoving has unblushingly expressed a
criterion of trusteeship: "Any trustee should be able to write a check
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for at least three million dollars and not even feel it." [74]
Ironically, it is the public support -- the tax expenditure -- hidden in
such large contributions that makes it so easy for the rich to give them.
This chapter has also offered no data as to whether a direct aid
system would be more decentralized than either donor decisionmaking or
trustee decisionmaking. Whether or not governmental arts agencies are
adequately representing the public interest is an important object of
cultural policy research, but it is not part of the current study.
Clearly more research is needed on this question even as the debate between
"populism" and "elitism" rages throughout government arts agencies [44].
But, as discussed at the beginning of this chapter, these agencies are
not hidden from public scrutiny and are subject to regular evaluation
by the Congress.
The analysis presented in this chapter has been primarily descriptive,
attempting to develop a better picture of how part of the existing indirect
aid system operates. I have said very little about why it is this way,
but the answer is deceptively simple; the decisions about charitable
giving are the result of two factors: variations in marginal tax rates,
which provide different incentives for different individuals, and variations
in individual tastes that are correlated with income. In general, these
two factors prompt wealthy individuals to give more to culture, and they
are, therefore, given the opportunity to determine the recipient of more
of the tax expenditure. Thus, even though tax law offers the opportunity
to all taxpayers 13 to deduct charitable contributions, a combination of
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the economic incentives to do so and the de facto assortment of individual
tastes does not decentralize the decisionmaking power very much.
Nor has this chapter had much to say about how we should be
decentralizing the decisionmaking process. With the exception of the
matching grant mechanisms, there is no clear policy which could be
counted on to make the system better conform to any of these models of
decentralization. (Unwieldy programs like referenda could work for
Model III, but the political system actually does that for direct aid
by definition.) And there are a variety of other possibilities which
ought to be considered, from basing the system entirely on individual
contributions to raising the relative proportion of direct aid programs
and allocating more of it at the state and local levels. Government aid
to the arts can be disbursed as ticket vouchers in an effective yet
decentralized manner. At the very least, this analysis should make it
clear that the goal of decentralization is not being well served and
that we need to think more seriously about how we can design a system
that would embrace it as a goal if we value it in fact.
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CHAPTER V; DECISIONMAKING -- HOW INCOME TAX LAWS
ENCOURAGE BAD DECISIONS,
We now know how the indirect aid system works (how much money is
involved, who pays for the various tax expenditures, and who decides
how that money is to be allocated), but very little has been said about
the decisions themselves. What types of decisions does the indirect aid
system foster? How do these decisions differ from those made as part of
other funding schenies? Does the indirect aid system encourage (or allow)
decisions which have a negative effect on the operation of arts institu-
tions? In short, what does society get as a result of these funding
decisions?
In this chapter I argue that the indirect aid system provides incen-
tives for many types of decisions which are not in agreement with public
policy. The indirect aid system encourages decisions which are inequitable,
inefficient, and motivated primarily by private interests. This is not to
say that all funding decisions made within the indirect aid system are
bad, only that the circumstances which surround the indirect aid system
do not provide appropriate encouragement for public-spirited decisions.
The analysis, for the most part, is based on a theoretical argument
as to the likely results of the interaction between the incentives em-
bodied in the indirect aid system and the personal tastes of the donors/
decisionmakers. I then explore how these results affect the behavior of
arts institutions.
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The argument relies heavily on a straightforward application of the
microeconomic model of the behavior of a firm. An arts institution can
be considered as a firm purchasing inputs and producing outputs, Given
prices determined in the market, the arts institution makes two basic
decisions: (i) which inputs to purchase in what quantities and
(ii) which outputs to produce in what quantities. The indirect aid
system has an important effect on the production process because it
changes the relative prices of the inputs, and this change, in turn,
affects the mix of outputs which is economical for the arts institution
to produce. The relevance of this analysis for this chapter lies in the
possibility that changes in the relative prices of inputs will encourage
arts institutions to produce a new mix of outputs which is less acceptable
to public policy in the arts than the previous mix was.
A simple, graphical presentation helps explain the model. Consider
a museum which purchases two inputs; "works of art" and "other inputs."
It uses these two inputs to produce two types of output; "educational
programs" and "new exhibits." Figure V.1 depicts the decision the
museum makes concerning the purchase of inputs. The museum is capable
of producing different levels of output; each level is indicated by an
isoquant, a curve representing the alternative input mixes which can be
used to produce that level of output. (Higher levels of output are
represented by isoquants further from the origin.) The institution is
constrained by its budget line (BL 1 ); it can only purchase a certain
number of works of art, a certain number of other inputs, or some linear
combination. The slope of the budget line is determined by the relative
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prices of the two inputs. The combination of inputs the museum actually
purchases (uses) is given by the point at which the budget line is tangent
to the highest possible isoquant, point A. (At this point the level of
output is 0 A.) When one input becomes relatively cheaper, the budget
line shifts. This happens, for example, when a law is passed allowing
charitable contribution deductions: the relative price to the museum
of donated artworks is lowered. As a result, the budget line shifts
(from BL1 to BL2), and the museum can now afford to produce a higher
level of output, 0B, using the combination of inputs specified by point B.
Figure V.2 depicts the decision the museum makes concerning the
production of outputs. The production possibility frontier for the
museum (PPF 1 ) represents the alternative combinations of the two outputs
which can be produced given a fixed quantity of inputs. The combination
of outputs the museum chooses to produce is determined by the relative
price consumers (audiences) are willing to pay for a new exhibit as com-
pared to an educational program. The model assumes the museum operates
to maximize its revenue. Each level of revenue is indicated by an iso-
revenue line. The slope of the iso-revenue lines -- the ratio of
product transformation (RPT 1) -- is determined by the ratio of the
prices to consumers of the outputs. The museum produces the combination
of outputs determined by the point at which the production possibility
frontier is tangent to the highest possible iso-revenue line, point C.
In the most basic microeconomic model, the only way the consumer can
influence the output mix of the institution, given the institution's
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production possibility frontier, is by increasing the relative price he
is willing to pay for certain outputs. This changes the slope of the iso-
revenue lines and the museum, still seeking to maximize its revenue,
alters its mix of outputs. If consumers become more willing to pay for
new exhibits as compared to educational programs, the slope of the iso-
revenue lines changes from RPT1 to RPT2, and the museum responds by
altering its production from point C to point D.
A charitable institution is unique in that there is another way in
which the consumer can affect the output of the institution: he can
become a donor and change the outputs of the institution by selectively
subsidizing the inputs the museum is using. Figure V.1 illustrates how
the mix of inputs changes with the passage of a charitable income tax
deduction. This new mix of inputs results in a new production possibility
frontier for the museum. In the simple case used here, the new mix of
inputs -- weighted more toward artworks than the previous mix -- favors
new exhibitions more than educational programs, so the production possi-
bility frontier is shifted more towards the production of new exhibits.
This change -- from PPF to PPF2 -- is shown in Figure V.3. Even with-
out a change in the relative prices which consumers are willing to pay,
the output mix the museum produces changes from point C to point E, an
output mix more heavily weighted toward new exhibits. Thus, the museum
produces relatively more new exhibits than it otherwise would have
produced. If public policy calls for increased emphasis on educational
programs in museums, the donor-induced changes in the institution's
inputs lead to a result in direct conflict with that policy.
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Shifts in the production possibility frontier can be the result of
conscious decisions on the part of donors ("I want the opera to present
more Wagnerian operas, so I will support a new Wagnerian production with
my charitable donation." "I want the museum to continue operating in
the traditional manner, emphasizing conservation and exhibition, so I
will donate a new gallery building.") or the result of unconscious
responses to the incentives presented by tax expenditures ("I will give
the museum an artwork because it is a better financial deal for me than
a donation of cash." "We will build a new building because it is rela-
tively inexpensive now that we have obtained a property tax exemption.").
In both cases the input mix is altered and the institution is confronted
with a different production possibility frontier, leading to a different
mix of outputs. Outputs not necessarily in agreement with public policy
are the result of shifts in inputs which are partially supported by tax
expenditure funds.
Admittedly, this model offers only an approximate picture of the
behavior of arts institutions. It would be a mistake, for example, to
depend too heavily on an assumption of revenue maximizing behavior for
nonprofit charitable institutions. But revenues and costs do have to
be considered by arts managers as they choose between various inputs
and between various outputs. The model does help explain these decisions;
considering the indirect aid system in this way helps to highlight the
input and output distortions this system encourages.
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Unfortunately, there is very little data to corroborate the theo-
retical argument; the data currently available are anecdotal at best,
and, as a result, the analysis presented in this chapter will strike some
readers as inconclusive. It is one thing to believe that a system
provides certain incentives, but it is quite another matter to prove that
they affect behavior as theory predicts. What can be demonstrated, how-
ever, is that if the millions of arts-related funding decisions made each
year within the indirect aid system are to agree with accepted public
policy, the wise or efficient or public-spirited choices must consistently
be made despite incentives for donors and managers to do otherwise. If
this characterization of the indirect aid system is accurate, then the
public benefits which grow out of this system are at best fragile and at
worst nonexistent.
In this chapter I first consider these decisions at the individual
level: what are the incentives for a particular donor? Next, I discuss
how these individual decisions might aggregate: does the indirect aid
system encourage certain types of decisions? These aggregated decisions
are then considered more generally as economic distortions in the pro-
vision of arts services. And finally, I assess the contribution the
indirect aid system makes to problems of professional compromise and
-ethical compromise.
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Individual Decisions
As a starting point I accept the presupposition that the current
system of arts funding allows the corporate or individual contributor
to spend his own money -- his "private contribution" -- as he sees fit.
If he prefers a particular artist, medium, or genre, so be it. If he
wishes to support an institution which is notoriously parochial or
idiosyncratic in its program, that is appropriate also. But it is
another matter altogether when this view is extended to the tax expendi-
ture for which the donor is serving as a conduit.
How much influence should the donor have in determining how the
public, tax expenditure portion of his gift should be spent? At present
the donor is allowed to determine the amount and recipient of the tax
expenditure as well as to place almost any conditions he wishes on the
gift. To the extent that this occurs, the private donor can use govern-
ment financial aid -- the tax expenditure -- to affect the operation of
arts institutions in ways which may not be in agreement with prevailing
public policy toward the arts. Thus, the tax expenditure gives the
donor an added lever to influence the operation of an arts institution
in accord with his own wishes.
Viewed from the institution's perspective, the form of the tax
expenditure -- disguised as part of the donor's check -- makes it
appear that all of the benefits of a private philanthropic contribution
come from the private donor rather than from the government (all
taxpayers). This may reinforce and magnify a charity's tendency to
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please those donors from whom the bulk of its contributions are derived,
rather than serving a broader audience.3 In their annual reports
charitable institutions list total charitable contributions as private
support, but it is difficult to do otherwise because to calculate
the amount of tax expenditure received the institution would have to
ascertain the marginal tax rate of each of its donors (and, in the case
of a gift of property, its appreciation while in the donor's hands).
The conditions donors place on their gifts take a variety of forms,
ranging from relatively innocuous conditions (such as placement of the
donor's name on the concert program, next to a donated artwork, or on a
plaque hung in the lobby of the institution) to complicated sets of
instructions which determine the gift's uses in perpetuity. Museums
have been the grateful recipients of numerous collections donated with
the understanding that the collections were to be kept intact and on
display in the recipient museum [29]. But their initial gratitude
has often been tempered by the eventual realization that these restric-
tions prove to be expensive and difficult to continue as well as in-
appropriate as styles, tastes, and knowledge change. For many years
the Metropolitan Museum of Art exhibited the Altman, Friedsam, and
Bache collections in a suite of collectors' memorial rooms. Only
recently have they been redistributed throughout the museum, but they
are still all on display. Curators obviously prefer the freedom to
display the works as they choose -- by period or by school or not at all.
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It is not surprising that the public posture of museums is not to
accept restricted donations of artwork. The handbook of the Association
of Art Museums [109] urges that "gifts be of a clear and unrestricted
nature and no work should be accepted with an attribution or circum-
stances of exhibition guaranteed in perpetuity." One of the authors of
this report was Thomas Hoving, director of the Metropolitan Museum of
Art, who not long afterward enthusiastically accepted the Lehman
Collection with a lengthy list of donor-imposed restrictions. The
collection is housed in its own pavilion, separate from the rest of the
museum. The original terms of the gift called for the museum to move
Lehman's entire 54th Street house, append it to the museum, and exhibit
it exactly as Lehman had maintained it. This restriction was only
partially relaxed: the Metropolitan was still obliged to reproduce
exactly seven rooms from the house and install them in the new pavalion,
retaining stairways which lead to nonexistent upper floors, paintings
installed in curious nooks and crannies of the rooms, and windows with
no view.
It seems a reasonable assumption that the terms of this gift
restricted the museum in a way in which it would have preferred not to
have been restricted, yet it was decided that the benefits of the
collection outweighed the costs of the restrictions placed on it. But
this is not the museum's view of what has transpired. Ashton Hawkins,
Secretary and Counsel of the Metropolitan, states flatly that if the
museum had instead received the financial equivalent of the Lehman donation,
it would have purchased exactly the same 3,000 artworks and installed
them in exactly the same way [103].
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Donor restrictions are not limited to gifts of artwork.
Mr. and Mrs. Sydney Lewis, Richmond collectors, made a $250,000 grant
to the Whitney Museum for the purchase of works by living American
artists. Thomas Armstrong, the director of the Whitney, has described
the details of this grant as follows:
As in the case with other donors, the arrangement
has been that both the Lewises and the museum can
recommend to each other works to be acquired for
the permanent collection, and each reserves the
right to veto the other's choice. So, if I wanted
to buy a work by an artist that they didn't like
or didn't feel was important, they could say that
it wasn't appropriate; they didn't want their money
spent that way [110].
This quotation is particularly revealing because of the emphasis the
museum director puts on the perception that only the donor's money is
at issue. To the large extent that this gift includes a tax expenditure
it should not be treated as private funds.
Donor restriction can even shape entire museums. Meyer [77]
estimates that there are 100 "donor memorial" museums in the United States
including the Frick Collection, the Isabella Stewart Gardner Museum,
the Phillips Collection, and the J. Paul Getty Museum. These museums
consist chiefly of individual or family collections that bear a variety
of restrictions. The Gardner Museum is probably the most famous example
of an entire museum subject to donor restrictions; the contents and
arrangement of the collection are inviolable, guaranteeing that visitors
will continue to be surprised by idiosyncratic juxtapositions of objects,
to wonder about the artistic merit of countless curios displayed through-
out the building, and to be denied the insight some curatorial initiative
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could provide. Until 1960, when a successful lawsuit allowed 400 members
of the general public to be admitted each week, the Barnes Foundation
had succeeded in almost completely excluding the public from the Barnes
Collection in accord with the wishes of its benefactor, Albert Coombs Barnes.
Like the Gardner, this collection is a curious melange of items exhibited in
a predetermined and inviolable manner. The court, keeping in mind that
the Barnes Foundation was tax-exempt and established with a substantial
tax deduction, found it to be an art gallery and not merely a private edu-
cational institution [28,77].
Even more remarkable in illustrating the importance of whim in influ-
encing donations is the beneficence of Mrs. William Hayes Fogg to Harvard
University. Mrs. Fogg was a widow with no connection to Harvard or
Cambridge or Boston; her lawyer, a Harvard graduate, obtained her bequest
for Harvard, establishing the Fogg Art Museum [27].
Museums do not have a monopoly on donor-imposed restrictions, although
it may be easier to trace these restrictions in museums because of their
dependence on the gifts of objects. Baumol and Bowen write:
We-know of at least one case where a leading patron
of an orchestral group has virtually banned
contemporary music; and where, in addition, the
occasional performance of a pre-nineteenth century
piece is suffered only as an obvious exercise in
forbearance [14].
When Anthony Bliss, director of the Metropolitan Opera, decided to treat
the costs of new productions as capital investments and finance them
as much as possible from contributions by the Opera Guild, the National
Council (an outside-New York group of large contributors), or any other
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individuals or corporations who were willing to make gifts for this
purpose, he opened up a new avenue for donor influence [17]. Numerous
productions have been financed in this way, some for rather astonishing
reasons. Cornelius Starr, a New York insurance executive, commissioned
a new production of Madame Butterfly because he was appalled that the old
Met production featured an unforgivable anachronism: cherry blossoms
and chrysanthemums side by side on the stage. Some gifts were turned
down, however: the bequest of McNair Ilgenfritz, an opera box holder
and amateur composer, stipulated that it was to be used in part to produce
one of his own one-act operas and was refused.
As corporate donations to the arts have increased, arts professionals
have expressed concern about the influence corporate donors try to exert.
Lee Rosenbaum, the editor of Art Letter, has suggested that the corporation
may be the most restrictive sponsor of all [110]. Corporations tend to
be conservative in their taste in art. Walter Poleshuck, development
officer of the Whitney Museum, says:
Corporations are primarily interested in representational
art; the masses of people relate to it more surely. The
masses do not relate to abstract art. Corporations are
interested in improving their image, and if they spent
money on an exhibition which the bulk of people do not
relate to, they would, in their view, be doing themselves
more harm than good [110].
Corporations have also been involved in sponsor-initiated shows,
packaging and assembling the shows without assistance from the museums
where they are scheduled to appear.
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Foundations, may also exert undue influence on the art they support.
The Joffrey Ballet cut its ties with the Rebekah Harkness Foundation, a
source of considerable support, when the foundation requested that the
ballet change its name to the Harkness Ballet and allow the foundation
officers an unspecified amount of control over the artistic decisions of
the company [65]. W. McNeil Lowry, former vice-president of the Ford
Foundation and the architect of that foundation's major support of the
arts, did not think of the foundation as a passive supporter:
We are catalysts rather than reformers, participants
rather than backers, communicants rather than critics...
Our investments in the arts are not so much subsidies
as they are levers[78].
But restricted private donations like these do not necessarily
indicate an overall trend. There are countless examples of unrestricted
donations to arts institutions; in the past ten years, for example, the
U. S. Steel Foundation has made modest, unrestricted, annual contributions
to approximately 50 arts organizations [79]. And other donations have
been only moderately restricted: the Fairchild Foundation and the
Vincent Astor Foundation have helped the Metropolitan Museum of Art remain
open to the public on Tuesdays; Mobil Oil made a grant to the Whitney
so that it could continue offering free admission on Tuesday evenings;
and the Museum of Modern Art received a grant from Mobil to support its
series of Summergarden concerts [1101.
These examples suggest several crucial public policy questions.
How common are donor-imposed restrictions on donations to arts institutions?
To what extent do these restrictions actually constrain the operation of
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cultural institutions? (Or as Ashton Hawkins has claimed, would the
institution have operated in the same manner even if the funds had been
unrestricted?) Do the separate restrictions when added together form
trends which work contrary to public policy towards the arts? It is
necessary to answer each of these questions to measure the overall
effect of supporting the arts through an indirect aid system.
The extent of donor-imposed restrictions in the arts is impossible
to measure. But there are a number of indications that restrictions
are fairly common. The question has been answered for funding for
higher education. McDaniel reports that 70 percent of the funds received
by higher education from living individuals are restricted as to use,
and he finds this to be particularly interesting because of the argument
that replacement of the charitable contribution with direct government aid
would result in increased control from the funding source:
If this be the case, the control argument is not
one over the fact of control over the federal share.
Apparently colleges and universities are more
comfortable with control imposed by wealthy donors
than by Congress or the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare [69].
Is the experience of cultural institutions substantially different from
that of universities? Their donors are certainly similar in all the ways
we can observe.
The extent of donor restrictions is probably clearest in the develop-
ment of museum collections. The critical link between donors and museum
collections is well-documented. According to Thomas Hoving, between 1965
161
and 1975 the Metropolitan Museum of Art added 15,000 works of art to its
collection, 85 percent of which were gifts or bequests. Meyer has
estimated that the total value of these donations, including the Lehman
collection and the Nelson Rockefeller collection of primitive art, was
more than $100 million [77]. Ralph Colin, the Administrative Vice
President of the Arts Dealers Association of America, has stated [34],
"The museums of this country, with few exceptions, rely to the extent
of well over 90 percent on gifts and legacies for their new acquisitions."
The recent dissatisfaction with museum "deaccessioning" practices indi-
cates that in addition to donor restrictions on the disposition of gifts
of artwork there is informal pressure on museums to retain all gifts.
Alan Shestack, Director of the Yale Art Gallery, has expressed the fear
that through donor restrictions successive generations of donors will
dictate the character of museum collections [114].
Yet there are more subtle ways in which donors can "restrict" their
gifts. They choose to donate to one institution and not to another.
They choose to donate to one type of cultural activity and not to another.
They choose to donate to the fundraising drive their favorite institution
is sponsoring while they will not donate to a different drive for the
same institution. All of these decisions affect the artistic output
which the public is able to enjoy. Viewed in this broader context, it
becomes clear that there are two types of donor influence, overt and
covert, and if the extent of the first is difficult to document, the
second is impossible.
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A brief example will help explain covert donor influence.5
Anthony Bliss, the Director of the Metropolitan Opera, has flatly denied
that philanthropy affects his artistic decisionmaking [102]. Yet any
new production relies almost entirely on donations for its support. He
repeatedly receives offers from donors to finance specific new produc-
tions, and when artistic judgment approves, he accepts the donation.
But the fact remains that Bliss cannot present an opera if he does not
have sufficient financial support; his donors are only making some
operas possible. The others are being foreclosed by donor selection.
Perhaps Bliss is indifferent to which operas are produced, but what is
more likely is that his preferences are being restricted by donors'
tastes. One is forced to conclude that after a while the menu of
possible productions presented to potential donors is influenced by the
likelihood of finding financing among those donors; donors' tastes have
had a covert influence on the operation of the institution. Rosenbaum [110]
has documented that covert influences also play a major role in obtaining
corporate sponsorship of museum exhibits.
Any donation which passes between a donor and an arts institution is,
in some sense, the result of a negotiation between the two. In this trans-
action there is little doubt that covert influence can play an important
role. Yet it is very difficult to identify and separate the covert in-
fluence from the transaction. To the extent that the institution anticipates
donor tastes and preferences, donor influence will be hidden.
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The existence of covert influence makes it difficult to determine
whether donors actually restrict the operation of arts institutions.
If a new building is built with donations pledged and restricted to
a special building campaign plus money raised from other more general
sources, can we conclude that the operation of the institution has been
constrained in a way which emphasizes facilities at the possible expense
of programs? Probably not, but the institution may well have decided
a priori that it had a better chance of proceeding in that direction.
In any event, to the extent that the charitable contribution contains a
tax expenditure, the donor's influence -- whether covert or overt --
is being exerted with publicly-supported funds.
Trends in Decisionmaking
The most important public policy question, however, is also the most
general one. Does the aggregate of the private charitable contribution
decisions form identifiable trends in charitable funding which are in
conflict with generally accepted public policy? In my research I have
identified several such trends, each of which has important consequences
for the arts.
The clearest trend is suggested by the analysis of Chapter IV: the
indirect aid system is inequitable in that it accentuates the tastes of
the wealthy by allowing them to channel a disproportionate share of the
tax expenditure -- the wealthier the donor, the larger the tax expenditure
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he commands.6 This trend is particularly evident in the contribution
receipts of each of the charitable sectors (compare Table II.6b to
Table IV.3b): cultural institutions receive 1 percent of the total
private contribution to all charity but 4 percent of the total tax ex-
penditure; and educational institutions receive 5 percent of the total
private contribution but 13 percent of the total tax expenditure; while
religious institutions receive 78 percent of the total private contribu-
tion but only 59 percent of the total tax expenditure. Wealthy donors
take advantage of the incentives provided by the charitable contribution
deduction and use the tax expenditure to channel additional money to
their preferred charities. There is no reason to believe that wealthy
donors do not do this within each of the charitable sectors as well.
They prefer certain types of arts institutions and use the tax expendi-
ture to help support them, while other cultural institutions, which may
be just as deserving of public support, are denied a share of this
support. Although there is no empirical evidence on this point, it
would not be surprising to discover that wealthy donors tend to favor
the major, well-established cultural institutions that are concentrated
in a few cities.
Monroe Price has argued very strongly that public support of culture
should not be determined by wealth:
The present condition is that museums characteristically
represent a context in which a public trust, largely
publicly supported, is vested in individuals over
whom the public has virtually no control. Wealth and
status, independent of other characteristics, can find
their place. While there is nothing wrong with those
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characteristics, it is wrong to have a system of museums
dependent on wealth, just as it would be wrong to have
a system of public education dependent on wealth. The
critical point is to develop a tradition in which collection
and donation of gifts to museums are not accompanied by
expectations of control... By relying on tax-induced
contributions, we place the center of strength for our arts
institutions with the rich. It is their taste that becomes
the museum's taste, and thence the community's. As a nation
we have always depended on the bounty of the rich and the
powerful to build our cultural institutions, but in this
century, we have rewarded such gifts with generous tax
savings. Perhaps it is time that we review our method of
building public collections to determine whether more
democratic means would yield institutions that are
freer of idiosyncratic and individual taste [106].
Even individuals who, for philosophical reasons, do not consider chari-
table contributions to be tax expenditures have argued against political
contribution deductions because such deductions would, in their view,
enhance the influence of the wealthy, but they have been unwilling to
extend the same line of argument to charitable contributions [5].
It is clearly possible -- not to mention attractive from both the
donor's point of view and the institution's -- for a charitable insti-
tution to cater to the tastes of the wealthy. If we are to believe that
the indirect aid system does not distort arts funding according to the
tastes of the wealthy,we must believe that these donors consistently
make donations which turn out to be in the more general public interest
despite the incentives to the contrary. Only if we decide that the
wealthy ought to be the decisionmakers on behalf of society -- presumably
because of their higher education or more-refined tastes -- can we be
entirely satisfied with this allocation of decisionmaking. I know of
no theory which demonstrates that the goals of public policy are
coincident with the tastes of the wealthy.
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A related pattern, fueled by the disproportionate influence of the
wealthy in the indirect aid system, is that private philanthropy tends
to favor capital construction over operating expenses. Donors are
eager to have their names preserved in buildings or other tangible objects,
particularly donors who are wealthy enough to consider putting up most of
the cost of such buildings. Often the institution is left to its own
devices to raise the funds necessary for the continuing maintenance of such
a gift, but the lack of committed maintenance funds has not dissuaded
institutions from accepting such gifts. This is particularly true for
donors who consider their donations to be seed money, intended to attract
other financial support.
As Vladeck [142] has documented, the charitable income tax deduction
is but one of a number of factors which contribute to overinvestment in
capital on the part of charitable, nonprofit institutions, but it is an
important one. Arts institutions are painfully aware that it is much
easier to solicit funds for construction projects (or other projects to
which it is easy to attach appropriate donor recognition) than it is
for ongoing operating expenditures; it was not accidental that the
Museum of Modern Art called its drive for a larger endowment a "building
campaign" [80].
In economic terms the incentive toward capital intensive donations
represents a distortion of inputs. The arts institution in the absence
of such donor pressure would pick and choose freely among the various
inputs which it uses to produce and maintain its programs: personnel,
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buildings, exhibit materials, collections, interpretative materials,
and the like. If the price of selecting any of these items changes, the
operation of the institution is affected in a manner which may not be
efficient. It may, for example, become burdened with a new building
which will siphon off substantial operating funds which might have been
better used for some other purpose.
Another characteristic of the charitable deduction system of support
is that it does not prevent artworks from being donated irretrievably to
the wrong museum. This characteristic is another example of the distortion
of inputs. The choice of the word wrong may seem a bit strong, but it
provides an accurate summary of the present situation. Donors give
artworks to institutions for a variety of reasons not necessarily having
to do with the appropriate place of that work in the collection of the
recipient museum or in the collection of some other museum. Furthermore,
donors are able to encumber their gifts with "no sale" and "perpetual
display" agreements which effectively block museums from trading among
themselves to improve and complete their collections.
Consider the donor who decides to donate a painting by a minor
painter to Museum A. The museum already owns several paintings by this
artist and has little need for a third or fourth example of hiswork.
Yet the museum has little incentive to turn the donation down; it costs
nothing (with the exception of marginal increases in storage, insurance,
and security costs) and the acceptance of the donation will help maintain
a good relationship with the donor. The museum may even accept the
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painting even if it has no intention of ever displaying it. Museum B,
on the other hand, might benefit greatly from the addition of -this paint-
ing to its collection; it may have no work by this particular artist, or
it may be looking for works from a particular period or genre. In the
absence of donor restrictions a mutually beneficial agreement might be
reached, but if the donor has made sale or display restrictions the
transaction will be prohibited. Through the tax expenditure the public
has helped pay for a transaction which will benefit the public little
if at all. 8
Some museums have cautiously begun to "deaccession" unrestricted
works from their collections, yet the public has greeted this action
with more dismay than approval. The prevalent feeling seems to be that
museums are betraying the trust which donors placed in them when they
made the original donations. There is also a good bit of second guessing;
Was the museum paid enough? Shouldn't it have kept that painting and
sold a different one? Did it get an equally important artwork in exchange?
It is time that we realize that if museums are to be operated in the
public interest we ought to begin by minimizing publicly-funded private
restrictions on their operation.9 The same, careful scrutiny that has
been applied to museum deaccessioning policies should be applied to the
use of public tax expenditure funds.
Investment in and donation of artworks has been particularly attrac-
tive to potential donors because of the special tax treatment of capital
gains. This treatment, described in Chapter II, makes a donation of
169
appreciated property even less expensive than a donation of cash,
especially for wealthy donors. Data presented in Chapter II indicate
that 57 percent of the total charitable contribution to culture in 1973
was in the form of property while only 10 percent of the total charitable
contribution to all charities was in that form. (For museums alone, this
percentage is probably even higher because of the relative importance of
gifts of artwork.) Because the relative price of a donation of appreciated
property is low, the economic incentives of the indirect aid system have
attracted donors to this type of gift and have funnelled relatively more
appreciated property to charitable institutions, particularly from
wealthy donors to cultural and educational institutions.
Ironically but predictably, the tax advantages for the donation of
appreciated property have contributed substantially to the dramatic overall
increase in the price of artworks. As early as 1941, Holger Cahill,
National Director of the Federal Art Project, noted:
The emphasis on masterpieces is primarily a
collector's idea and is related to a whole
series of commercial magnifications which have
very little to do with the needs of society [31].
And more recently, Brannon and Strnad have outlined the effects of the
special treatment of capital gains and the charitable deduction of gifts
of appreciated property on prices in the art market [25]: Because of
the tax advantages of such donations there is no effective budget con-
straint on potential purchasers of art; they realize that in a rising
market no matter how high they bid for a work of art it will continue to
appreciate after purchase and will eventually provide the donor with a
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substantial tax deduction; with rising prices it is profitable to buy
art in order to contribute it. Since the tax benefits are keyed to the
wealth of the donor, this system will primarily affect the prices of art
preferred by the wealthy and will provide no incentives for production of
other forms of art which might enter into the lives of more people such
as industrial design, popular illustration, and the like. Savage [112]
has pointed out another way in which taxes can distort prices in the art
market: in some European countries taxes on the possession of works of
art have led to a demand for,and appreciation in the value of,small,
easily concealed works of art.
One final area in which the direct link between trends in arts
support and income tax provisions can be clearly observed is tax shelters.
Prior to 1976 income tax law provided a number of tax shelters in the
movie industry. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1976 severely limited use of
these tax shelters, investors have turned to other areas of investment --
including investment in artists' plates for original, fine art prints --
as alternative tax shelters. The Act has diverted money from one artistic
sector into other uses. (Tax shelters are discussed more fully in
Chapter VI.)
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Professional Compromise and Ethical Compromise
Recently the operation of tax-exempt charitable institutions has
come under increased scrutiny. State Attorneys General have been
particularly active, insuring that these institutions are being
operated in the public interest. Arts service organizations have ex-
pended considerable effort compiling codes of behavior for trustees,
curators, managers, and other arts professionals. The media have been
quick to draw public attention to conflicts of interest in the operation
of arts institutions. The trend is toward greater accountability.
Two issues -- professional compromise and ethical compromise -- are
at the center of this reexamination, and, not surprisingly, the indirect
aid system plays an important role in raising them. Society's reliance
on the hidden and widely misunderstood indirect aid system has
encouraged the belief that the institutions receiving this aid are
"private" in nature and thus somehow not subject to public scrutiny.
Moreover, certain problems of professional and ethical compromise are
directly attributable to the indirect aid system.
An arbitrary distinction between professional compromise and ethical
compromise is helpful to compare the incentives provided for each under
the indirect aid system: professional compromise involves matters of
taste or quality -- violations of professional "standards" -- while
ethical compromise entails A's gain at B's expense, perhaps illegally.
Viewed in this way, professional compromise is a common occurence.
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Arts administrators often modify their programs in the presence or
absence of financial support; professional compromise is the other
side of the coin of covert influence. More generally, any input or
output distortion will affect arts administrators' plans and may leave
them with a feeling of professional compromise.
This broad view of professional compromise suggests that even direct
governmental grants can result in professional compromise as their con-
ditions affect the behavior of arts institutions vying for the grants.
Presumably, if direct aid programs were well formulated and efficiently
administered, any resulting changes in the operation of arts institutions
would be applauded as working in the public interest even though arts
professionals might have been forced to change their plans, "lower"
their standards, or aim toward a different audience. Note also that the
arts market, comprised of millions of individual consumers, has a
similar effect on artistic production. Many plays fold annually despite
critical or expert approval; some bad films are financial successes
and some immortal ones are box-office failures; and some opera or
symphony programs are less well attended than others. All of these
represent market restrictions on arts institutions. Programs have to be
designed carefully to attract an audience, and, by logical extension,
this adaptation to popular taste can be considered professional compromise.
Society should not consider all such compromises bad, even though
they affect the behavior of arts professionals. The public interest in
art has to be balanced with the other considerations.
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Ethical compromise is a more serious matter. And, if anything,
the indirect system encourages ethical compromise rather than minimizing
it.
Perhaps the single arts transaction most fraught with opportunities
for ethical compromise is the gift of artworks to museums. This contri-
bution presents a golden opportunity for crime. Because the actual
market value of appreciated property such as unique works of art is
difficult to assess and because no more practical means of declaration
has been devised, the donor makes his own estimate of the market value
of the donated property. For collectors this amount is fully deductible
against income for the taxable year in which the donation is made, and
income taxes are refunded as if full taxes had been paid on the income
represented by the full market value of the donated artwork. A higher
estimate of market value means a higher deduction and a greater tax
savings or, equivalently, a greater tax expenditure. If the deducted
valuation is high enough, the financial advantage of donation may surpass
the after-tax profits from a sale of the property; there need be no
philanthropic motive involved. Thus, the system tempts donors to take
deductions in excess of the legal limit, the market value of the artwork.
The donor and the arts administrator receiving the gift are
partners to an exchange that is paid for in large part by taxpayers who
are not parties to the transaction. This transaction is like victimless
crimes in that no individual party to the deal has anything to gain by
enforcing the law (with the exception of small penalties for overvaluations
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detected by the Internal Revenue Service). In this case there is a
victim, though -- the taxpayer. The more the donor cheats by inflating
his deduction, the more taxpayers pay.
The Internal Revenue Service monitors the deduction of gifts of
appreciated property and audits tax returns with unusual deductions.
The I.R.S. urges that the donor have the artwork appraised by a dis-
interested third party, but even this process is not free of compromise;
it has been suggested that the use of certain appraisers virtually
guarantees a tax audit [144]. Valuations are referred to an Art Advisory
Panel comprised of collectors, artists, and other knowledgable individuals.
(The panel also considers the valuation of artworks for estate and gift
tax purposes; in these cases an individual cheats by underestimating
the art's value to lower his tax bill.) The experience of the panel
clearly indicates that cheating does occur. The March 1974 meeting
considered 92 items with an aggregate claimed valuation of $5,875,000.
The panel recommended adjustments of approximately $2,697,000 -- a
28 percent net reduction in charitable contributions claimed and a
110 percent increase in estate and gift tax appraisals claimed. Only
34 percent of the items considered were accepted at their claimed values [82].
In 1972 the panel met three times and reviewed 711 works valued by donors
at more than $18 million. The panel recommended a 30 percent net reduc-
tion in the values claimed for charitable contributions and a 25 percent
increase in values claimed for estate and gift tax purposes. An I.R.S.
study has indicated that when additional agents are hired by I.R.S. they
recover $100 in taxes for each 48 cents spent on additional salaries [144].
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Occasionally the donor may even ask -- or expect -- the curator to
become a party to this deception. Will he substantiate the inflated
valuation which the donor intends to claim? The curator, not anxious
to establish an inflated value for a painting (which might even be of
questionable provenance), is torn by his desire to have it in his museum's
collection at no cost to the museum or at least to assure that this
particular donor will not be scared away by the institution's seeming
lack of gratitude. ("If you accept and defend this overvalued painting
now, I will eventually give you other, much more valuable artworks from
my collection.")
Another common tax dodge is the back-dating of donations. A donor
discovers that the tax advantages of a gift would have been greater in
the previous taxable year, so he asks the museum to back-date the
receipt for the gift. (Back-dating was particularly tempting in
early 1970 to artists, authors, composers, and other public figures
who realized that the Tax Reform Act of 1969 had severely limited the
deductions which they could claim for donations of their own artwork or
personal papers.) It costs the museum nothing to back-date the
receipt, but the back-dating will cost the taxpayer something. Alan
Shestack, Director of the Yale Art Gallery, turned down just such a
gift only to discover it one month later on the cover of the bulletin
of another museum featured as one of the major acquisitions of the
previous year' But even though refusal was the ethical (and legal) action,
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he recognized that museum trustees usually assume that their administra-
tors will do everything in their power to improve the collection and
attract gifts [114].
Several other problems in museum operations can also be traced to
the deductibility of appreciated property: Is there a compromise
involved in the acceptance of a gift of a painting that the curator
expects will never be displayed? (Whether or not the painting will ever
be displayed, a tax expenditure helps finance the transfer.) Should
artists' gifts of their own work be accepted at all? If such a work
is displayed, has the museum inappropriately contributed to the appre-
ciation in the value of the rest of the artist's portfolio? Similarly,
should museums display gifts (or loans) from trustees when a prime
result may be a substantial increase in the value of the remainder of
the trustee's collection? In all these cases the donations are encouraged
by the charitable income tax deduction; as a result, they are made
available at no cost to the recipient museum. The indirect aid system
makes it too easy for the museum to accept them without fully consider-
ing the consequences of that acceptance.
Summary
In summary, the indirect aid system causes, encourages, or fails to
prohibit a number of trends in arts support decisionmaking which are not
in agreement with public policy toward the arts. The system is inequitable
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in the income tax treatment of donors and inefficient in its many distor-
tions. Of particular importance are the changes in relative prices that
income tax expenditures create in the arts sector.
Society ought to replace the current indirect aid system with sup-
port programs which would be more equitable, more efficient, and easier
to adjust to correspond with changes in public policy. Some specific
proposals are discussed in Chapter VII. But it is necessary to ask
whether a change to more direct governmental funding would eliminate
these problems. A longstanding concern of artists and arts administrators
has been the amount of influence which the government might exert over
artistic institutions; it was this concern that delayed the creation of
the National Endowment for the Arts [119]l1 and kept symphony orchestras
from accepting government aid until as late as 1969 [61]. At present
the consensus seems to be that government arts agencies in the
United States have successfully avoided undue political interference in
their grantmaking policies.
At the same time, there is little doubt that government grants include
both overt and covert influences -- they are encumbered with a variety of
restrictions -- and they certainly result in changes in relative prices
as certain programs become cheaper for arts institutions. But the
overriding factor is that the government grants are made in consonance
with accepted public policy while the individual decisions which allocate
the tax expenditure are not. The changes felt by arts institutions as
a result of direct government support are designed to promulgate national
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(or state or local) cultural policy. Direct government support also
allows the pursuit of goals on a broader level; only through direct
funding (or endless tinkering with the tax system) will the government be
able to control the allocation of governmental funds among all the
charitable sectors. At present this allocation is determined in large
part by the coincidence of donor taste and wealth and the incentives
built into the income tax system. And even if the impact of donor-
restricted gifts is diverse and relatively minor, leading to no detri-
mental effects on the operation of arts institutions, there may still be
important governmental objectives such as geographical redistribution
which will not be adequately met by the indirect aid system.
One simple view of the reason for government support of the arts is
that the aggregate of private support is (i) not enough or (ii) in the
wrong configuration.12 To the extent that the second is the case it is
inefficient for society to allow private donors to spend tax expenditures
in one way and then have to come around and clean up the additional
negative effects with direct aid. There is definitely a role for direct
government aid to the arts, and the analysis of this chapter indicates
that it should be expanded to replace at least part of the indirect aid
system, thereby improving the government's ability to pursue public
policy goals in the arts.
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CHAPTER VI: SECURITY -- HOW CHANGES IN INCOME
TAX LAW AFFECT THE ARTS
Tax expenditures are usually well-hidden from public scrutiny,
and they are in practice less susceptible than direct aid programs to the
passing whim of legislative bodies. Unlike appropriations, which must
pass formal review every year, indirect aid payments are made through
the general framework of tax (or other) law and rarely come up for
independent scrutiny. The appropriateness of subsidies hidden from
review by legislators might well be questioned, particularly since these
programs are created by the congressional committees responsible for
overseeing tax law -- the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee -- rather than by the committees responsible for the
substantive areas of arts policy and charitable institutions -- such
as the House Committee on Education and Labor or the Senate Committee
on Labor and Public Welfare.
The obscurity of these forms of aid is expected to protect them;
the conventional wisdom is that indirect sources of aid are secure.
This supposed security of indirect aid is often advanced as the persua-
sive argument in favor of maintaining and expanding these funding
mechanisms. But the premise that disguised aid is secure is dubious and
ignores the changes, both major and minor, in indirect aid mechanisms
which do occur periodically as legislative bodies amend and restructure
tax laws. These changes are not often thought of or billed as "arts
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related" or "charity related," but they can have just as much financial
effect on arts institutions as bills specifically designed to implement
an arts program. Precisely because the tax expenditure is part of the
general tax structure, many changes in tax law affect arts institutions
as taxpayers adjust their behavior in response to these changes.
The arts provide one particularly vivid example of how changes in
income tax law can affect the flow of charitable contributions.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 limited the deduction which
an artist could take for the charitable contribution of one of his
artworks to the cost of the materials used in the creation of the work;
this change dramatically reduced the incentives for such a contribution.
The immediate reaction to the change is recounted by Robert Anthoine;
Take your mind back to the last days of 1969. The
President has just signed the 1969 Tax Reform Act into
law. In New York City the snow is snowing, the wind is
blowing, but somehow wagon after wagon weathers the
storm and pulls up in front of the Museum of Modern Art
and the Whitney Museum of American Art to disgorge a
stream of paintings and sculpture. Strange and wonderful
indeed -- and directly attributable to the new tax law
and to the alertness of the administrative directors of
those museums. Seldom is it possible to pinpoint so
directly the impact of tax law upon human behavior...
Those last days of 1969 represented the last chance
perhaps in a lifetime -- for the creator of property
such as paintings and sculpture to obtain a full fair
market value deduction for the donation of his created
work [ 6].
Even without discussing the appropriateness of this change in tax
law1 or the more general policy question about the rate at which con-
temporary artworks are (or are not) getting into the hands of museums
at little or no cost (to the museums), it is clear that this law has
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had a significant effect on arts institutions. The Museum of Modern Art
between 1966 and 1969 received gifts of 321 artworks from 97 living
artists. In the three years following the passage of the Tax Reform Act
it received 28 works, mostly prints, from 15 artists. Libraries and
other museums have also reported substantial reductions in such donations[133]. 2
In general, tax changes that increase taxation -- by increasing
tax rates, by decreasing the size of the standard deduction (the zero
tax bracket), or by removing certain tax benefits (loopholes) -- raise
the incentives for charitable giving. As an individualls taxes rise,
the price of giving falls and a charitable donation becomes a (relatively)
cheaper alternative use of one's money. Similarly, tax changes that
lower taxes generally lower the incentives for charitable giving, An
important characteristic of this relationship between level of taxation
and incentives for charitable giving is its inherent asymmetry; tax
changes that work to the advantage of taxpayers by decreasing their taxes,
work to the disadvantage of charitable institutions.3
Nor does the judgement that indirect aid is secure take into account
recently collected information on the behavior of donors. The National
Study of Philanthropy [86], sponsored by the Commission on Private
Philanthropy and Public Needs, reveals some interesting differences in
donor behavior vis-a-vis the various charitable sectors. The first charac-
teristic of donor behavior has already been discussed at length in Chapters
II and III; donors to cultural institutions, on the average, are
wealthier than the general population and wealthier than donors to any
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other charitable sector except education. (Tables II,4a and II.4c)
As a result, tax changes aimed particularly at wealthier individuals --
such as the elimination of tax shelters -- affect the arts proportion-
ately more than they affect other charitable institutions.
Another aspect of charitable giving disclosed by the National
Study data is the low priority gifts to cultural institutions seem to bear
relative to gifts to other charitable sectors. Each interviewee was
asked to name the sectors to which his first, second, third, and fourth
charitable gifts were made. These responses are summarized by percentage
of gifts and by percentage of total charitable contributions to each
sector in Tables VI.1 and VI.2. Cultural institutions receive relatively
few first gifts. Furthermore, 53 percent of the gifts to culture were
third or fourth gifts. Only health institutions suffer from a similar
low priority in relation to other institutions. The pattern is much the
same for total charitable contributions; cultural institutions received
a smaller portion -- 41 percent - of their contributions as a first
choice recipient than any other charitable sector.
That cultural institutions are given a lower priority than other
charitable recipients does not mean that donors regard arts institutions
as unimportant. It may simply reflect the fact that most donors have
specific loyalties to their church or alma mater (or both) that they
satisfy before they support cultural activities. Also, religious and
educational charities more readily lend themselves to single-institution
loyalty; a donor may favor one church or college but several cultural
institutions with his donations.
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Table VI.1 Precedence of Charitable Giving, Charitable Gifts
by Sector, 1973
Percentage of Gifts Given to Each
Charitable Sector by Order of Gift
Charitable Sector
Culture
Religion
First
Mention
19%
89
Second
Mention
28%
6
Third
Mention
18%
3
Fourth
Mention
35%
2
Education
Health
Other Social Welfare
Other Charitable
Total
Number of
Gifts
(millions)
.43
32.02
2.59
10.05
18.53
.13
Aggregate 55% 23% 14%
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs,
National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Note: All rows do not add to 100% because of rounding errors.
63.75
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Table VI.2 Precedence of Charitable Giving, Total Charitable Contributions
by Sector, 1973
Percentage of Total Dollars Given to
Each Charitable Sector by Order of Gift
Charitable Sector
First
Mention
41%Culture
Religion
Education
Health
Second
Mention
16%
3
28
26
Third
Mention
33%
1
7
16
Fourth
Mention
9%
1
4
9
Other Social Welfare
Other Charitable
Aggregate 84% 10%
Source: The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs,
National Study of Philanthropy, 1974 [86].
Note: All rows do not add to 100% because of rounding errors.
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Whatever the cause, the implication for cultural institutions should
be underscored. Relative to other charitable sectors, cultural institu-
tions are marginal recipients of charitable contributions. If the
incentives for charitable giving are reduced, the donor will reduce his
total giving. Possibly he will reduce all his gifts proportionately,
but more likely, given this evidence, he will reduce his giving by putting
more of the burden of that reduction on his later choice charities rather
than on his top-priority choice. If tax laws or other governmental rules
are altered in ways that discourage charitable giving, donors will
probably reduce their gifts to the arts more than to other charities.
Cultural institutions thus receive a more-than-proportional impact
from any across-the-board changes in tax law and are more sensitive than
other charities to changes affecting wealthier taxpayers. For a small
arts institution, heavily dependent on charitable contributions, a
marginal change in the tax law might have a large -- perhaps disastrous -
effect.
Tax changes with adverse impact on arts institutions are more than
a theoretical possibility. Artists' reluctance to donate their works
since 1969 bears testimony to this, and in the last ten years Federal
income tax legislation has undergone two major revisions which include
numerous other examples of how such legislation can affect the arts.
Changes in state law are no less important, although they are harder to
pin down because of their diversity.
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In the following pages I discuss both of these major revisions in
income tax law to suggest ways in which they affected charitable insti-
tutions. The discussion is not a catalog of all the tax provisions
which can be deemed to have had an effect on the arts -- indeed, any
change in tax law theoretically affects the flow of funds to arts
institutions as its effects are visited throughout the tax system --
but it indicates the variety of ways in which such legislation may impact
the financial situation of the arts. Nor is the purpose of this chapter
to evaluate these tax changes from a tax administration viewpoint; many
of these changes improved the administration or internal logic of tax
law, and from these perspectives they are entirely justifiable. Yet,
at the same time, they act to the disadvantage of charitable institutions.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 [121] was in large part designed to deal
with abuses -- both real and imagined -- in the operation of foundations
controlled by a small number of individuals. The Act defined a new sub-
class of tax-exempt charities, private foundations, including those that
generally do not operate as churches, schools, or hospitals and which do
not derive substantial support from the general public and the government.5
These private foundations were subjected to new reporting requirements,
special excise taxes, and other constraints designed primarily to correct
abuses of their tax-exempt status including self-dealing, undue control
over business enterprises, excessive accumulation of tax-free income, and
expenditures for inappropriate purposes.
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The arts were affected in two ways by the new rules for private
foundations. First, some arts institutions were accidentally caught in
the net cast to catch private foundations. Second, to the extent that
private foundations themselves provide aid to the arts, disincentives
to the growth and operation of private foundations affect the flow of
funds to the arts.
Most arts institutions are not "private" according to the Act's
definition; their sources of income are sufficiently diverse to classify
them as "public" charities. The Act did nothing directly to change the
internal operation of public charities. But some arts institutions
found themselves defined as private foundations. In congressional
testimony given in 1973 Kyran McGrath, Director of the American Association
of Museums, estimated that 15 museums were classified as private founda-
tions as a result of the Act [132}. (Later estimates have increased this
figure to as many as two dozen.) These museums in general are those
having such large endowments that their investment income dwarfs their
public support. Most were created and heavily endowed by one individual;
in some cases the collection is that of the original donor. Prominent
examples are the Frick Collection, the Currier Gallery of Art, the
Kimbell Art Museum, the Sterling and Francine Clark Art Institute, the
Corning Museum of Glass, the Winterthur Museum and the Adirondack Museum.
The "private foundation museums" incurred two financial liabilities
as a result of their classification. First,they became subject to a
4 percent excise tax on their endowment income, putatively an "audit fee"
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to reimburse the Internal Revenue Service for its costs. Second, because
private foundations are required to exercise "expenditure responsibility"
for grants to other private foundations, entailing detailed record-
keeping and reports, museums which themselves are private foundations
are less willing to make grants to them. Furthermore, if a private
foundation is the primary source of funds for a charitable institution,
that support may cause the charitable recipient to be classified as a
private foundation as well.
Karl Meyer [82] reports that in the years following the passage of
the 1969 Act the Frick Collection found itself liable for between
$55,000 and $75,000 in annual 4 percent excise taxes on investment
income. In order to halt this seemingly unnecessary expenditure, the
Frick finally introduced a $1.00 admission charge so that its balance
of endowment to other income would be changed and it would no longer
be classified as a private foundation. The Frick's base of support became
more public but, paradoxically, only by restricting public access to the
collection by means of the new admission charge and collecting funds that
it never thought it needed.
The inclusion of some museums as private foundations was probably
accidental; Congress sought to differentiate public charities from private
ones and seized on support as a convenient criterion. The support test
operates as a rough surrogate for a control or behavior test, on the
theory that the more dependent the institution is on diversified public
support the more the donors will assure, by withholding or sending their
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donations, that the institution is acting in the "public interest.,
(Congress might, by contrast, have focussed on the mechanisms for control
of the foundation, treating as public those foundations with diverse rep-
resentation on their boards of directors and as private those controlled
by a single donor, his family, and his associates,) The problem, in any
case, lies in finding a convenient criterion by which a determination of
publicness or privateness can be made. The American Association of
Museums has argued that Congress should have emphasized the behavior
of the institution rather than its type of support, since public-spirited
behavior was the desired result, and advocates using a procedure like
their accreditation process (developed after 1969) to separate museums
acting in the public interest from others,
The impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 on the amount of grants
given by foundations to arts institutions is difficult to assess,6 It
is not clear that the net result of the private foundation provisions
of the Act has been to decrease support for the arts, It certainly
halted the substantial growth of private foundations, but even if the
tax laws entirely eliminated favorable treatment for private foundations,
philanthropy would not necessarily cease. Donations and bequests which
formerly went to foundations as charitable contributions may now go
directly to other charitable ventures.
It is similarly difficult to gauge the net effect of the specific
limitations on private foundations, The 4 percent tax on investment
income decreases the amount a private foundation has available for
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distribution, but the Act also requires minimum payouts for charitable
purposes (by non-operating private foundations) equal to their net
income or (if greater) a fixed percentage of the value of their assets.
The latter requirement may, in fact, result in more money flowing to arts
institutions as foundations increase their spending to comply with these
tax provisions.
The Tax Reform Act of 1969 also revised provisions influencing the
behavior of individual and corporate donors. It increased the general
limitation for individual donations to public charities from 30 percent
to 50 percent of the donor's "contribution base" (essentially equivalent
to the donor's adjusted gross income). The additional 20 percent cannot,
however, be in the form of appreciated property. This increase in per-
centage limitations primarily affects large and, presumably, wealthy
donors. Since the arts are supported mostly by just such donors who
give substantial sums at one time, the arts are net beneficiaries of
the new limits. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the Act limited
the deduction for gifts of appreciated inventory and other ordinary income
property, including artists' works, to the donor's basis. The Act also
limited the deduction for gifts of appreciated tangible personal property
(e.g., paintings, but not stocks) to basis plus half of the appreciation
when that property was unrelated to the exempt function of the charitable
recipient.
The Act also discouraged individual and corporate donations to
private non-operating foundations by (i) reducing the deduction for a
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gift of appreciated property to its basis in value plus one-half of the
unrealized appreciation, (ii) limiting such charitable deductions to
20 percent of the contribution base, and (iii) foreclosing carry-forwards
to other taxable years of gifts in excess of the 20 percent limitation.
The favorable limits for donations to public charities as compared to
those for private foundations added to the effect of funneling donations
to public charities including most arts institutions.
And finally, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 also made a number of changes
in the provisions governing the donation of split-interest gifts -'- gifts
in which the donor retains a partial interest. Bargain sales of
appreciated property were made less attractive. (This change is discussed
in Chapter II.) Deductions for the right to use property were eliminated.
For example, the portion of a building used rent-free by a charity can no
longer be deducted as a gift.9 Prior to 1969 some courts had implied that
the owner of a painting could take a charitable deduction for the value of
the work for the period of exhibition, but the 1969 Act closed off this
intriguing incentive to the public display of privately held art.10 The
rules pertaining to charitable remainder trusts -- trusts which pay their
income to a private person (typically the donor) for life and the remainder
to charity -- were revised. At the moment these changes do not seem to
affect the arts because arts institutions are not yet making extensive
use of charitable remainder trusts as fundraising mechanisms.
Despite its focus on private foundations, it is not surprising that
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 also affected other charitable organizations,
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particularly arts institutions. The net effect of all the changes in
this Act is difficult to assess, but the American Association of Museums
has claimed that private foundations are a major source of support for
many museums and that the new provisions limited this important source
of support. But even though there may be ways other than tax law to
control the operation of these foundations, it is important to remember
that foundation endowments are, in part, creations of favorable tax
laws, and a substantial portion of these endowments is in the form of
tax expenditure. The public does have an interest in the behavior of
the private individuals who, through their foundations, determine the
ultimate use of these public funds.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976
On its face, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 [125]was less concerned with
the operation of charities than the 1969 Act. Its major changes simpli-
fied the operation of estate and gift taxes and curtailed the use of
certain tax shelters. Yet these and other provisions in the Act,
although not explicitly concerned with charities, will have significant
effects both on contributions to cultural institutions and on the opera-
tion of these institutions.
In the Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress enacted the first major
revisions of estate and gift taxes since the 1940's including; the
consolidation of the estate and gift taxes into a "unified transfer tax"
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with increased exemption limits, increases in the marital deduction, and
the introduction of "carry-over basis" for calculating capital gains tax
on inherited property. These changes, designed to simplify administration
and coordination, alter the incentives for charitable giving and will have
various effects on the flow of bequests and gifts to charitable institu-
tions, but these effects are beyond the scope of the present study.'1
The other major thrust of the 1976 Act dealt with tax shelters. Tax
shelter investments typically generate paper "losses" in initial years
which can be deducted from, and thereby reduce tax liability on, regular
income; the income is thus "sheltered" from taxation. A tax shelter
encourages investment in certain industries, typically those with large
front-end capital costs and proceeds realized over a number of years.
The changes in tax shelters are important for the arts because of
two popular forms of tax shelter that were eliminated for the motion
picture industry by the 1976 Act.12 First, loss deductions were subjected
to an "at-risk" limitation. An investor can no longer deduct a loss in
excess of the amount he has at risk in the investment in the form of
cash or property put into the venture or personal liability on notes.
This eliminates deductions for money borrowed with no liability. Second,
an investor may not deduct currently the costs of producing and distributing
movies (and video tapes, sound recordings, books, and plays). These costs
must now be capitalized and deducted by using the income forecast method.
Both provisions bring the individual's profit/loss calculations more in line
with the actual investment he has made and with the expected time stream of
194
costs and benefits, rather than, as earlier, accelerating the deductions,
allowing them to be set-off against other income. This restriction of
shelter benefits makes capital more expensive to movie-makers by eliminat-
ing a source of tax-expenditure-supported capital investment in films. 1 3
Note that changes in tax law can affect profit-making arts institutions
just as significantly as they affect nonprofit, charitable arts institu-
tions.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 also simplified and reduced individual
income taxes. Several of these changes affect charitable institutions;
the most important is the increase in the standard deduction (renamed the
"zero bracket amount"), further altered and enlarged by the 1977 Tax
Reduction and Simplification Act [127]. The cumulative effect of these
changes is to reduce the number of taxpayers who itemize deductions,
including charitable contributions. The Congressional Conference
Committee estimated that 7 million tax returns would switch from itemized
deductions to the standard deduction. For these taxpayers income tax law
no longer provides any incentive for giving. Feldstein estimated that
the change in the deduction in the 1976 Act would cost charities approxi-
mately $300 million per year and that similar changes in the 1969 Act had
cost them $700 million [120].
Modifications in the standard deduction and the associated drop in
charitable giving affect the arts proportionately less than they do other
charitable institutions. Taxpayers who take the standard deduction are
in lower tax brackets and, as discussed earlier this chapter, tend to
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contribute to religious or health and welfare organizations rather than
to educational or cultural institutions. Nevertheless, some erosion in
charitable giving is likely to be felt by arts institutions, and those
institutions particularly interested in expanding their constituency
through a wider socioeconomic range will find it increasingly difficult
to encourage low and moderate income taxpayers to provide ongoing support
for the institution. Thus, these changes not only result in immediate
changes in giving levels but also may inhibit future expansion of
public support.
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 also relaxed some of the rules pertaining
to tax-exempt organizations, the area of tax law which had received so
much attention in 1969. Of particular interest are changes in the manda-
tory payout percentage for private foundations (discussed earlier in this
chapter) and new regulations governing lobbying by public charities,
Regulations on lobbying were clarified and the scope of permissible
lobbying activities expanded, thus bringing about an important change in
charitable institutions' ability to monitor and influence legislation
which will affect them.
Umbrella organizations such as the American Council for the Arts and
the National Council for Arts and Education, in the arts field, and the
Coalition of National Voluntary Organizations, representing all major
segments of the nonprofit charitable sector, will probably become
even more active as a result of the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
A subtantial part of their mission is legislative lobbying, and it can be
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expected that they will take full advantage of the new lobbying pro-
visions. And as arts organizations become more aware of the impact of
legislation, particularly in the previously murky areas of indirect aid,
they will be better able to influence that legislation.
Two other changes contained in the Tax Reform Act of 1976 are of
interest to the arts community. The first tightens the rules related
to the deduction of expenses attributable to the use of the taxpayer's
home for business purposes. This provision may have a significant impact
on artists whose studios are part of their homes, The second, of interest
primarily to business taxpayers, provides a tax carrot-and-stick approach
to the preservation of historic structures. The law allows rapid amorti-
zation (five-year write-off) of rehabilitation expenditures on historic
structures, and prohibition of business expense deductions for the
demolition of an historic building. Furthermore, for real property
constructed on a site previously occupied by an historic structure, only
straight line depreciation (the least favorable to the taxpayer) is
allowed, while accelerated depreciation is allowed on substantially re-
habilitated historic properties.
The Tax Reform Acts of 1976 and 1969 include virtually all of the
major structural changes in Federal tax law which have occurred in the
past ten years. Both pieces of legislation had important consequences
for arts institutions and, in certain cases, for artists. Many of the
changes have worked to the disadvantage of the arts, sometimes with the
effects coming quite accidentally. It is difficult to remain confident
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that the indirect aid mechanisms for charities generally, and for cul-
tural institutions in particular, are protected from erosion.
To complete the discussion of the impact of federal tax law changes
on arts institutions we need to ask what changes are possible and likely
in the near future. Can we make some guesses about the future security
of indirect aid?
Possible Changes in Federal Income Tax Law
Currently four important proposals concerning individual and corpor-
ate income taxes are foci of debate; (i) the separation of the standard
deduction and the charitable deduction, (ii) changes in overall tax
rates, (iii) changes in the preferential treatment of capital gains, and
(iv) integration of corporate and individual income taxes. Some of these
proposals are under more active consideration than others; some have a
better chance of being passed by Congress than others. But more important
for arts institutions is the fact that each of these proposals is being
considered without any particular arts constituency in mind, even though
each one would have an identifiable impact on arts institutions,
Increases in the size of the standard deduction prompt more people
to use the standard deduction; the tax incentive for charitable giving is
removed for those people. The interplay between the charitable deduction
and the standard deduction defines the actual economic incentives for
giving for each taxpayer.
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The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs has lamented
the fact that the charitable deduction is "highly vulnerable to .
indirect political erosion" as the standard deduction is expanded [39].
While it is true that recent tax legislation has made substantial increases
in the level of the standard deduction, those changes have been made for
primarily economic reasons reflecting changes in the costs of personal
expenses and higher incomes. When the standard deduction was first
introduced into income tax law in 1944 more than 82 percent of taxpayers
used it. That percentage steadily decreased to approximately 58 percent
in 1969 [1221], but since that time increases in the standard deduction
have increased the number of taxpayers using it to 64 percent in 1974 (138].
It is true that these changes have affected the flow of money to charitable
institutions as the incentives for charitable giving have changed, but
these changes were not implemented for the purpose of affecting cultural
institutions. They were made to reflect changing economic conditions and
to simplify the administration of the income tax.
In order to circumvent the interdependency between the standard de-
duction and the charitable deduction and to avoid the politically embarrass-
ing position of opposing increases in the standard deduction, charitable
institutions have begun to advocate moving the charitable deduction
outside of the standard deduction, allowing taxpayers to take advantage
of both. The Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs in its
final report [38] proposed two tax changes implementing this idea:
-- All taxpayers who take the standard deduction should also
be permitted to deduct charitable contributions.
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-- Families with incomes below $15,000 a year should be allowed to
deduct twice the amount of their giving, and those with incomes
between $15,000 and $30,000 should be allowed to deduct 150 percent
of what they contribute.
This extension of the deduction would enable the nearly 60 million tax-
payers who claim the standard deduction to benefit by itemizing
charitable contributions; the cost of a $1.00 gift would become at most
$.86 for any person paying income tax.14  The Commission estimated that
implementation of these recommendations would result in an annual increase
in giving of $1.9 billion; of this amount, approximately $1.4 billion
would be in the form of foregone government tax revenues, a tax expenditure.
It is important to recognize that not all nonprofit institutions
would receive equal benefits from such an expansion, Because nine-tenths
of the taxpayers with incomes over $25,000 already itemize their deduc-
tions, the extension in the charitable deduction will primarily affect the
giving of taxpayers in lower income brackets, whose gifts tend not to go
to educational or cultural institutions. The arts would not benefit nearly
as much as other types of recipients.
As of this writing such proposals have received some serious attention
despite the facts that the permanent national commission on the nonprofit
sector, recommended by the Filer Commission,has not been established by
Congress, and the Advisory Committee on Private Philanthropy and Public
Needs within the Treasury Department has been discontinued by the Carter
administration. Arguments in favor of modifying the charitable deduction
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(rather than scrapping it in favor of another system such as tax credits,
matching grants, or a progressive deduction) have not yet persuaded the
general public, though charitable institutions are more frequently using
the public media to argue for allowing a charitable contribution deduc-
tion in addition to the standard deduction.
Another area of income tax law which is receiving increased attention
is the tax rate schedule itself. In the past several years a number of
tax reduction proposals have received widespread public support;
President Carter has proposed a proportional across-the-board tax rate
reduction which would be paid for in part by closing loopholes,
In evaluating the effect of such proposals on charitable arts insti-
tutions the rule of thumb developed at the beginning of the chapter is
indispensable. Decreases in tax rates increase the price of giving. To
a first approximation this decreases the amount of gifts; both the tax
expenditure and the induced gift may shrink. Economists term this the
"substitution effect;" donors substitute other uses of their money for
charitable contributions as those contributions become relatively more
expensive. But because the taxpayer has more money in his pocket than
before the taxes were reduced, his donations might increase; this is an
"income effect."
Using President Carter's proposal as one example of a change in tax
rates, the procedure used to estimate the overall change in charitable
giving can be illustrated. The price of giving $1.00 to a charitable
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institution is 1-r, where r is the taxpayer's marginal tax rate. If tax
rates are reduced by a constant percentage, p, the percentage increase
in the price of giving is (p x r)/(l-r). For taxpayers in the highest
marginal tax bracket (70 percent) the percentage increase in the price
of giving is (p x .70)/.30 = 2.33 p; for taxpayers in the lowest
marginal tax bracket (14 percent) the percentage increase in the price of
giving is (p x .14)/186 = .16 p. The percentage increase in the price
of giving for the highest income group is over 14 times the percentage
increase for the lowest taxpaying income group. Thus, this proposal
would affect arts and educational institutions much more than other chari-
table institutions because of their dependence on wealthy donors.
Feldstein [51] has estimated that the overall price elasticity of giving
is -1.24. The percentage decrease mentioned in connection with Carter's
proposal is two-sevenths; the top marginal tax rate would be lowered from
70 percent to 50 percent, and the rates in all the other brackets would
be lowered proportionately. Using Feldstein's elasticity and a 2/7 tax
reduction, total charitable contributions would decline by 11 percent
while contributions to cultural institutions would decline by 32 percent.15
This estimate isolates the substitution effect and includes no
estimate of the income effect on giving resulting from the change in tax
rates. The Carter proposal actually includes two separate income effects;
the first is due to the increase in disposable income after the applica-
tion of the lower marginal tax rates. The second depends upon exactly
which loopholes the reform bill closes; the removal of different loop-
holes will decrease the amount of disposable income for different taxpayers.
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If the reforms affect rich taxpayers proportionately more than poor tax-
payers -- the likely direction that such reform would take -- then the
income effect will not necessarily increase giving enough to offset the
decrease attributable to the price effect; the arts might be hurt by both
aspects of such a plan.
This brief analysis of one tax reform proposal indicates the importance
of more refined research on the relationship between tax law and charitable
contributions. It is essential that each sector of the charitable community
assess the likely impacts of such proposals on its own operations and con-
tribute this information to the public debate about such reforms, It cannot
be assumed that the House Ways and Means Committee or the Senate Finance
Committee will bring these considerations into their deliberations, It may
also be necessary to propose that additional direct aid to the arts be
substituted for the expected reduction in indirect aid, but this is tricky
because different congressional committees oversee direct governmental
aid to the arts. And finally, it is important to notice that because
changes in tax laws have widely different consequences for specific types
of charitable institutions, the interests of the various nonprofit sectors
do not necessarily coincide. It is a mistake to assume that a natural
coalition of nonprofit institutions will always form to battle such pro-
posals. Replacing the income tax deduction with a tax credit, for example,
might work to the advantage of religious institutions while working to
the disadvantage of arts and educational institutions.
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No recent changes in tax law reveal the insecurity of the indirect
aid system so well as the debate over preferential income tax treatment
for capital gains. When I wrote the first'draft of this chapter the law
taxed "long-term" capital gains -- assets held more than one year -- at
half the tax rate otherwise applied to ordinary income. This preferential
treatment was designed to account, roughly, for the fact that if capital
gains accumulated over a number of years were taxed in one year, they
would result in a larger tax liability than if the appreciation were
allocated and taxed throughout the years the property was held. At that
time there was substantial public discussion about the possibility of
removing this special treatment for capital gains. Such a change would
have led to an increase in the donation of appreciated property to
charitable institutions.
Congress, however, soon passed the 1978 Revenue Act [128] which aug-.
mented the preferential treatment of capital gains. Since October 31, 1978
capital gains have been taxed at 40 percent of the rate which otherwise
would have applied. This change in tax law was made to provide an incentive
for investment, but at the same time it decreased the incentives for
charitable donations of appreciated property. It is too soon to measure the
actual impact of this change, but if the economic argument holds,this change
will decrease donations.
The fourth major proposal of current interest is integration of the
corporate and individual income taxes. Integration proposals are designed
to remove what many consider to be a "double taxation" embedded in the
current rules.
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Consider the taxpayer who owns one share of ACME Corporation stock.
ACME Corporation makes a profit of $7.00 per share: of this, $3.36
goes to corporate income tax, $1.64 is retained corporate profits, and
$2.00 is distributed as dividends. The individual taxpayer then includes
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the $2.00 of dividends in his taxable income. If the taxpayer is, for
example, in the 50 percent marginal tax bracket, he is liable for an
additional $1.00 in taxes as a result of this dividend. It is argued
that the dividend has been "doubly taxed," once as part of the $7.00 and
again in the taxpayer's hands. On the other hand, the individual taxpayer
pays no tax now on his share of the corporation's retained earnings, $1,64.
Nor does he pay interest for deferral of the tax if the corporation dis-
tributes the profit to him in a later year. Indeed, if the taxpayer sells
his share (or the corporation liquidates) after he holds the share for a
year, he will pay capital gains tax, not dividend tax, to the extent he
realizes the retained earnings as appreciation.
One proposal for full integration requires each shareholder to treat
his proportional share of the corporation's profit as his own income, and
the taxes paid by the corporation as taxes paid on the taxpayer's account.
In other words, he takes the corporate tax paid as a tax credit: in our
example, the taxpayer would add $7.00 to his income, take a credit for the
$3.36 already paid in taxes by the corporation, and pay an additional $.14
in taxes to complete his full tax liability of .50 x $7.00 = $3.50, The
$1.64 retained by the corporation would increase the taxpayer's basis in
the stock as though it were reinvested.
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It seems unlikely at this writing that full integration will be pro-
posed; some type of partial integration stands a better chance of passage.
One such proposal is simply to add to the corporate income tax a deduc-
tion for dividends paid out. The first-order effect of such a proposal
would be to decrease corporate income taxes without increasing individual
income taxes. Because there is a tax saving associated with paying out
dividends, however, the second-order result would be an increase in
dividends paid, thereby further decreasing the amount of corporate income
taxes actually paid and simultaneously increasing the total amount of
individual income tax paid. Another proposal is to give the benefit to
the shareholder, by crediting a portion of the corporation's income tax
as if paid by the shareholder.
How would an integration proposal affect charitable institutions?
In both the individual and the corporate income tax systems there are
charitable deductions. Proposals for integration have so far not
specifically resolved the question of the relationship between the two
deductions. Adjustments in the relationship between the corporate
charitable deduction and the individual charitable deduction will result
in redistribution of contributions among charitable sectors as well as
among the various types of arts organizations and in changes in the over-
all level of charitable giving. The net results are entirely dependent
on the integration proposal which is adopted.1 7
The proposed tax changes discussed in this chapter have not been
specifically arts-related; they have been part of general tax reforms.
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Yet an increased awareness of the importance of the indirect aid system
is likely to lead to proposals which manipulate that system for a
variety of goals which have very.little to do with tax logic or tax
administration. This trend has already begun in the arts. In the next
few pages I use the analysis which has been developed throughout this
thesis to evaluate one such proposal.
H.R. 3999 was introduced in the 94th Congress by Congressman Rees
(D-California) [124]. It is an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code
which would allow a full income tax deduction for purchases of contem-
porary American art up to a total expenditure of $10,000, with any excess
eligible to be carried forward for 9 years. This bill is putatively
designed to get more income into the pockets of living visual artists by
stimulating the art market. To accomplish this it reduces the actual
cost of the art to the purchaser by making all other taxpayers partners
in his purchase through a tax expenditure.
This deduction has the same faults as all such deductions, It
rewards the wealthy taxpayer much more than the poor taxpayer; the
public will pay for 70 percent of a wealthy individual's purchase, whereas
a poor individual has to put up all the cash himself. It, therefore,
makes expensive art (by successful artists) particularly cheaper since
only wealthy buyers can afford it. Such a proposal would further distort
artistic output according to the tastes of the wealthy and of speculators.
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But more important, this proposal uses a very imprecise tool to deal
with the problem of low artistic incomes. If individuals were to use
such a deduction to a substantial degree would they not stick to proven,
well-known artists, particularly if the deduction attracts those who are
not knowledgeable about art? And it might not help artists at all; if
demand is inelastic, art buyers, buying about as much art as they want to
now, at prices they themselves determine, would simply appropriate the
entire tax expenditure without increasing demand -- or prices -- signifi-
cantly.
In addition, such a bill does not and cannot deal with income problems
of playwrights, poets, composers and others, who, it would seem, have a
similar claim to income support. Direct aid for purchases and new produc-
tions by arts institutions, and general income maintenance programs, seem
to be better adapted to dealing with inequities in individual incomes.
One further criticism of this bill is that it uses public money to
purchase private property which will then appreciate to the sole advantage
of the private owner. At the very least, a public display requirement
for art purchased with taxpayers' money would make the bill more palatable.18
Summary
The security of the indirect aid system is overrated; the important
sources of indirect aid are not secure. Income taxes have undergone major
revisions even during the last ten years, revisions which will have lasting
208
effects on giving to and operation of charitable institutions. More
such reforms are being considered; they too will influence charitable
institutions, and it will be difficult to estimate the net effect of
these proposed changes without extensive research (a task arts advocacy
groups might well assume).
The dynamics of the tax framework which provides indirect aid have
seldom come under the scrutiny of arts institutions. These institutions
have typically evidenced a blind, or at least myopic, faith in the con-
tinuation and accretion of tax preferences generally beneficial to
charitable institutions, The need for ongoing monitoring of tax laws
by nonprofit institutions is clear, but I am pessimistic that even a
broad-based coalition of nonprofit organizations will be able to deal
successfully with these problems. Recall that the interests of one
segment of the nonprofit sector -- churches, for example -- do not
necessarily coincide with the interests of other segments of the nonprofit
sector -- such as the arts. A tax change that benefits one segment may
work to the detriment of another.
The hidden nature of the indirect system may even be a liability.
The effects of the indirect system are difficult to identify, and the
system is much harder to influence than a direct system of aid. Think,
first, about the time and energy institutions spend wooing potential
donors and, then, about the further difficulty of lobbying to improve or
merely protect the favorable -- to the institution and to some taxpayers --
aspects of the indirect system. Arts institutions have had to resort to
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ex post facto complaints about tax reforms that injure them; when tax
law changes are being considered, arts institutions do not receive
letters of inquiry -- much less Arts Impact Statements -- analyzing the
impending changes. Often nothing at all will be said, either because
the impact on the arts is inadvertent or because it is believed to be
minor. Indeed, if viewed on the scale of Federal expenditures rather
than on the scale of individual institution expenditures, it often is
minor; but on the scale of art-related policy impacts, it can be
apocalyptic.
I conclude that indirect systems of support not only perform poorly
when measured according to the criteria of equity and efficiency, but
also are wanting in security. I am optimistic that funding programs can
be designed to meet better the equity and efficiency criteria and to
be as secure as many other successful government direct aid programs.
In the final chapter I discuss a number of such reform proposals.
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS --
HOW THE INDIRECT AID SYSTEM
CAN BE REFORMED
Income tax expenditures are a significant source of government aid
for the arts. Charitable income tax deductions, capital gains tax exemp-
tions, and income tax exemptions for foundations and arts institutions
provided over $300 million in publicly-supported funds to arts insti-
tutions in 1973. (An additional $24 million was provided as induced
gifts in individual charitable contributions.) This aid was more than
one and a half times the aid provided by direct government arts support
programs in the same year.
Despite its financial importance to arts institutions, the charac-
teristics and effects of the indirect aid system are poorly understood.
Even though the system -- particularly the individual charitable income
tax deduction -- is widely believed to be decentralized, in fact, it is
not according to most reasonable definitions of decentralization.
Similarly, the system is not as secure as is widely believed; it is
particularly susceptible to political erosion.
Moreover, the current system of income tax deductions is inextri-
cably linked to the personal tastes, preferences, and whims of donors.
And since the system is inequitable in its provision of tax benefits
(and donation incentives) to donors, with wealthy donors receiving
greater benefits, the system accentuates the tastes of these wealthy
donors. Arts institutions, uniquely dependent on the support provided
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by wealthy donors, are particularly susceptible to their tax-
expenditure-weighted influence. The decisions that private donors make
lead to input and output distortions in the operation of arts institu-
tions -- distortions which may be in conflict with
accepted public policy for the arts. This is particularly true for
donor-restricted gifts. A further side-effect of the income tax expendi-
ture system is that it offers an attractive opportunity for donor fraud
and ethical compromise on the part of arts managers.
In short, the current system is inequitable, inefficient, insecure,
centralized in the hands of the relatively wealthy, and very difficult
to adjust in accordance with accepted public policy. Reforms of the
indirect aid system could lead to marked improvements in the operation
of the arts support system.
In the sections that follow I describe a number of different pro-
posals to reform and/or replace the current system of income tax
expenditures. I begin with proposals that entail only moderate alter-
ations in the system and proceed to increasingly broad reforms. There
are clear advantages in replacing the indirect aid system with an almost
entirely direct aid system, but I recognize that such a major change
in emphasis is unlikely in the short run and may well be politically
unfeasible in the long run as well. Therefore, serious consideration
ought to be given to proposals that improve the functioning of the
existing system of aid. As it happens, relatively simple reforms can
improve the efficiency of the system, while more far-reaching reforms
are necessary to improve its equity.
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In proposing reforms to the present arts funding system, it is
important to emphasize the results of Chapter III concerning the incidence
of income to the arts. While the portion of the indirect aid system
attributable to income tax deductions is slightly redistributive, a
variety of alternative funding mechanisms would be similarly redistribu-
tive. Thus, alterations in the current system will not substantially
alter the overall incidence of income to the arts and will be able to
retain the redistributive nature of the system. This is particularly
true of the reforms proposed in this chapter because they fit comfortably
with the range of alternatives tested in Chapter III.
Generating a Trail of Data
The problem that most inhibits understanding the current system
is that, unlike direct aid programs, it generates almost no data by
which it can be evaluated. One simple change in the mechanism of the
current system could dramatically improve this situation: when declar-
ing their charitable deductions on their income tax forms, donors
could be required to categorize their donations according to types of
charitable recipients. Categories such as the charitable sectors used in
this dissertation would probably be adequate, although more detail would
certainly improve the usefulness of the data collected. The Internal
Revenue Service could then document changes in the pattern of charitable
contributions as part of its annual Statistics of Income publications.
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Limiting Donor Restrictions on Charitable Gifts
As suggested in Chapter V, many of the problems associated with the
indirect aid system stem from donor restrictions on the use of their
donations. To the extent that these gifts are private contributions,
this is nothing more nor less than is always allowed to individuals;
but to the extent that these gifts are publicly subsidized through tax
expenditures, we need to ask whether these restrictions are in accord
with acceptable public policy. If the United States continues to
provide a substantial portion of its support to the arts through an
indirect aid system, we need to explore ways of minimizing these problems
by limiting donor restrictions. All taxpayers are helping to finance
the donor's gift, and they ought to have a say in what restrictions can
or cannot be placed on the expenditure of their money.
The situation is complicated by the fact that it is not trivial to
identify donations that are restricted -- or, for that matter, are
restrictive. For example, it may be possible for a charity to define
itself specifically enough to successfully avoid the question of restric-
tions: a donation to a health research foundation might be considered
restricted if the donor specifies it must go to cancer research while an
unrestricted donation to a foundation created solely to fight cancer
might not be so considered. On the other hand, it can be argued that
a cash donation to a museum, restricted to the purchase of art, does
not restrict the operation of the museum if the museum spends some of
its unrestricted funds to purchase art in addition to all such restricted
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funds. In this instance any "distortion" is the result of the museum's
decision and not the net result of the donors' restrictions.
Any limitation on donor restrictions might make a useful distinction
between donor-imposed restrictions and donee-suggested restrictions.
Arts institutions frequently announce special fundraising campaigns for
capital improvements or for purchase funds or for other major projects.
In one sense, a donation to such a campaign can be considered restricted;
it was given with a specific purpose in mind. On the other hand, the
special fund indicates a decision made by the institution prior to
any donor-placed restrictions (but which doubtless considers the propen-
sity of donors to give to certain types of fund drives). To date American
cultural policy has left most of the artistic decisionmaking in the hands
of arts institutions with only occasional prompting from governmental
agencies. If we are to continue this pattern, donor-imposed restrictions
are of a greater concern than donee-suggested restrictions, and cultural
policy ought to discourage the former.
The problems arising from donor-imposed restrictions can be remedied
in large part within the current indirect aid system without major
changes in that structure. In this section I discuss several ways to
limit donor restrictions. The first proposal deals specifically with
the problem of misallocation of donated artworks. The second and third
proposals deal more generally with donor restrictions.
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One problem that can be addressed by modifications within the
indirect aid system is the misallocation of donated artworks. In
Chapter V, I argued that allowing individual donors to determine the
recipients of their gifts and to restrict those gifts in perpetuity
leads to a distribution of artworks among museums that is determined
primarily by individual wishes and tastes and economic incentives and
that is not necessarily in agreement with accepted public policy. The
mismatch between society's goals and the donor's interests is a public
policy concern because gifts of appreciated property are supported by
tax expenditures. To be sure, some artworks are given to the museums
in which they are most valuable (as among the many museums in which they
might reside), but most often the gift is conditioned by the donor's
association with the museum in question and, more often than not, the
geographical location of the donor. Frequently the museum is diffident
about, or prevented by the terms of the gift from, selling the work
(even to another museum) when it is redundant or inappropriate for its
own collection. It is expecting too much of a museum, operating within
the current indirect aid system, to risk losing the gift or the donor's
goodwill. by negotiating the terms of the gift with the donor. From a
public policy perspective, the wrong museums receive these gifts.
Admittedly, it is difficult if not impossible to determine the "best"
allocation of these works of art through some centralized system. While
art scholars may benefit from having dozens of Rodin sculptures located
in the same institution, the art-enjoying public arguably would benefit
more if these works were dispersed throughout a number of different
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museums. Which of these allocations would be more in the public interest?
It is difficult to decide, but it is clear that the present indirect
aid system promotes neither of these results. Moreover, the present
system does not lend itself to easy manipulation in light of public
policy goals for the distribution of artworks. The allocation of the
donated artworks would be improved through an aid system which more
carefully accounted for public goals.
A centralized procedure could be developed whereby the government
would take temporary possession of artworks individuals wished to donate
as charitable deductions and then allocate them among eligible art
museums. Such a system, however, would eliminate completely the relation-
ship which is the source of significant financial support in the form of
the donor's private contribution. If the identification between donor
and recipient institution were altered in this way, private charitable
giving might decrease substantially.
I believe it far preferable to allow the institutions themselves
to determine the correct allocation of artworks constrained by their
own budgetary restrictions, within a system minimally constrained by
donor preferences. Museums would become the custodians of the public
interest in the distribution of artworks, a role which -- except for
donor restrictions -- they play now. This is in keeping with the general
theory of deductibility of contributions that charitable institutions are
providing services "which the government otherwise would have to provide."
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An auction mechanism allowing other museums to compete in a market
to determine the final allocation of donated artworks would meet these
requirements.1 The auction would operate as follows:
(1) The donor announces that he wishes to donate a
particular work of art to a specified museum.
(2) The museum publicizes this offer -- perhaps through a
centralized service -- and invites other eligible
charitable recipients to submit bids for the artwork.
(3) Once bids have been submitted, the designated museum
has a choice: it can accept the gift or it can sell
the artwork to the institution that offered the highest
bid. In either event, the donor uses the highest bid
as his charitable deduction.
The museum's ability to use its best professional judgment about
acquisition and distribution of its collection would be greatly aided
by this proposal. The designated museum might refuse the highest bid,
but the decision to do so would be made explicit, and the director and
the trustees would be accountable for turning down attractive offers for
redundant or inappropriate objects. Official recognition of the impor-
tance of the proper distribution of the nation's art resources among
its museums would have the added advantage of greatly strengthening the
hand of individual museums in persuading donors to see the advantages
of not only giving a valuable object but also insuring that it winds up
in the institution for whose visitors it will have the greatest value.
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An additional benefit of this system is that it offers an objective
mechanism to establish the value of the charitable deduction. Instead
of relying on the donor's subjective judgment about the appropriate
valuation, this mechanism ascertains the actual value of the work to
potential recipient institutions by testing what the work would command
in the market. Even though the auction does not include all possible
interested bidders -- collectors and noncharitable institutions are
ineligible according to the procedure outlined above -- it offers a
better estimate of the market value of the donation than the amount
the donor would like to deduct.2 ,3
There is no reason why this proposal should be limited to gifts
during the donor's lifetime. Although the appropriate level of the
deduction is generally of no concern with charitable gifts from estates --
the full value of the gift is exempt -- the proposal is well suited to
allocating gifts of artwork made from estates. Museums would be desig-
nated and competitive bidding allowed; the designated museums would have
the same options: accept the art or the highest bid. (If the proposal
were not extended to the estate tax, individuals might postpone their
gifts of artwork to assure, through their estates, the final resting
place of the art. This is an important factor for donors who are more
concerned about the final resting place of their donated property than
about the financial benefits they can enjoy through such a donation.)
It is not essential to limit the auction to charitable institutions.
What would happen if the auction were opened to individual bidders as
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well? The results of the auction would only differ if an individual
bidder outbid institutional bidders. The museum that keeps the artwork
is no better off, but the donor is entitled to a larger deduction than
he would have received had the auction been limited to charitable
institutions. If the museum accepts the highest bid rather than the
artwork, the individual bidder would get the painting, the designated
museum would get the money, and the donor would get the higher bid
as his deduction. (Note that the indirect aid still goes to the desig-
nated institution via the donor and not to the individual bidder who
offered the highest bid.) The individual gets the painting but pays
fair value for it, the institution gets the market value of the donation --
partially supported by indirect government aid -- and the donor gets an
equitable deduction. If individuals were allowed to participate in the
auction, one artwork could be the impetus for numerous successive
charitable donations to arts institutions involving the same artwork.
Society's reliance on tax expenditures to provide funding for the
arts has been criticized for its contribution to the dramatic rise of
prices in the art market [25]. The beneficiaries of subsidizing the
plastic arts by generous tax deductions for contributions to museums are
principally private owners of art who have purchased for speculation.
The auction mechanism may augment this trend towards higher prices in
two ways: (i) to the extent that this mechanism eliminates donor
restrictions on deaccessioning works of art it adds museums into the
competitive market for the art, and (ii) if individual bidders are
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allowed, the artworks may circulate longer through private hands before
ending up in an institution and private speculation will continue unabated.
The structure of the auction mechanism and the associated
increases in art prices brings up a further question: would the auction
allow the wealthier museums -- such as the Getty and the Metropolitan --
to increasingly dominate the art market? Perhaps, but unless these
museums are always the designated museums -- they are not now and there
is little reason to believe they would be under this proposal -- they
are not assured of getting the artwork for their collection even if they
bid the highest. Even if the wealthier museums did manage to obtain most
of the donated artworks, the auction mechanism would gradually redistri-
bute purchase funds among a number of museums as other museums bid the
art away from designated museums. If this became a significant problem,
the National Endowment for the Arts could prime the purchase funds of
selected museums.
The proposed auction also eliminates some of the opportunity for
fraud in the indirect aid system. Under the auction the designated
museum may elect to keep the painting even though the value of the
painting by itself is not larger than other bids offered. Typically
this would be the case if the donor offered to designate the museum as
the recipient of a donation which was not particularly valuable in
exchange for future designation of a more valuable work -- a situation
that would guarantee the museum would not have to participate in an
uncertain auction for a very valuable piece. In the present system this
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is advantageous to the donor if the museum agrees to accept the donation
and, presumably, not disagree with an inflated deduction claimed by the
donor. Under the proposed mechanism the museum would not have to turn
down such a donation or accept it; if any bids were offered by other
institutions, the designated museum could accept the highest bid. In
this case, the donor's allowable deduction would be correspondingly low --
but the donor would enjoy the same financial benefits whether the museum
accepted the artwork or the highest bid. Museums would compete to become
the designated institution much as they compete now to receive donations,
but the incentive to the donor and the museum for making such deals would
be removed.5
One drawback of this proposal is that it might prove very costly to
operate, particularly for the individual museum. Not every artwork
or artist is well-known, and to bid intelligently museums would have to
allocate a substantial amount of staff time to ascertain the value (to them)
of each piece offered. Museums might decide that it is not worth the
trouble to participate in the auction, particularly since it is an
auction with a secret "reserve price" (below which the designated museum
will not sell). Yet museums do have a clear idea of what gaps in their
collections they would like to fill, and they can choose accordingly the
auctions in which they will participate. Even so, the cost of preparing
an informed bid may be too high when compared to the uncertainty of
acquiring the object, even having submitted the highest bid. To society
the costs of operating the auction system might prove to be greater than
the costs of allowing the subjective valuation of donations to continue,
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particularly if another mechanism can be developed by which the distri-
bution of artworks among museums can be improved.
By suggesting this auction scheme for public consideration, I do
not mean to imply that giving is simply a function of the financial
incentives presented to the prospective donor. Even though the auction
incorporates the same financial incentives as the current system -- with
the exception of stronger limits on inflated valuations -- it alters a
number of intangible factors which affect the donor's decision to give
and choice of donees. The net result of the auction is difficult to
assess. If artworks tend to remain in private hands under this proposal
rather than flowing to museums, then the art arguably will be less
accessible to the public than it would be if it were in the "wrong" museum.
Proposals such as auctioning gifts of artwork to museums ought to be
considered to correct the problems inherent in the indirect aid system,
but they also need to be evaluated according to the costs they will incur,
the uncertainty in predicting their net results, and the additional com-
plexity they will introduce into tax law.
On balance, I believe that the advantages of the auction mechanism
outweigh its disadvantages, but this mechanism is designed to deal with
only one type of donor restriction, the donation of restricted artworks.
It is possible, however, to design a more general policy which is able to
deal with all types of donor restrictions and which may have lower ad-
ministrative costs and be simpler to implement. Two such policies should
be considered: a sunset law on donor restrictions and partial deductions
for restricted gifts.
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A sunset law would require all restrictions -- whether donor-
imposed or donee-imposed -- to expire after a specified amount of
time. After the expiration of the restriction neither the donor nor
the donor's heirs would have any legal recourse against an institution
that chose to no longer honor that restriction. This approach makes
the institution the custodian of the public interest in deciding
whether or not to continue honoring the donor's restrictions. Of
course even with such a law, museums still could make agreements with
prospective donors about the intentions of the museum to honor the
donors' wishes beyond the time set by law, but such agreements would not
be binding on the institution after the time period had expired.
A sunset law would allow a museum to deaccession donated artworks,
to break up a collection and stop exhibiting it in toto, or to spend
its previously restricted endowment in any appropriate manner. To be
sure, the law might not help alleviate the incentives for over-
capitalization; once a building is built it is unlikely that it will
be soon torn down. But the sunset law may strengthen the bargaining
position of the museum when it is initially negotiating for such a
major gift; presumably the museum would feel that its goals would be
better served by not restricting these gifts in perpetuity.
Sunset legislation would not necessarily end donor restrictions
on arts institutions. The institutions might be reticent to stop
honoring such restrictions after their expiration because future donors
might be less willing to donate to an institution unwilling to continue
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voluntarily honoring them. As long as society relies on an indirect
aid system to provide aid to the arts, donors and recipients will be
able (and encouraged) to make under-the-counter deals with other
people's -- the taxpayer's -- money. But with a sunset law the donor's
bargaining position is considerably weaker, particularly if the time
limit is set at the donor's lifetime or lifetime plus a specific
number of years. By passing such legislation we admit the possibility
of improvement in the allocation of resources to nonprofit institutions.
A sunset law would, in many ways, be similar to a provision
already in existence in another form of indirect aid to the arts, the
limitation on the duration of copyright protection. For works created
after January 1, 1978 the new copyright law [126] provides copyright
protection for the author's life plus fifty years. (In the case of works
done for hire, protection is limited to the shorter of 75 years from publi-
cation or 100 years from creation.) Society offers a period of rigorous
copyright protection in exchange for the promise that protected material
will eventually become widely available for public use. The sunset law
on restricted gifts would also be directly analogous to the rule against
perpetuities in property law which limits the restrictions which may be
placed on the transfer of real property.
The length of time during which the sunset law would protect the donor's
restriction should be a matter of public debate. Obviously, the longer the
time period, the less effective the limit on donor restrictions will be;
but the shorter the time limit, the more important distinctions between
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various artistic media will become. It is likely that donor restrictions
placed on the plastic arts, particularly on museums, are calculated to have
a longer term effect than restrictions placed on other types of arts
institutions or media. In Chapter V, I discussed at length the effects
that gifts in perpetuity have had on museums, whether those gifts were
buildings, artworks, or restricted cash. Restrictions on performing arts
institutions tend to have less long range consequences: a donor-financed
production will only stay in the opera company's repertoire for a limited
number of years anyway, and other donations are typically made for particular
programs in the upcoming season. Performing arts institutions as a group
tend to be less dependent on donor largesse for buildings (many of them
rent or occupy halls owned by governments or educational institutions) or
for physical objects which lend themselves more easily to restriction in
perpetuity. Thus, to the extent that the length of the sunset law does
limit donor restrictions it is likely to have a more significant impact on
the operation of certain types of institutions. The others will continue
to operate much as they have in the past.
A second policy that would limit donor-imposed restrictions on
donations while still recognizing that part of the donation is the
donor's private contribution is partial deductions for restricted gifts.
This approach has already been used in tax law to provide disincentives
for certain types of gifts: the Tax Reform Act of 1969 discouraged
donations to private non-operating foundations by limiting the deduc-
tion for gifts of appreciated property to the donor's basis plus one-half
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of the unrealized appreciation and by further limiting these gifts to
twenty percent of the donor's adjusted gross income with no carry-over
of the excess to future taxable years [121]. A similar proposal providing
only partial deductions for restricted gifts could be adopted, and the
deduction could be prorated according to a variety of criteria.
Partial deductions could be pegged to a variety of scales:
length of restriction, severity of restriction, type of restriction, and
the like. The longer a donor wished his restrictions to be binding upon
the institution the smaller the allowed deduction; gifts restricted
in perpetuity would receive the least favorable treatment, and
unrestricted gifts would be treated as all gifts are now. Distinctions
might plausibly be made on the basis of severity of the restriction:
the donation of a painting that the museum was required to retain for-
ever might be treated less favorably than the donation of cash limited
to the purchase of works of art, a donor-created program for the training
of several apprentice conductors less favorably than a donor-created
program of free concerts for school children, and requirements on the
display of a donated collection less favorably than a requirement that
a museum simply retain the artwork in its collection. Partial deductions
could also be used in a more calculated manner to selectively provide
incentives for giving to certain charitable sectors and to certain types of
institutions within charitable sectors. A major problem with partial
deductions, however, is that regulations reflecting these distinctions
would be difficult to write and would make the tax code more complex.
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Unfortunately, this proposal also suffers from one of the major
flaws of the current indirect aid system: it invites donor fraud. To
the extent that such a proposal would rely on donor disclosure of the
terms of the donation, donors could report no restrictions while having
an implicit "understanding" with the recipient institution. It is
unlikely that arts institutions would be willing participants in a
procedure requiring them to reveal to the I.R.S. donor restrictions on
gifts. The most objective scale for prorating deductions is one that
uses the length of restrictions, but it would be much simpler adminis-
tratively to implement a sunset law eliminating any restrictions after a
reasonable amount of time.
All of the chapters of this thesis have been concerned with donors'
responses to the economic incentives presented by the indirect aid system --
the price elasticity of giving -- but donors' responses to any of the proposed
limitations on donor restrictions may be more dependent on another elasticity --
the elasticity of giving with respect to the restrictions the donor is
allowed to impose. At present there is no empirical evidence to indicate
how donors are likely to respond to limits on donor restrictions. If the
primary motivation for a charitable contribution is that it will serve as a
perpetual memorial to the donor, then limits on donor restrictions might
result in substantial cutbacks in certain types of charitable contributions.
In this case, the financial impact might be substantial, particularly for
arts institutions which are highly dependent on gifts of property. Even so,
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estate and gift tax considerations might eventually present a strong
enough economic incentive to the donor so that he might still decide
to make the charitable contribution, albeit at a later point in his life.
(Note that to the extent that donors stop making charitable contributions
and that that money ends up as part of their taxable income, income tax
revenues will rise and the government will be able to make up the short-
fall in tax expenditure support through increased direct funding.)
Equitable Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions
Another major problem with the current indirect aid system is its
inequitable treatment of donors -- the higher the individual's taxable
income the more of the tax expenditure he is allowed to allocate.
Charity is the province of the wealthy because of their personal tastes,
their ability to donate, and the tax benefits they are given by the
indirect aid system. The observation that the current income tax
deduction for charitable contributions is inequitable is not new,6 and
economists, lawyers, and public policy analysts have proposed a variety
of mechanisms which, while retaining certain characteristics of the
present system, treat individual donors more equitably with respect to
one another in the benefits and incentives they receive for each
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donation. Reform in this area may be particularly overdue as the public
has become increasingly sensitive to provisions in the tax code it con-
siders illegitimate.
All the proposals to reform the charitable deduction within the
general framework of the indirect aid system retain two elements of the
current system: (i) the opportunity for the individual donor to
determine the recipient of his and the government's largesse, and
(ii) the matching grant structure through which the donor's private
contributions are matched in some manner by governmental funds.
Despite the impossibility of assuring that individual decisionmaking will
be in accord with good public policy, individual choice has been
staunchly defended as a prime virtue of the current system, and it is
perhaps appropriate -- if not politically inevitable -- that this
characteristic of the system be retained. And a matching grant is a
logical form for a system that uses individual preferences to channel
governmental money to charities.
A variety of matching grant schemes have been proposed as alterna-
tives to the current system. In this section I discuss the three
major matching grant proposals: the tax credit, the sliding matching
grant, and the percentage contribution bonus.7
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In addition to the characteristics shared by all of these proposals
(discussed above), each proposal can be defined by its unique combina-
tion of three other characteristics: eligibility (Who is eligible to
have his contribution matched?), location (Does the mechanism operate
within or without the income tax system?), and calculation (On what
basis is the matching grant calculated?). It is important to enumerate
all of the reasonable options for each of these characteristics because
proposals often are made without consciously considering what is implied
by the rejection of the alternatives.
Eligibility can be practically defined in one of three ways: all
individuals, all taxpayers, and all taxpayers who itemize their deduc-
tions. The current system uses the third method of determining eligi-
bility; contributions are supported by taxes only if the donor has
enough deductions to make it advantageous to itemize all his deductions
rather than to take the standard deduction. This has the interesting
result of making incentives to charitable giving dependent on other,
unrelated aspects of the donor's financial life. For example, consider
two taxpayers with identical incomes only one of whom owns a home. Even
if their finances are identical in all other respects, the homeowner
may be able to itemize his deductions because of deductions for his
mortgage interest and property tax payments. This, in turn, makes it
worthwhile for him to deduct charitable contributions. The non-homeowner
may find it to his advantage to take the standard deduction, in which
case he would have no financial incentive for charitable giving.
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Allowing donors to use the charitable deduction whether or not they
itemize their donations -- a proposal which has been discussed in
Chapter VI -- is a way to implement eligibility for all taxpayers. Such
a proposal is presumably based upon the assumption that the system should
allow all taxpayers some say in how those taxes are being distributed.
At the same time, it indicates a relatively circumscribed view of the
public interest. Only those who pay would vote in this election. The
British system of matching charitable contributions through Deeds of
Covenant -- discussed later in this chapter -- uses this form of eligi-
bility.
Others have advocated opening up the matching grant process to all
individuals. It is argued that this would improve the legitimacy of the
matching grant process and improve its pluralistic base. Although
attractive -- all citizens get a chance to participate in the allocation
of public money -- this form of eligibility may lead to higher costs
because of the necessity to reach beyond regularly filed tax forms to
adequately track gifts and assure that the match is made. Administrative
costs may well be higher than for the other types of eligibility.
This leads to the second characteristic of matching grant programs.
The grants can be administered through the existing tax system with
contributions reported on the tax forms and individuals making the
necessary adjustments to channel the total contribution -- the private
contribution plus the government match -- directly to the recipient
institution. They can also be administered through a separate system
with its own bookkeeping and reporting requirements. The appropriate
232
mechanism is closely related to the adopted eligibility rules. In
general, there is a trade-off between administrative costs and the
degree to which inequity can be -removed from the indirect aid system by
broadening eligibility.
The rate at which the government matches the donor's private con-
tribution can be calculated in a variety of ways. A common theme of
all the matching grant proposals is to remove the direct relationship
between the size of the government's contribution and the size of the
taxpayer's adjusted gross income, but this implies no particular
matching rate to install in its place. Determination of the appro-
priate matching rate is particularly important if we wish to assure that
the net flow of money to charity is not decreased. Since it is fruit-
less to try to discuss all of the ways in which a matching grant might
include a rate that is more equitable than the present system, it is
necessary to turn to a consideration of specific proposals.
Of the three, widely-advocated, alternative matching grant proposals
the tax credit is the most similar to the existing deduction. The tax
credit would allow each donor to subtract the same percentage of any
charitable gifts directly from his tax liability. With some experimenta-
tion the government, if it so desired, could set the matching rate so
that the present level of charitable funding would be maintained, or to
achieve any other desirable level of charitable giving. Because the rate
would be determined separately, unlike the match in the current system
which is determined by the donor's marginal tax rate, the government
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would have an additional lever by which it could make adjustments to the
system.
This property of the tax credit hides the fact that even though
the system can be adjusted to maintain the net flow of gifts to chari-
table institutions, the results will differ across charitable sectors.
For example, Feldstein [523 has estimated that substituting a 30 percent
tax credit for the current system of charitable deductions would increase
total charitable giving by approximately 17 percent, but that not all
charitable sectors would benefit. While religious,health and welfare,
and some other institutions would experience an increase in their
charitable contribution revenues, educational institutions would experi-
ence a drop of approximately 20 percent. Cultural institutions would
experience a drop similar to the one predicted by Feldstein for educa-
tional institutions. The relative incentives for different donors
change dramatically with a tax credit system, and this change explains
the redistribution of charitable funds. Individuals in higher income
brackets have a lower incentive to give while individuals in lower
income brackets have a higher incentive to give, particularly those
who take the standard deduction and are ineligible for a match under the
current system.
I demonstrated in Chapter II that the arts, like education, rely
primarily on higher income individuals for their gifts. Thus, a tax
credit calculated to maintain the net flow of donations to all charity
would decrease total charitable contributions to the arts. Whether or
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not this is considered a bad result depends on a number of factors
including the willingness of the government to implement additional
direct funding for certain charities and the relative importance of tax
equity as compared to arts support.
The second proposal, the sliding matching grant, is designed to
achieve a middle ground between the inequity of the existing charitable
deduction and the redistribution of funds among charitable sectors which
would occur with a tax credit. Under the sliding matching grant the
size of the Federal match is determined by the percentage of the donor's
income given to charity during the year: the matching rate increases
as the percentage of income donated increases. Greater incentives are
offered to those who show greater "effort" in their giving. The concept
of equity employed in this proposal is rather curious: it treats indi-
viduals the same if they expend identical portions of their incomes
rather than just treating all of them the same. It also has some curious
side-effects: single people and childless couples who have more discre-
tionary income and can better afford to make charitable contributions
are probably awarded a higher match.
McDaniel has used several matching rate schedules to estimate the
net results for charity of certain sliding matching grants [70]. He has
concluded that a reasonable system which would keep aggregate giving at
the same level would result in a moderate increase in funds to religion
and a correspondingly moderate decrease in funds to other charitable
institutions (including, presumably, cultural institutions),
235
a result similar to, but less marked than, the estimated result for a tax
credit. This result should not be surprising: in McDaniel's words,
"(it) is the expected product of a more democratized system." The
sliding matching grant has the further property that Federal support of
all types of charitable organizations can be relatively even-handed;
in McDaniel's example, the Federal share for each charitable sector
comprises about 18-20 percent of the total charitable contributions
received by that sector. Again, the critical question is whether the
improved equity, effectiveness, pluralism and rationality within the
tax system are worth the price paid by shifting funds away from certain
charitable sectors and towards others.
The sliding matching grant can be implemented either within the
tax system as a rebate to the donor or outside the system with the
government making payments directly to the charity. This could most
easily be handled as part of the individual's income tax forms, but
additional forms would have to be developed for individuals who
otherwise would not file. If the match were handled within the income
tax structure, the individual would merely send the entire contribution
to the charitable institution and would be refunded the government's
share after he filed his taxes for the year. This would facilitate
an ongoing flow of contributions. Since the actual percentage
match could not be calculated until the end of the year when the percent-
age of income the donor actually contributed could be accurately determined,
this procedure includes some uncertainty for the donor who is unsure of how
much he will ultimately contribute to charity or of how large his income
will be. (Of course, this uncertainty is also present to some degree in
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the current system.) Individuals who would pay no taxes for the year or
taxes that were less than the rebated share of charitable contributions
would have to advance the money to the government, a situation which
might prove to be a disincentive to charitable giving. It can also be
argued that operating the sliding matching grant entirely within the
tax system retains one of the major problems of the charitable deduction:
charitable institutions perceive the donations as coming entirely from
private hands and respond to them differently than they would if it
were clear that a portion of the gift is actually government support.
Operating the matching grant system outside of the tax system by
having the government make payments directly to charitable institutions
requires greater administrative expense and freezes the governmental
match until the end of the year when the percentage the individual
spent on charitable contributions can be determined. (Institutions
could, of course, maintain their cash flow by temporarily borrowing from
their endowments.) After several years of experience with such a system,
however, the government could estimate and provide regular payments to
charitable institutions that could be corrected by adjusting the last
payment of the year. On the other hand, individuals with small (or no)
tax liability would not have to advance the government's share to
the charity and wait to have it rebated as much as a year later.
Even though both administrative mechanisms theoretically end up with
the same financial impact on the donor, it has been suggested that operat-
ing the matching grant as a direct payment to the charity presents less
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of an incentive to a prospective donor than rebating the match to him
after he has paid the full donation (his share plus the government's
share). The donor may give less or simply not bother to report what he
gives. (This has been offered as one explanation why the British
Deed of Covenant system is used so little by donors.) It would seem
that charities and the government could more than adequately accept the
burden of explaining the consequences and advantages of such a system.
Charities, particularly universities, do an exemplary job of explaining
the existing system to their potential donors.
A major drawback to operating a matching grant system outside of
the tax system, however, is that the constitutionality of such a system
is questionable. Although the courts have found that the principle of
separation of church and state is not violated by the indirect aid
system, modifying the system so that the government match would be sent
directly to the charity would not necessarily pass this test. Unfortu-
nately, there is no adequate way to test this short of implementing such
a system and seeing how the courts react to the inevitable challenge.
A third matching grant proposal, the percentage contribution bonus,
is a flat matching grant for which all donors are eligible. It is like
the sliding matching grant in its design and implementation possibilities
and like the tax credit in that it matches all charitable donations at
one fixed rate. Its advantages and disadvantages are much the same as
those described above for the sliding matching grant. Most important,
this proposal corresponds to a much more basic concept of equity --
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everyone is treated exactly the same -- and it eliminates the necessity
for the donor to include extensive reporting on his income tax forms.
If administered outside the tax system, much of the reporting burden
can be placed on the charitable institution because all of the gifts it
receives will be matched at the same rate.
The British system of matching grants to charity, constructed
around a written agreement between the donor and the charity known as a
Deed of Covenant, is similar in many respect to the percentage contribu-
tion bonus. Under a Deed of Covenant the donor agrees to give to the
charity of his choice a predetermined amount annually for at least seven
years. The donor's payments are in after-tax income. The charity then
reclaims from the government the taxes paid on that income as if they had
been paid at the lowest marginal tax rate, 35 percent. Only taxpayers
are eligible to make donations via a Deed of Covenant and all such dona-
tions are matched at the same minimum tax rate independent of the marginal
tax rate the donor actually paid. (A similar covenant exists for corporate
donations.) Functionally, this system is the equivalent of a 35 percent
tax credit, but like the percentage contribution bonus it operates out-
side the tax system avoiding the problem of the charitable institution
perceiving the public contribution as private.8
The charitable income tax deduction is inequitable and, therefore,
an inappropriate way to provide governmental aid to charity. Short of a
complete transfer of governmental aid into a direct aid system, proposals
to improve the equity of the indirect aid system ought to be seriously
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considered. I have argued that a government matching grant system can
preserve two of the characteristics of the current system, individual
choice and the basic matching procedure, while removing some of the
other problems of the current system. I prefer the percentage contribu-
tion bonus -- available to all, and treating all equally -- and would
opt to operate it outside of the tax system so that it would be as ex-
posed as possible to public scrutiny and so that it would force charitable
institutions to perceive that the matching part of the donation was being
financed by the public and not solely by individual donors. 9
I recognize that any matching grant system would present a net
cost to the arts (or a windfall for other charities, depending on
how the matching rate is set), but this could easily be made up through
increased direct aid. In fact, some portion of this shortfall may be
able to be made up within the- present income tax system without any
additional changes beyond the implementation of the matching grant.
Evan a matching grant system that results in decreased aggregate chari-
table giving will generate increased government revenues that can be
made available directly to charitable institutions. If charitable
contributions fall, taxable income will rise and tax revenues will rise.
The extent to which the increase in tax revenues will be able to cover
the net decrease in aggregate charitable giving or in giving to any
particular sector (or the net decrease in tax expenditure support for
all charity or for any particular sector) depends on how changes in the
funding mechanisms affect donors in different tax brackets. If
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maintaining a level of charitable funding at least equal to the present
level is an important public policy consideration, direct aid may have
to be increased. Some of this increase will be raised automatically
as the tax system adjusts to changes in donor behavior; the remainder
will have to be raised through additional taxation.
Of course, in the long run it may be advisable to rely more heavily
on direct funding mechanisms, thereby improving the ability of the
government to monitor and administer public policy for the arts. This
possibility is discussed briefly in the next section.
Replacing Indirect Aid with Direct Aid
In the final analysis, income tax expenditures are a very imprecise
mechanism by which to promulgate national cultural policy. Even a
matching grant which is as dissimilar as possible to the current system is
still fundamentally linked to donor preferences and tastes. And these
preferences and tastes give the system a momentum of its own -- a
momentum which only occasionally and accidentally is in agreement with
public policy toward the arts.
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From a public policy perspective it may be far better to replace
income tax expenditures with a direct funding system. Such a system
has numerous and obvious advantages:
- Public policy goals can be pursued directly without endless
tinkering with the parameters of a tax deduction -- or a matching
grant -- system.
- Aid previously restricted to nonprofit charitable arts institu-
tions by the income tax code can be provided directly to recip-
ients that are no less deserving components of the arts system
including: artists,10 audiences, amateur activities, arts
research, or even profit-making arts institutions (through more
small business loans or, perhaps, even through direct grants).11
- Direct aid programs can be clearly identified, and their
impacts usually can be traced and assessed with relative ease.
- A direct aid system is subject to regular, explicit legislative
review and is, therefore, more accountable to the public.
- Donor fraud and ethical compromise on the part of arts adminis-
trators can be minimized.
To be sure, replacing the indirect subsidy to arts institutions
with a direct system, even if legislatures are willing to continue the
subsidy in some form, is fraught with difficulties. Since the subsidy
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will no longer be hidden, at first arts institutions may discover that
it is much harder to build a subsidy with a direct budget price into
legislation than it is to preserve the hidden preferences which exist,
at no visible cost, in the indirect aid system. The amounts are much
larger than the Congress or state legislatures are used to putting in
National Endowment or state arts council budgets -- even though they are
the amounts being provided for government arts support -- and these
appropriations will have to compete directly with other budget priorities.
But this competition is appropriate and essential to the rational deter-
mination of public priorities.
Yet, before making a wholesale switch from an indirect to a direct
funding system, the same questions which I have asked about the indirect
aid system in this thesis need to be asked about the direct aid system.
Chapter III offers a picture of the incidence of both the indirect
system and the direct system, but I have said very little about decentral-
ization or decisionmaking in a direct system. To date research on the
effects of the direct mechanisms used by government to support the arts
has been very limited;12 the National Endowment for the Arts has
established a Research Division which is beginning to address many of
the issues related to government funding for the arts. One advantage of
a direct aid system is that it can be more easily adapted to take into
account research findings suggesting restructuring of arts funding
mechanisms.
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One way to assess what effect a change to direct government aid
would have is to consider the current relationship between private
support and direct government support. Although there is little empirical
evidence, there is nevertheless a strong suggestion that the two sources
of aid have increasingly similar patterns. If this is true, a switch
to proportionately more direct aid will result in less drastic changes
in the pattern of arts support than would otherwise be the case.
Hendry 163] concludes that government support for the arts in Canada
sets a "seal of approval" on the recipient group and improves the chances
of support from other (private) sources. Vaughan [140] interprets the
fact that the National Endowment for the Arts has primarily financed
institutions rather than audiences or artists as a duplication of the effects
of the charitable deduction, which may only be used for contributions to
eligible institutions. Livingston Biddle, the chairman of the National
Endowment for the Arts, feels quite strongly that a government grant to
an arts institution encourages corporations to provide further support to
that institution [16]. In addition, government arts agencies have begun
using direct matching grant programs to a greater extent (e.g., NEA's
Challenge Grants and most of the grant programs of the Museum Services
Institute). In these cases, the government grant is contingent on the
institution's ability to obtain private contributions to match the govern-
ment grant. Through this mechanism private giving can be led to recipients
and uses more in line with public policy.
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One area of arts funding in which the relationship between govern-
ment funding and private funding has been well-established is with
foundations. For the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs,
Koleda, Bourque, and Smith [67] compared Federal and foundation support
in several areas of philanthropic activity including "Arts and Humanities."
Arts and humanities was the only area in which foundations outspent the
Federal government. When government and foundation expenditures are
examined by type of recipient institution, the distributions of money
are not very different. (Table VII.1) When the funds are allocated by
the type of activity being supported, however, some interesting patterns
do emerge. (Table VII.2) Foundations are more substantial donors to
educational activities than is the Federal government: for every Federal
dollar spent on educational programs in the arts and humanities, $3.76
are spent by foundations. On the other hand, the Federal government is
a proportionately larger supporter of expansion programs than are the
foundations. Expansion programs emphasize community based arts projects
and are designed to promote the geographical distribution of arts activi-
ties. It is not surprising that the National Endowments for the Arts and
Humanities, with their national constituency, place more emphasis on this
type of program. Expansion and education are the two most important
areas of innovation in the arts and humanities at present, and the record
shows that both foundations and the Federal government are supporting
these innovations.
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Table VII.1 Foundation and Federal Support to Arts and Humanities
by Recipient Institution, 1973
Recipient Institution
Museums and Other Repositories
State and Local Governments,
Associations and Public Media
Educational Institutions
Professional Performing Groups
Other
Total
Total Spending ($ millions)
Percentage of
Foundation Support
27%
100%
$194
Percentage of
Federal Support
22%
100%
$108
Table VII.2 Foundation and Federal Support to Arts and
by Activity Supported, 1973
Percentage of
Activity Foundation Support
Humanities
Percentage of
Federal Support
Educational Activities
Museums and Art Galleries
Performing Arts
Music
Theatre
Dance
Expansion Programs
Other
Total
44%
12
100%
21%
33
100%
Source: Koleda, Bourque, and Smith, "Foundations and the Federal
Government: A Look at Spending Patterns, " in Commission on
Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, 1977 [67].
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In summary, a switch to more direct government funding would in all
likelihood result in a different, though not necessarily drastically
different, distribution of arts funding throughout the arts sector, but
the funding would then be conducted within a system responsive to public
policy goals for arts funding. If we are going to have a public policy
for the arts -- and it is hard to interpret either the direct system or
the indirect system as anything but a public policy toward the arts --
then let's make it public.
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NOTES
Chapter I
1. For a more general discussion of the indirect aid system and its
effects on the arts see O'Hare, Feld, and Schuster [105].
2. A useful summary of government support for charitable organizations
in foreign countries has been compiled by Arthur Andersen and Company [3].
3. For a discussion of the reasons for public support of the arts see
Netzer [99], Blaug [21], or Baumol and Bowen [15].
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Chapter II
1. Even this result underestimates the financial importance of the
indirect aid system because it neglects other tax provisions that
provide indirect aid such as property tax exemptions and estate
and gift tax exemptions. O'Hare, Feld, and Schuster [105] estimate
that all indirect aid sources provided nearly $500 million to the
arts in 1973.
2. This example ignores the possibility that the donor will increase
the total size of his contribution if it becomes deductible. But
even in that case the societal perspective is much the same; there
is still a tax expenditure which has to be paid for in some manner.
The donor's economic response to changes in the price of giving is
discussed in detail later in this chapter.
3. In Green v. Kennedy [59] a three-judge Federal Court found that tax
exemption for private schools was a sufficient government benefit to
enforce limitations imposed by Federal policy. In this case the
schools discriminated by race in their admissions policy and, as a
result, their tax exempt status was removed. Similarly, in McGlotten
v. Connally [73] a three-judge District of Columbia Court found that
tax exemption was "Federal financial assistance" within the definition
of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On this basis, tax
exempt status was removed from an Elks chapter which had a racially
discriminatory membership policy. And in 1973 the Supreme Court, in
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist [36],
found no constitutional difference between direct tuition grant
assistance and tax deduction tuition assistance to parents of children
attending religious schools; both conflict with the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. It is significant that even the dissent-
ing judges found no functional difference between direct and tax
assistance. On the other hand, an earlier decision, Walz v. Tax
Commission [143], held that the granting of property tax exemptions for
churches was not in violation of the Establishment Clause.
4. The legislative history of the charitable income tax deduction is
ambiguous on this point. It was added to the Internal Revenue Code on
the Senate floor in 1917. Senator Hollis, the sponsor, argued that
the war and high wartime tax rates had had an adverse impact on the
flow of funds to charitable organizations, and he preferred a tax
deduction to a direct government subsidy.
5. The inclusion of culture as a separate category in the National Study
of Philanthropy is significant. The classification of cultural data into
categories captioned "other" has plagued researchers in all areas of arts
policy. This will change only when it is widely recognized that arts
policy is a legitimate focus of public policy research.
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6. The term "individual" is used by the Internal Revenue Service to
distinguish people from corporations: "individual taxpayers" include
married couples filing jointly, and married couples filing separately
as well as single individuals who file by themselves.
7. But note: even if this incentive does not work at all, i.e. if
contributions after the implementation of the tax expenditure provision
remain the same as they were prior to the tax expenditure provision,
there is still a tax expenditure. A tax subsidy is being realized and
all taxpayers are helping to pay for it.
8. The major studies of the elasticity of the individual charitable income
tax deduction (listed in chronological order) are by Kahn [66],
Taussig [116], Schwartz [113], United States Department of the Treasury
[130], Brannon [24], Feldstein [51,52], and Feldstein and Clotfelter [53].
McDaniel [71] provides an excellent,concise review of these studies.
9. This result has led Feldstein [51] to characterize the individual
charitable deduction as "efficient." The act of foregoing taxes generates
additional giving greater than the actual taxes foregone, or, more
rigorously, the "price elasticity of giving" is less than -1.0. But the
deduction is no more "efficient" in the economic sense than, say, a system
which would abolish the deduction and increase taxes so as to recoup the
tax expenditure plus the induced gift, allowing the government to
subsidize these activities at the same level through a direct system.
The net result would be the same in each case.
10. Note that the marginal tax rate applies only to the income earned within
the corresponding tax bracket. For example, a single taxpayer with
$4,000 in taxable income would pay the following tax:
14% x first $500
15% x next $500
16% x next $500
17% x next $500
+ 19% x next $2000
TOTAL TAX $690
11. For a complete discussion of the rules governing the charitable income
tax deduction see Feld [50].
12. These estimates were made from data in the National Study of Philanthropy
[86]. First, they were aggregated and weighted according to the procedure
developed by Morgan, Dye, and Hybels [87]; then the figures within each
income group were adjusted according to the actual mix of itemizers to
non-itemizers in that group as given in Statistics of Income -- 1973 [137];
finally, they were adjusted according to the amount of gifts actually
deducted by each income group on the 1973 income tax returns. Note that
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these estimates differ from the estimates of total giving reported by
Morgan, Dye and Hybels. This is attributable to the fact that their
analysis did not include the last two adjustments. These steps are
necessary to minimize the effect of overestimation by the individuals
surveyed; if these corrections are not made, the National Study data
can only be used for relative comparisons of giving patterns and not
for absolute estimates.
13. These categories provide a convenient, if arbitrary, division of the
data collected in the National Study of Philanthropy [871. The
categories have been defined as follows:
Culture - Arts, humanities, symphony, theatre, ballet,
museums, public TV.
Religion - Churches and church groups.
Education - Elementary and secondary schools (including
religious schools) and higher education.
Health - Research and prevention, health centers, medical
appeals (e.g. March of Dimes) and other medically
related groups (Planned Parenthood, Alcoholics
Anonymous).
Other Social
Welfare - Combined appeals (United Way), community activities
and services, aid to the poor or disadvantaged,
public affairs (ACLU, League of Women Voters),
environmental affairs, and international programs.
Other
Charitable - Private foundations, trusts, and miscellaneous
charitable contributions.
Aggregate giving includes gifts to all of the above.
14. The tax expenditures were calculated by multiplying the charitable
gifts by the estimated marginal tax rate for each individual donor
and then making the same adjustments as were used for estimating
total charitable contributions.
15. Compare these results to the results of two other studies of tax
expenditures: Because Federal (and state) income tax forms are not
designed to allow easy identification of the recipients of tax de-
ductible contributions and because I.R.S. statistics emphasize taxes
actually collected rather than remitted as tax expenditure subsidies,
there has only been one I.R.S. analysis of charitable contributions
deductions -- in 1962 [135]. Extrapolating from these data, Vandell
and O'Hare [139] have estimated the 1972 Federal income tax expendi-
ture for the arts to be between $180 million and $240 million.
The Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 [123]
required the Federal government to estimate the income tax expenditure
for charitable contributions made by individuals and corporations as
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part of an annual "tax expenditure budget." As a result, the Depart-
ment of the Treasury estimated the 1975 tax expenditure for all
individual charitable contributions to be $4.8 billion --
$0.4 billion for education and $4.4 billion for other charities [129].
No attempt was made to separate cultural institutions. (The same
study estimated that corporate charitable contributions in 1975
included $0.6 billion in tax expenditures.)
16. The artists' complaints notwithstanding, these changes were made to
improve the logic of the tax system. There is little doubt that the
previous rules operated to the advantage of artists, but the new
rules attempt to improve equity in the treatment of artists as com-
pared to other individuals, including collectors [35].
17. 1973 data are used in order to compare this estimate with that for
the individual charitable deduction. By 1976 corporate donations
to the arts had grown to $220 million, and the tax expenditure had
grown correspondingly. Corporate donations are the area in which
tax expenditures for the arts are experiencing the most dramatic
growth.
18. Some states do have a progressive state income tax, but the rise in
income tax rates over income is so gradual that it does not offset
the effect of the rise in the Federal marginal tax rates.
19. This figure may include some double counting because the estimates
of corporate donations to the arts may already include some of the
money which is channeled through private foundations.
20. This analysis makes the simplifying assumption that donations to
private foundations are distributed via foundation grants to
charities in the same taxable year.
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CHAPTER III
1. For an interesting compilation of 270 audience studies see
Paul DiMaggio, Michael Useem, and Paula Brown [47]. Even this
report, while going further than any other discussion of audience
surveys as a group, is not sufficiently wary about extrapolating
from the results of its collection of studies. For example, the
median income of the arts audience that it reports is actually the
median of the medians reported in each of the studies, with no
adjustment for the sample size used in each institution's study
or for the fact that the more prestigious institutions are more
likely to conduct research of this type.
2. Other researchers have used the terms "frequency" and "reach"
or "incidence" and "prevalence" to characterize the concepts of
"visits" and "visitors." I prefer the simpler, more descriptive
terms and adopt this standard usage throughout this study. Both
Cameron [33] and O'Hare [1011 provide excellent summaries of the
differences between these two concepts.
3. A further refinement to this assumption might be made in the case of
museum visits because the length of visits varies; it could be
argued that the subsidy should be allocated according to length of
visit. (Performances in the other art forms are enjoyed in discrete
amounts; one performance pretty much equals one visit.) Data on
length of visit by income group do not exist, and it is unlikely that
such a refinement would substantially alter the primary conclusions
of the analysis.
4. One important adjustment has been made to the NRCA data for respon-
dents who classified themselves as "students" in the survey.
Students have temporarily depressed incomes and will likely end up
in an educational category higher than the one reported at the time
of the survey. In addition, with respect to their arts attendance,
students' tastes tend to mirror those of people in the socio-economic
categories they will enter after schooling. (See DiMaggio, Useem,
and Brown[48].) Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, the analysis
has imputed to students income levels and educational levels higher
than those reported in the survey. (The survey sampled only indivi-
duals who were at least 16 years of age, so this procedure involved
only modest shifting.)
5. Interestingly, Baumol and Bowen's work preceded almost all govern-
mental direct aid programs for the arts (with the single major
exception of those programs funded by the Works Progress Administra-
tion in the 1930s). Thus, it appears that 10 years of direct
government involvement in the arts has not done as much as it might
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to broaden the audience for the arts; the income gap between the
audience and the population, although smaller, is still substantial.
It is possible, however, that these data conceal other more subtle
effects. Visitors may, in fact, include a wider range of family
incomes than they did prior to direct government intervention, but
this may be offset by different attendance patterns across income
groups (i.e. visits per visitor may also be different from what
they were when Baumol and Bowen conducted their survey). The Baumol
and Bowen data [12] are not sufficiently detailed to substantiate
such conclusions.
6. The term overrepresented is used to indicate situations in which the
percentage of the distribution of one variable in a given demographic
category is greater than the percentage of individuals in the popula-
tion in that demographic category. For example, using Table III.1,
individuals in the $20,000-$24,999 income bracket comprise 5.3 percent
of the population, but they made 9.3 percent of the visits to arts
institutions. Thus, they are overrepresented in the arts audience.
Underrepresented indicates the reverse situation.
7. Table III.1 reports the mean number of visits per individual, and
Table 111.2 reports the mean number of visits per visitor in each
income group, but these numbers ought to be treated with less
confidence than the relative percentages reported in the tables.
Because the data are based on survey results they are subject to
overestimation on the part of respondents who wish to appear "'cultured"
(to the interviewer or to themselves). When extrapolated, the number
of visits reported in the survey appears to be substantially more
than the visits reported by various arts service organizations such
as the American Association of Museums. Relative frequencies are
more resistant to this bias and can, therefore, be used with more
confidence.
8. In comparing the different audiences the concept of "the same" is
used in a statistical sense: the demographic distribution of one
audience is compared to the demographic distribution of another
audience. The test is whether the audiences have the same charac-
teristics, not whether they are identical.
9. The similarity lies in the proportion of total visits in each income
class. This is not to suggest that individuals attend the visual
arts as frequently as they do the performing arts -- on the average
they attend the performing arts 65 percent more often -- but, rather,
that the distribution of incomes in their audiences are similar.
10. It deserves repetition that these conclusions build on assumptions
of (i) equivalence in value of visits to different institutions,
(ii) similarity between the audiences of government-aided art and
of all art, and (iii) the equivalence of the government's contributiQn
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to each visit. If very rich people enjoyed a trip to the museum
much more than poor people, or if all government aid were directed
to particular features of museums or plays that rich people
especially enjoyed, the analysis would be misleading.
11. To measure who benefits from any particular program, it would be
necessary to examine the new visits or visitors attributable to
the program or changes in the quality of visits.
12. Even here the matching of cost to benefit is not clear because the
economic burden of the tax may be passed along to others and
because timing differences may alter the class of payers.
13. For a fuller discussion of the problems associated with allocating
tax burdens by household income brackets see Musgrave, Case, and
Leonard [89].
14. Feldstein's results do not agree with other, earlier studies on
the incentive effects of the charitable income tax deduction. When
he presented his estimates to the Advisory Committee to the
Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, that committee
reached a consensus view that the elasticity was not likely to be
significantly different from -1 [71].
15. There is, at present, no consensus as to the proper mode of account-
ing; several attempts have been made to standardize the accounting
process for arts institutions and for nonprofit institutions in
general in order to bring them in line with "generally accepted
accounting principles" [ 1,42].
16. For a full discussion of these and other tax expenditures for the arts
see O'Hare, Feld, and Schuster [105].
17. This ignores, for simplification, differences in jurisdictions.
Property tax exemptions for the arts are concentrated in certain cities
and are paid for by the taxpayers in those cities, not by all property
taxpayers.
18. Because no research has been done on the response of corporate donors
to the incentives offered by the charitable contribution tax expendi-
ture, I have assumed that the price elasticity of giving for corpora-
tions is -1. In other words, I assume there is no induced gift
component in corporate charitable contributions.
19. It should be noted that while Models 3, 4, and 5 do not result in
changes in the incidence of payments for arts support, they may result
in changes in audience demographics which may limit the redistributional
nature of arts support. For example, to the extent that the loss in
revenue resulting from the removal of the charitable income tax
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deduction is made up by increases in ticket prices the audience may
shift toward the more affluent as less wealthy ticket purchasers
decrease their attendance.
It would be misleading to attempt to include an estimate of the
changes in the audience in the present study because of the lack of
good data on the price elasticity of demand for the arts. Mathtech
in a report to NEA on the audience for live professional theatre [75]
concluded, concerning the elasticity, "Most of the available evidence
is based on methods or data that can be seriously faulted. And even
the most careful examinations have not reached the same conclusions."
They go on to point out that studies by Baumol and Bowen [13], by
Deane and Ibrahim [43], by Hilton [641, and by Moore [84] have found
no significant relationship between price and attendance at Broadway
theatres. Unfortunately, no true price experiments have been conduc-
ted to test these results.
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CHAPTER IV
1. Note that the indirect aid system also allows corporations, founda-
tions, and institutions themselves to determine part of these
allocations. But those who advance the decentralization argument
typically emphasize the individual's role in it without mentioning
the others.
2. The final report of the Commission on Private Philanthropy and
Public Needs is rather single-minded in its treatment of the charitable
contribution. The concept of tax expenditures is given no recognition
whatsoever. This unfortunate omission leads to a perception of the
indirect aid system as a "private" domain. Yet the authors of the
report do realize the important impacts that changes in government
legislation can have on the level and types of charitable giving.
3. In this case we are looking at one particular characteristic, house-
hold income, of the individuals who are making these decisions. The
decisionmaking analysis focusses on this demographic variable because
of the strong relationship between donor income and the type of
charitable recipient and because of a general concern that too much
public decisionmaking power not rest in the hands of the wealthy.
The analysis which follows could also be done with a variety of other
demographic variables if the data were available.
4. For ease of presentation I have limited this argument to the Federal
income tax expenditure in a charitable contribution, ignoring both
state income tax expenditures and capital gains taxes foregone on
gifts of property. Note that the induced gift, even though it is
attributable to the existence of the tax expenditure, is not included
in this analysis because the decentralization argument is applied only
to the public portion of the total charitable contribution -- the
tax expenditure.
5. In the analysis that follows the decisionmaking unit for the pur-
poses of allocating charitable contributions is considered to be
the household. Decisions about charitable expenditures tend to be
household decisions, coming out of the common household budget or
at least implicitly agreed to by members of the household. This
simplification also facilitates the analysis because most of the
data is readily available disaggregated by households.
6. Of all the variables in the analysis, the income distribution of
total wealth is the most difficult to obtain reliable data for.
The most complete attempt to estimate this distribution was made
in 1962 as part of the Federal Reserve Board's Survey of Financial
Characteristics of Consumers [107]. The data used in this chapter
are estimated from the results of the Federal Reserve Board study
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by inflating the income categories in that study using relative
consumer price indexes, extrapolating and dividing the resulting
distribution into the same categories which the National Study of
Philanthropy, my primary data source, uses.
7. This separation is also important in Chapter VI in which the
security of the indirect aid system is considered. The strong
differences in the type of donors and the amount of donations across
charitable sectors indicate that changes in the indirect aid system
will have different impacts on each of the charitable sectors.
8. Most introductory economics texts include a discussion of Lorenz
curves. See, for example, Samuelson [111].
9. Even though the variable of comparison changes in each of these
models the distributions of the tax expenditures do not; this
characteristic of the comparison preserves the order of fit.
10. Technically speaking, a tax credit system would not quite correspond
to this model unless it covered individuals and households with no
tax liability. For a further discussion of the tax credit, the
percentage contribution bonus, and other matching grants see
Chapter VII.
11. Other interesting discussions of the demographic characteristics
and the politics of boards of trustees can be found in Meyer [81],
DiMaggio [44], and DiMaggio and Useem [45,46].
12. The board has continued to maintain its exclusivity by refusing
large annual contributions from a major labor union and from the
city,both of which were conditioned on allowing membership and
representation for these broad constituencies on the board [7 ].
13. The word "taxpayers" is significant in this context. Individuals
who do not pay taxes have no incentive to make charitable contri-
butions and cannot, under the present system, have a say in the
allocation of the tax expenditure.
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CHAPTER V
1. Microeconomics can also be used to model the behavior of the donor
as a consumer. He chooses between various consumer goods --
including charitable contributions -- to maximize his utility as
constrained by his income. If the relative prices of goods
change, he will modify his behavior to consume more of the cheaper
goods. Thus, to the extent that the indirect aid system reduces
the price of charitable contributions, it provides an incentive
for the donor to make more such donations.
2. Of course, even from the tax expenditure perspective it is still
true, in one sense, that the benefits come from the donor: if
the donor had not made the decision to make a charitable contribu-
tion to a particular institution, the institution would have
received neither the private contribution nor the tax expenditure.
3. Brannon and Strnad [25] have observed this to be the case for
hospital management which, as a result of income received from
medical services charities, "may be largely oriented to satisfy
other fund sources than the patient."
4. Although the gift of the Lehman collection was negotiated during
Mr. Lehman's lifetime, the actual donation was not made until his
death. The transfer, therefore, involves an estate tax expenditure
rather than an income tax expenditure. Nevertheless, it well
illustrates the problems associated with donor restrictions.
5. The use of the word "covert" to describe implicit donor influences
on the operation of arts institutions is perhaps misleading; there
is nothing secret about this type of influence. But this term has
been widely used in the literature to describe this situation, so
I accept it. For a concise discussion of the evidence of covert
influence in charitable contributions see Brannon and Strnad [25].
6. This effect is in addition to the disproportionate influence which
the wealthy have anyway because they have more money to start with.
7. The Lehman Pavilion at the Metropolitan Museum of Art is a notable
exception to this trend. The Lehman Foundation has endowed the
ongoing operating expenses of the wing.
8. Some museums, no doubt, would prefer their donations in cash rather
than in artworks, and public policy might agree that the tax expen-
diture would be better provided in cash, thereby allowing the
museum to decide how the public support would be spent. But under
the current system the museum must accept the artwork or nothing.
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9. Montias [83] has suggested an ingenious auction scheme which would
improve the allocation of donated artworks among museums. This
scheme is discussed in detail in Chapter VII. O'Hare and Feld [104]
have argued that not only should museums feel free to deaccession
works from their collection but they should also consider using
their expertise to speculate in art as a component of their
investment portfolio.
10. Even more elaborate schemes are allowed and encouraged by the
indirect aid system. One in which the government is defrauded while
the museum, the donor, and an art dealer all come out ahead is the
following: The donor donates $100,000 in cash to a museum with
the stipulation that the museum use it to buy a specific painting
in a certain art gallery. The director of the museum goes to the
gallery and buys the painting for $100,000. The collector has a
cancelled check indicating that he has made a tax deductible contribu-
tion in that amount to the museum; the director has his new
painting which cost the museum nothing. What is not immediately
evident is that the donor was also the previous owner of the paint-
ing. He took the painting to the art gallery and offered to sell
it to the gallery for $95,000 -- an inflated price for the
particular painting -- guaranteeing that in several days a museum
would come in and pay $100,000 for it. The dealer makes a quick
$5,000, the collector has created a large tax break for himself,
the museum has its painting, and it is almost impossible for the
I.R.S. to untangle this web. Even if they could, they would
probably discover that the transaction is strictly legal [114].
11. Prior to the creation of the National Endowment for the Arts,
however, Baumol and Bowen [14]had concluded:
One can make a strong case to the effect that
interference by private patrons is far more frequent
and poses a far more imminent threat than does
government control.
12. More complete discussions of the reasons for government support of
the arts can be found in Baumol and Bowen [15], Netzer [99], and
Moore [84].
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CHAPTER VI
1. The new rule is well-founded in concept; it applies to ordinary
income property the most general rule of tax deductions; the only
allowable deduction is one involving expenditure of previously-
taxed income. The recent buyer of a painting, who has presumably
purchased it with taxed dollars, can donate it to a charitable
institution and deduct the full market value (the amount of money
which he has expended -- the amount of his income which he is
actually using as a charitable gift). The deduction offsets other
income. But, by logical extension, the artist who has just created
a painting and donates it to a charitable institution cannot deduct
the full market value of the painting; he has paid no taxes on
that part of his income and there are no prepaid taxes to reclaim.
(The artist, of course, could sell the painting and then donate
the proceeds to the museum, pay income tax on the sale proceeds and
reclaim it as a result of the tax deductible gift. The result is
a wash for tax purposes, except for the undeducted materials cost.)
On the other hand, it is true that the rules for the collector
violate this general principle by allowing a deduction for the
appreciation in value which has never been taxed. At present, the
artist is not able to take advantage of this favorable treatment
even though his work may have appreciated in value while he has
held it.
2. It is easy to ascribe too much impact to this change in the law.
The works not being donated will find their way to other owners via
market transactions or bequests. For these new owners, tax incen-
tives for charitable donations still exist; at the very worst
society may have postponed the stream of donations to museums by a
generation or so. The impact is significant, in the short run,
but it will be ameliorated over time.
3. This discussion ignores the income effects resulting from changes in
the level of taxation; a person who pays lower taxes has a lower
tax incentive to make charitable contributions, but he also has more
money in his pocket with which he might make a charitable contribu-
tion. McDaniel [72] provides a useful summary of studies which
have attempted to estimate the income elasticity of charitable
giving.
4. The order of gift is determined from the respondents' answers to
the National Study of Philanthropy questionnaire: The "first
mention" is the donor's largest gift. The second, third and fourth
mentions are not necessarily in order of size of gift, but the
survey questions imply such an order [87], Alternatively, it can
be assumed that the donor recalls first the contributions which he
believes to be the most important ones. In either event, the fact
that cultural institutions tend to be mentioned later indicates
that they have a lower priority for donors than other charitable
sectors.
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5. In 1971 the Tax Institute of America sponsored a symposium on the
impacts on philanthropy of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, The final
report, Tax Impacts on Philanthropy [117], contains a number of
interesting articles offering a more general perspective on the
impact of the Act.
6. Changes in tax law,to the extent that they change the balance
between support from various types of contributors -- foundations,
individuals, and corporations, also affedt the types of activi-
ties supported.
7. The 1969 Act set various payout percentages, more than six percent
in certain cases. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 changed the payout
requirements to the greater of (i) a flat rate of five percent
of its assets or (ii) all of its endowment income.
8. The rule for gifts of tangible personal property related to the
exempt purpose of the recipient institution carried the potential
for restricting gifts of works of art. Is the gift of a painting
to decorate a university president's office related to the univer-
sity's exempt purpose? More interestingly, would a museum,upon
accepting a work for which the donor claimed a full deduction, be
required to display the art work? to retain it forever? Congress
probably meant to bar full deductibility where the work was to be
sold shortly after the donation and the recipient institution was
to benefit from the proceeds of the gift rather than from the work
itself. In the event, however, court and Treasury Department
rulings have been very liberal in their interpretation of this pro-
vision.
This provision, though ineffectual in practice, exemplifies
the use of tax law directly to achieve public policy goals (in
addition to raising revenues). While the United States has shown
willingness to introduce such concepts into tax law (tax credits
for installation of building insulation, for example), other
countries have been more explicit in so serving arts-related public
policy goals.
The Canadian Cultural Property Export and Import Act, for
example, is designed to encourage gifts or sales of artworks of
national importance to the nation's museums and galleries thereby
dampening the trend of export to the United States [68]. It gives
"right of first refusal" to Canadian institutions to purchase such
works of art and establishes a fund to enable the government to
purchase important works of art for its institutions. The Act
contains specific benefits for collectors who sell or donate approved
works to Canadian institutions. If a collector sells a designated,
nationally important work of art to a Canadian institution, the
government pays fair market value and exempts the collector's
proceeds from capital gains taxation. If the collector makes a gift
262
of the artwork, he receives a 100 percent deduction from taxable
income and, again, avoids capital gains tax, The Act also enables
an artist to donate one of his own works as long as it meets the
criteria of the Act. A review board considers whether or not par-
ticular works are of national importance; these benefits are not
available for all gifts of artworks. Curators may also apply for
special tax status on behalf of potential donors of works of art
that museums and galleries identify as "great assets" to Canada,
The selectivity of the benefit doubtless makes it more attractive
as an instrument of arts policy than the more general benefits
provided in United States tax law for any artworks or even any
property.
9. This did not eliminate the deductible gift of partial interests in
property. A painting can be gradually given to a museum over
several years with the successive portions being deductible as long
as the museum is in possession of the painting for that portion of
the year corresponding to the percent interest resting in the
museum during that year.
10. A similar concept, based on the public, charitable use of artistic
property, does exist in California property tax law; works of
art privately owned are exempted from personal property tax if
they were made available to a publicly owned art gallery or museum
for a minimum period of 90 days during the preceding year 132],
In a similar vein, Hugh Jenkins, the British Minister for the
Arts, has proposed that the British wealth tax on assets worth
more than $250,000 be applied to works of art as well, The tax
would be levied on a graduated scale rising from 1 percent to
2.5 percent of the estimated worth of the work, but works on loan
to public collections would be exempted from the tax,
Such current discussion of how tax laws can encourage the
public exhibition of privately held artworks has led Monroe Price,
Professor of Law at UCLA, to suggest -- only partially in jest --
turning the whole system on its head by requiring that the owner of
a work of art could avoid exhibition only by the payment of a tax [106].
11. O'Hare, Feld and Schuster[105] present a detailed discussion of the
impact of estate and gift tax legislation on the flow of bequests
and gifts to arts institutions, emphasizing the role played by
tax expenditures.
12. It is said that some Congressmen were moved to support these limi-
tations in order to stop the flow of capital into pornographic
movies. Cinema as an art form may have lost out because of its
bedfellows.
13. In the absence of this tax shelter it appears that investors have
turned to other artistic areas for tax shelters. Both Art Letter [ 8]
and the Arts Reporting Service [ 9] have described a move to original
print publishing as a yet unrestricted area of tax shelter investment.
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14. Though this proposal does decrease the marginal price of giving for
many individuals, it really does very little to remove the vertical
inequity in the charitable deduction. In fact, in certain cases
it actually accentuates the differences between taxpayers in dif-
ferent tax brackets. Consider the following table:
Current Law Proposed Law
Marginal Price of Marginal Price of
Tax Giving Tax Giving
Taxable Income Rate $1.00 Rate $1.00
Family A $ 0 - $ 1,000 14% $ .86 14% $ .72
Family B $20,000 - $24,000 32% $ .68 32% $ .52
For these two families a pre-reform difference of $.18 in their
respective prices of giving is "reformed" into a $.20 difference
per dollar given. Even though giving is cheaper for both families,
differences in tax treatment are accentuated.
Another inconsistency in this proposal appears near the cutoff
points, where the inequity is actually reversed. Families with
incomes of $15,000 would be allowed charitable deductions at a
marginal rate of 50 percent, and families with incomes of $15,001
would be allowed deductions at a marginal rate of 37.5 percent;
families with an income of $30,000 would be allowed deductions at
a marginal rate of 58.5 percent, and families with an income of
$30,001 would be allowed deductions at a 39 percent marginal rate.
15. It is possible that a donor, in response to a tax rate reduction,
would not only reduce the tax expenditure and his induced contri-
bution but would also reduce his base contribution -- perhaps to
nothing. The first-order reduction in his gift might be enough to
make it advantageous for him to take the standard deduction -- or,
equivalently, to move him into the zero tax bracket -- thereby
removing entirely the incentive for charitable giving. At this
point, he might decide to decrease his future donations even more
substantially.
16. This example, for simplicity, assumes that all corporate profits
are taxed at the highest corporate marginal tax rate, 48 percent.
The relatively small fraction of a large corporation's profit that
is taxed at lower rates is ignored, as are investment credits,
accelerated depreciation, percentage depletion allowances and other
similar adjustments to corporate taxable income. The example also
ignores the $100 individual exclusion for dividend income.
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17. Lester Thurow [1l8]has pointed out another effect of this integra-
tion. Nonprofit charitable institutions will have higher incomes
if corporate profits are taxed less: the dividends on the
institutions' investments will increase, though the public may
give somewhat less to charities if they know that the income of
these charities is increasing. Thurow asks the further interest-
ing question: if we intend these organizations to be truly tax-
exempt why do we tax their corporate, but not other, sources of
income? Another effect is that all shares will undergo a one-shot
capitalization of the reduction in tax, with a consequent increase
in the value of the charities' endowments.
18. American Artist has published a more detailed discussion of the pros
and cons of this proposal [108].
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Chapter VII
1. A similar auction mechanism for the allocation of donated artworks
has been advocated by Montias [83].
2. In cases where no bids were offered or the bids were ridiculously
low, the donor could revert to the current, subjective system for
declaring the value of the donation. In any case, a mechanism
within the Internal Revenue Service would allow the donor to appeal
the valuation determined at auction.
3. One criticism of this donation mechanism might be that when the
designated museum accepts the artwork rather than any of the bids,
the donor receives a deduction lower than the logical one to which
he is entitled; the museum, by not taking the highest bid, has
indicated that the value to that museum of the artwork is more than
the highest bid. Shouldn't the donor be entitled to a higher deduc-
tion? Yes, but in economic terms it is a relatively minor matter.
In an actual auction the "winning" museum would have had to bid only
marginally more than the next highest bidder. Thus, this second bid
is an adequate measure of the value of the artwork.
This concept has been incorporated into "Dutch Auctions" in
which the winning bidder pays the second highest bid for the
auctioned item. This procedure minimizes strategic bidding in favor
of bids which reflect the actual value of the auctioned item to the
bidder. Each bidder can be sure that if he wins he will only have
to pay what would have been necessary to outbid his nearest competi-
tor. One refinement for the auction proposed here is to allow the
donor to deduct the winning bid, even if the winning donor were only
required to pay the second highest price.
4. Such restrictions might be placed on the eventual owner museum --
whichever one that might be -- but they could not be enforced on
the originally designated museum. And society would not want to
apply such restrictions to individual bidders if they were allowed
to participate.
5. A donor might propose a similar deal under the auction mechanism,
but it would be much more fragile. In exchange for agreeing to offer
an unrealistically high bid for the first artwork the donor offers
to another museum, the donor could offer to make the museum with
which he is negotiating the designated museum for an extremely valu-
able artwork he will donate later. This is likely to provide less
incentive than the analogous deal in the current system because it
requires the museum to put its funds on the line publicly rather
than merely make a costless promise. Museums might even become
partners, helping their prospective donors achieve high deductions
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by entering into gentlemen's agreements to submit unreasonably high
bids when certain gifts are auctioned so the other museums' donors
can get an inflated deduction with the expectation that the favor
will be returned when a work is being donated to your museum. Such
an agreement is unstable, though; the museum which is bidding extra-
ordinarily high can be required to purchase the artwork.
6. It should be noted that this view is not universally held.
Andrews [4 ] and others have argued on philosophical grounds that
charitable contributions should be excluded from taxable personal
consumption and, therefore, should not be subject to income taxa-
tion. This view makes the question of equity in the financing of
charitable contributions moot.
7. Within the literature there is no commonly accepted vocabulary to
identify the various proposals. In essence all of them are "match-
ing grants," so I have reserved this as a generic term referring
to the entire group. Where feasible I use more descriptive terms
to refer to particular matching grant proposals. For a detailed
discussion of the various types of matching grants refer to "Alter-
natives to Tax Incentives," Part V, Volume IV of Commission on
Private Philanthropy and Public Needs [37].
8. The Deed of Covenant is not widely used even though it costs nothing
to the person who intends to make a donation. It has been estimated
that British charities could increase their receipts from donations
nearly 20 percent if all contributions were made through covenants.
It has been suggested that this underutilization is due both to the
required length of time of the agreement and to widespread misunder-
standing of the benefits to charity of such an agreement. Variations
on the Deed of Covenant are also currently used in Ireland, Denmark
and Scotland (the "bond of annuity"). For a more detailed descrip-
tion of Deeds of Covenant see Booth [22] or Mullin [88].
9. Good and Wildavsky [58] have suggested a mechanism by which the
percentage contribution bonus could be gradually phased into existing
law. This would allow a test of the constitutionality of the mechanism
before the entire old system had been scrapped and would minimize the
impact on the various charitable sectors as donations adjusted to the
new incentives.
An acceptable alternative to the percentage contribution bonus
would be a tax credit with a rebate provision available to all donors.
Any donor could file for a tax credit and if his taxes for the year
were not more than the credit to which he was entitled, he would
receive a rebate. This proposal, operating within the tax system in
a manner similar to the present charitable deduction, would probably
avoid the constitutionality problems of the percentage contribution
bonus. It is also better adapted to handling gifts of property.
When donating property, particularly artworks, the donor is unable
to donate only the private contribution of that gift; he gives all
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or nothing. This is cumbersome to handle under a percentage contri-
bution bonus in which the government provides the matching portion
of the contribution separately. The major disadvantage of the tax
credit with rebate is that it would perpetuate the perception that
the entire charitable contribution comes from the donor.
10. One concern about direct governmental aid to the arts is its poten-
tial for fostering "approved" arts through either benign or blatant
censorship. This concern may be real, but even at the very worst
a change from indirect aid to direct aid would not result in fewer
artists being supported as they are ineligible to receive tax
expenditure aid through the income tax deduction anyway.
11. Netzer [100] concludes that the government should reconsider its
policy or ineligibility for profit-making arts institutions. He
identifies several ways in which government agencies could broaden
their types of support.
There is, in any case, one way in which the current indirect aid
system already supports profit-making arts institutions: the
business expense and entertainment deduction which allows a deduction
for the cost of theatre, concert, and sports tickets if used for
business purposes. Taxpayers help by financing part of the purchase
price of such tickets. Arts managers well understand the financial
implications of this deduction as witnessed by the outcry when
President Carter proposed the elimination of this deduction [26].
12. The best work to date in this area has been Netzer's Twentieth Century
Fund Study on public support for the arts in the United States [97].
Hart [61] has addressed some of these issues for symphony orchestras,
as has Meyer [76] for art museums. Several seminal papers on the
evaluation of public expenditures for the arts are contained in
Blaug [20].
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